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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE ST.A.TE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plainti.ff a!nd Responde1lf,

vs.

E. B. ERWIN, HARR.Y FINCH and

CASE
NO. 6200

R. 0. PEAR.CE.
Defenda·n,fs and AppeU(uzts.

Brief of Appellants R. 0. Pearce and Harrg Finch
I~""TRODUCTORY

STATEMENT
Thi~ statement will be based upon the oosumpti0111,
not admitted, that the pleadings here are sufficient.
Three defendants were convicted, Mr. Erwin, former
mayor, Harry Finch, former Chief of Police, and R.
0. Pearce, attorney. The offense charged is that an
agreemoot was entered. into between the said three appellants ~and one Ben Harmon, dooeased, and Frank A.
Thacker, ·ooqnitted, to ''allow, as·s.ist, and enable house·s
of ill fame, * '*' * lotteries, dioo games, slot machines,
book-making and other gambling devices and games of
ch3JILCe to be kept, maintained and operated at * * *
Salt Lake City." * J1: *
This case is unique in that it ·does not charge· an
agreement between officers and operators! of any of
these things to operBJte or to pr:otoot their operation, as
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has been -charged in other eases com1ng before the
courts. No one im this ·ea.s:e was ·engaged in thH operation of any of the:se things in any manner. This is an
important element to be· kept in mirod in applying the
law, as wen as the t~e·stimony here. App;ellants are not
charged with operating nor .agreeing to op·emte. ·They
are not -charged with an agre·ement to collect money
n·or with -colle.etimg money from .any of these ope·r:ations.
More important, they 1are not eharged, either as
officials or otherwi'S·e, with the offensie of ~suffering or
all·owing .any of these things to oper~ate.
As:suming that it may he a ·crime to operate ~thes·e
things or a crim·e to permit them to he oper.ated by per·sons having authority to .stop· them, this is n:ot the
·charge. It wrus. irn this (~onnection that there wa.s 1a s.erious misapprehension on the part of the prosecutors and
rthe oe~ourt in this eas~e.
A good deal of irrelevant testimony was int•roduced
to show that the,se things. op·e-rat·ed, on the appa.re.nt
theory that if this were shown it might be presumed
that the app'eHants kfnew that they were being ope·rruted.
This wa:s irrele"\nant beoause under the law ·even knowledge that a eons.pir;acy exists .and is being ·carried out
does not charge a person with guilt of participation,
and se·eondly, as already stated, the op·eflati,on or the
allowance of an opeDation was not the offense charged
here.
Incidentally, there was no :evi1dence as to ~slot machines or dice games at. all. It is ·comon knowledge thal
prostitution, lotteries, hook-making and gambling with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cards. al,vay~ operate in n1etropolitan sootions to son1e
extent. Card room~, ·and 8ome ot.h~r g·~unbtling d~t\\riet~s,
were licensed here. It \Yas est.ablis.hed by plaintiff'·s evidence that t~hese thing·s except sl()t n1nchines aJld dice
games operated at the •times alleged, and also that they
had operated substantially the same before this time
as well as subsequently. It appear'S to be conceded on
all sides that gambling frequently aooompanies card
playing and that an officer, even though he ma.y watch
the game being played. cannot tell whether it is being
played fQr money or for fun.
So that. while we ha'e abolished common Law conspiracies by statute and have limited the criminal ones
to an agreement to collliirit ".an act" injurious to public morals or for the perversi(}n of justice, we have here
charged an agreement not to commit ''an act'' but to
allQw, assist and enable things to operate. Which thing.s
not only cnSJtomarily operate in spite of law or the ordinary, or even extraordinary efforts at law ·enforcem~nt, but which cl-early may and continuously do operate without any agreement whatsoever evem as between
officers and operSJtors ; and which obviously operate without such agreement between officers and laymen not
connected with the operation of any of these things.

This brings us to two very basic propositions in
this case to which we were never able to get the law
applied on the trial :
(1) First, evidence that prostitution, lotteries
book-making, rand gambling ooouiTed was no evidence
at all of an agreement between the parties charged. ParSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ticul~a.rly

is this true \vhere the defendants \Vere ~never
conne·cted with ·each other in any way or at any time or
place· in as!Sist[ng -or permitting ·anything of ·this kind, so
that this ·evidence had no connection whatsoever with
·any relationship hetw•Hen the defendants. It is not a
case of conspiracy to commit a orime sur;h as to rob
a bank or the oommi:s.sion of the ·crime· of arson, where
people meet at ·certain time and place, each contributing tools or ·equipmernt to commit the offense and all
joining in its commission. Admittedly the· bringing of
tools to -commit robbe.ry or infLamable materials to commit arson and the entry into the commis1sion of the act
i·s evid·ence of a previous agree·ment or unde~rstanding
to commit the· offens·e. Here no substtan:tive offense wws
charged. The agree·ment constituted the conspiracy and
the offense, charged.

It is true .the ·statute· required in addition that an
'' ove·rt'' act he alleged and proved to complete the of£e·nse. This should not he confus:ed, howev.er, with the
agreement which was the gist of ·the off,ense. On this
f:eature of the oa!S·e it w;as not neceS'sary 'to provH that
anything was done afterward to carry out the agreement if the tagreement were -e'Stablished. Anything thJa.t
was done .aflter to he material to this must be something that tended to prove the existence of the agree-:ment. Under the rule of law with rel·ation t·o circum·stant.ial evidoo:ce· it would not he admiS'sible to prove
the agreement unless i.t. were eonsist\ent only with the
existence of the 'agreement .and inco:nJS.i~stent with every
hyp·othesis of inoeence of the agreement. Clearly, therefore, the fact that gambling did occur was no eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dence of an

a.greem~nt

bet,veem. the

parti~~

e-ha.rg(ld.

(2) 1The second basic ma,t~ter, 'vhich i~ related to
the first, is that any insinuations of 'vr·ong doi111g or
n-eglect of duty, or e~n evidence of such, 'vas no.t only
wholly immaterial but 'Yas prejudicial to the defendants. unless, again, it had the legal probative force
required ~as proof of the agreement. Such alleged aets
of irregular conduct were not admissibl·e unless they
tended t.o prove th-e existence of the agreement and
were oonsistent only therewith, or in other words, could
not ha\e been e:xpeoted to be done except as a result
of the agreement alleged, between the defendants
charged.

The danger of ignoring these basic propositions
is that the jury from insinuations or gossip or pi"oof
of alleged irregular acts, though they were not charged
and ~though they were not competent or material or
relevant proof of the offense charged, would nevertheless feel called. upan to convict. They 'vere in -effect
so instructed. So t!hat, as we ·see it ihere, what might
have been expected t'O happen from a violation of these
rules laid down oo a guarantee of a fair trial, did happen and convictions resulted as a result of the introduction of evidence of irregular conduct w~hich was not material to the charge.
Before attempting a cl~s·er clarificaJtion ·of .the ·evidence and the assigments of error, some general statements 'Of fact will be helpful.
There is no evidence here that the defendants eVrer
met t'Ogether. There is noQ evidaooe that any person
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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charged ever dis-cussed ·the matter of permitting or aidi·ng the operation of pros;titution or gambling with
any other defendant or with 1any ofue,r person. There
is. no :evidence that the defendarrllts discussed any matter :velating to rbhe things alleged to have been agreed
to be .aided or permitted. There is some evid;ence that
Mr. Harmon may have talked with Mr. Finch and that
Mr. Thacker did talk with Mr. Harmon on different
occasions but mot in rel·ation ·to these matters. M[". Harmon's place operated under a be·er li·eense and operated
li.cens~ed marble games and had a licensed card room.
Thes'e wel'le op·erations which w·ere cheeked up by Mr.
Thackerr not only rhn his place but in other places where
the·y ope,r,ated.
There is no evidence that the subject of or .any
agreement that prostitution or gambling be permitted
or aided in oper.ation were ever discuss,ed between any
two defendants or by allly one of them with any operator. There is no evidence that Mr. Erwin knew Mr.
Ha.rmon. H~e did not know Mr. Finch until about the
tim·e they went into o.ffiee. 'The evidence showed t1hat
Mr. P·earce had examin.1,ed1 1ir. Erwin as a witness in
a eivil Clase that arose in 1934 but not as his attoi'II1ey.
T1he evidence is :that he met Mr. Finch only 'twice, once
some years previously when he los1t an eye in a golf accitdent 1at Nibley Park and once while ·Mr. Finch was in office he applie'd for a 1i~cemce for a ·client. So that the al11eged conspirators, upon the re-cord here, we.re· only
casual 1acquaintances or stl"angers. They never did ~any
act to ·assis.t each ot·her or to ''assist or enable'' any
place of prostitution or gambling to op·eJ'Iate. None of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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...I
the appellant~ "~a~ eYer illl any plaCIP \Vht:~rP tJ1(\~(\ operations were claimed t.o hnYe ooourrPd, except that
Mr. Fineh on one or t'vo 'OOOR~ions Yis·i.t.Pd ce1'11ain plaees
where it "-as testified gambling snn1et.in1t'S took place.
!Tthis was in his official duties. 'rthere was no .gambling
at the .time of such Yisi ts.

Xow as to dove·rt acts''. Our statute, as a recognized protection ·against abuses in prosecuting for alleged conspiracy, limits such prosooutivns as stated
above, ·and also requires separate allegation and proof
of an overt act or acts. (See R. S. U. 103-11-3, als·o 10532-11). The oommon law ditl not so limit or require.
Such an act, if and when the conspiracy is established,
may be by any conspimtor shown to be oonnecteld; the-rewith. It must, however, be in furtherance of the conspiracy, and with knowledge of the existen10e of the
conspiracy alleged.
The matter of the sufficiency of the allegations
of these is discussed elsewhere. Four things were aJleged as ''overt •acts'' :
( 1) That between March
15, 1936, and January 1st, 1938, defendants permitted,
allowed, assisted and enabled hous-es Df ill f·ame to be
operated. That ( 2) !between the same dates they did
likewise with lotteries, dioo games, slot machines, bookmaking and 'Other games of chance.Thus it is first alleged that defendants agreed to do s:omething v.ery general in its 1Jll8,ture and then it is alleged generally that
th~y did what they agreed. We thus have in fiact no
"overt act" as contemplruted by law or by the sta.tuie.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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What we said. p~eviously as tto the conspiracy applies
he~e because these things had .and "~ould tand did operate without any •agreement as to :their ,aJlowance or
as•sis1tanee., so that their op·er.rution is no proof of the
corn1spi:vacy, nor is it proof of 3Jily overt act committed
pursuant thereto.
No'v we have
(3), that. on the first of each month
from June, 1937, tu J a.nua.ry, 1938, defendants collected
and oa.used to be co1lec.ted ''money from operators of
house~s of ill fame''; and ( 4) that at various· times between April, 1936, and January, 1938, defendmts collecied money from op~erators of the s:ame: gambling
g1a.mes named in (2) above.
Bassing over the generality of ( 3) and ( 4) as alle~ati·ons of an "overt act", it may be admitted that
an overt act may also be proved even though its proof
tends to ·establish the ·conspira:cy a11erged. It may also be admi,tted that in ·CeTtain ·cases, ta.s above illus!tr,ated
by the bank robhe-ry and arson ins~tan. ces, an overt act
may be cogent proof of .an e·xisting ~conspir.acy. But
sueh is not tthe ~situati.on here. No def·endant ever collected any n1oney fro-m any opevator of any of the things
alleged. Golden Holt did, by his own evitd.ence, collect
from houses of prostitution from August, 1936, t.o January, 1937, and he s.aid he ~ave the money to Abie
Rosenblum. This wa1s in 1936 and no defendant in :Uris
ea.s~e was ·connected with that arrangeme,nt. or that collection. Officer Holt 1a.lso testified that ~again from June
1937 t~o January, 1938 he coll-ected money from the operators of house's of prostitUttion ~and gav·e the money
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to Ben Harmon. 'rhis appeared to ht' a separate arrangement a.nd if it amounted to a conspiracy 'vas a
separate conspiracy, and a point is 1nade of this in our
assignments.
There is no teostimony that a.ny oofeudant collected any
money and no te8-timony that any defendant "caused"
Holt to collect any. In ne"· of the money that he spent
in automobile and mooor boSJt opera.tio111s, in living at
the hotel and separately maintaining his family, and
in mining stock speculation and operation, it is quite
cer.taiJI1 that he didn't gi¥e all the money oollooted to
Rosenblum in 1936 or Harmon in 1937. In any event, he
testified he collected it himself alone. There is no different testimony on this.
During the latter part of 1936 he was head of the
anti-vice ·squad ; during the latter part of 1937 he was
under Mr. Thacker, who was 'head -of the squad, and
he w~ in charge of looking after the hoUJSes of prostitution from which he made the collections.
Upon the trial, and in an effort to make these collections overt acts of the defendants, the p:rosecutimg
attorney asserted (R. 318) that Holt was one of the
oonspinators. 'flhese oollections by a police officer are
not proof of the agreement alleged here. They are obvitQus1y typical police shakedowns of people subject to
his coercion. Such collections required no agroomemJt
as alleged and constitute no pvoof of .such. Neither did
they constitute any proof of an oV'ert aci by defendants
"to eff·oot the object" of the conspiracy alleged. This
is not an ext-orti{)n case.
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There is no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Holt was
a party with the defendants or any of them to the
~agre,ement all~eged. His -conversations, by his own testimony, as to the co1leeti~ons in 1936 were with Rosffilrb.lum alone. He testified that again in 1a.bout the middle
of 1937 he talked with Harmon about ~oollectioDB Md
after he had made -collections talked with Mr. P·earoo.
Harmon and P-earce were never mentiooed until about
June, 1937. There Wias nothing in Hny of these conversations with relation to .as,sisting or p~ermitting or aiUowimg houses. of p:vos.tiltution to op·erate. T,hey had operated for years before and still continue li:io operate. It
·cert,ainly was no asisistance to them for Holt to collect the income from t·heir ope:rrations.
1

Mr. T·hacker :testified that although he was immediwte,ly ~over Holt in the 1937 pe~riod he never knew
that Holt -eo11eeted from the women, and Holt never
cl,aimed or testified, lllior did any ~other witness testify,
thwt he did. Holt, although practically ,admitting that he
was tes·tifying to keep his job on the police force, which
he ·did 1an!d does keep, and indicating a willingness to
deny or ·explain away all previous eontrary statement's
and ·to teffi::ify to anything to help the State's. ca;se,
never testified to any agreement ~as alleged her-e to ''per~
mit, allow, assist ~or enable" these things to operate,
with any defendant, or at 1aii. There was no ·such agreement or understanding ever ifrutimated by or with him,
~and so these ·collections. were not p·roof of the oon.spiracy alleged nor were they overt acts as required
by the 1statute ( 103-11-3) ''~done to effect the ohj:e'ct thereof by one or more of the parties to .such agreement.''
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It should be 1nentioned in pas.~i ng, since it is raised
in the a~ignment~\ that ~1r. Pearel'\ and Mr. Erwin
had been cha.rged with ~1r. HaJ·n1on in this m.rut:ter of
extorting or collecting money from ~house·s of prostituJion knowing it to be the earni11gs of prostituh's, and
had been tried on exactly the same testimony offered
.here ·and. these defendtlJlts had been acquitted of this
charge.
·It should be mentioned also that clearly the district attorney could not make the witness Holt a conspirator with the defendants by merely as-serting that
he was such. He could and did admit that he was. an
accomplice upon the State's theory of the case. It is
our contention that his testimony was entirely without
corroboration and that the trial court should have so
instructed. However, he could not be made a f.ellow conspirator with the defendants except upon proof of .the
existence of the agreement alleged and his and their
connection therewith.
He testified that he had been, off and on for more
than five years, connected with 'the anti-vice squad, that
such plooe-s of prostitution had oper·ated all during
that period, and to ibis own knowledge had operated
£or many years before, that the officers could not s.top
prostitution. If ·they were to put an officer in any of
these hous·es, the girls would go .somewhere else and
that they could only drive them 0111 to the streets or into
the more residential sections. It was also .shown that the
law recognized this situation and 11lhe city ordinaJiree
gave to the ·City Bo~rd of Health the supervision of
prostitutes, ( Soo. 3o, R. ·444).
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The only other collection .of money was that by
Abe ~stuhHck, testified ~to by one witness, D.ar K·empne·r. (Ab. 40-64). It was te~s.tified by this witness that
Stuheek ~colle-cted some money from two pool halls "in
March, possibly April'', 1937. This is an alleged colle·ction by kbe Stubeck, who was never in any way or
by any te1stimony connected with any agreement as
alleged, or at all, ~or with .any of the defendamt.s in any
manner, or at .all. The admissi•on of this testimony is
assigned as e~rror, 'and of coulis;e it ·could not be any
p.roof of the agreement here .alleged or any proof of
an overt ·act.
:The recor-d discloses thatt ·the de.f.endoots were
not in fact tried for having agreed to allow or assist these things to opel'!ate. The trial court did not
follow the rule that .at le-as~t p·rima fiacie proof of the
agree~ment .should be required be£ore the acts and statements of one alle<ged ·Conspirator ·could be admitted as
binding upon the others. T~he whole basis of the primr
ciple of agency in this r·egar'd was ignored.
So that in addition, as we shall contend, to the insufficiency of the ·evidence to prove the ~charge alleged
•
and which alone the defen~dants wefle called upon to
·defend against, we have here 1a mass of irrelevaJli,
immaterial and incompetent assertions by the prosecutor and insinuations and intimations of irregular conduet or negle·cl .of duty and some p·~oof of things done
with and without the knowledge ·of defendants. All of
w;hich was not admissible .as evidence or circumstance-S
to prove the cha.rge, hut which created a confused ap-
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pea.ranoo of some eYil or eYil conditions,
jury to a feeling that. for them not to
would be in effoot -an a.pproval on their
·or all of the things intimated, insi£nuated

arous1ug the
convict here
part of some
or di.scuss'ed.

TESTIMl1XY OLA8SIFIE'D
A general classification of the evidence offered by
the staft.e will be attempted. This may be classified unde-r four heads, as follows :
( 1) 'Testimony as to the operation of houses of
prostitution, card games, book-making and lotteries. A·s
to this clr3JSS of testimony the court instructed (Ab. 266)
itn instructi-on 9(b) :

"That the operating of gambling, prostitution, lotteries, etc., either before or after or during 1936 and 1937, in and of themselves cannot be considered by you as evildlence of an agreement or conspiracy between the defendants in
this case. Such conditions may or may not exist by agreement and their :operation is consistent with the absence of such agre,ement. '"
This instruction, in -the absence of a cross appeal,
has become the law of the oose. So that it is our position that under the rule as to circumstantial evidence,
as well as under the Law of this caJse, this evidence gives
no support ·to the staJte 's case here.
-( 2) In this classification is a substantial volume of
testimony admitted upon the theory that it constituted
admissions by the different and individual defendants.
~his does not relate to the offense oharged or to guilt
of this offense. This testimony is made up of long
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statements by Fisher Harris rund other witnesses of
what they had heard or discovered or found out and
wa,s ,admitted on the ·Claim tthat they had SO .stated •at
different time·s to various defendants here. The'Se· were
almost entirely .after the conspiracy was alleged to
have ·ended. It not only ,doe's not 'support the eonvictti~om, here, but 'vas erroneously admitted.
( 3) ·This ·clastsification include-s evidence of alleged
wrongful tacts or irregular conduct or statements involving irregular conduct of the individual def·endants
thems•e1lves. It al~so involve·s s.ome evidence of knowl·e.dge on ·the part. of the defendantS' that some of the ·.operations, alleged took place. It in no Wiay relates to the
agreement alleged and for the most part was errone~ously admitted.
In tthis claS's m~ay be included some alleged declarations made by one defendant or a :third pe·rson with
reference to another defendant. T,his testimony is quite
limited. .s.ome of this was .a.ft.er the conspiracy was alleged to have ended; .all -of it was without .any founda( 4)

~tion

showing an agreement under which the state-ments·
could have been admitted as binding upon the de:fen.dant
mantioned in the statement in .any ea,se; and where made
by third parties, of ·cours-e, wa.s erroneously .admitted.
BRIEF AND ARGUMENT

Before di~seUJssion of the evidence and, the sufficiency,
it may be helpful :to inform the -court as to the theorie'S
here alleged and pursued.
Ses. 103-11-1 R. S. U., unde·r which the· charge is
laid, ~says :
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•· ... if t"·o or more persons eon:spire: ( ;) ) To
oommit an act injurious to (a) public n1oral~, (b)
for the perversion and obstruction of juBt.i<-.e, (e)
the due a.dnlinistration of la.\Y.''
~This

indictment incorporn.tes (a), (b) and (o).

Th-e cases cited by respond€n:t in support of the in,.
dictm.ent. are not cases in point, as we view the matter,
but they were oases h{)lding that under the allegations
involved a cause of action was stated under (b), .the
obstruction of justiee. There appears to be no case
holding that the theory at.tempted to be alleg~ here
W()uld be under the other divisions of this statute.

People v. Tenero1cicz, :253 ")."'. W. 296 (Mich. 1934),
was the ease mainly relied upon in support of the indictment. The indictment there charged the public officers and - the operators of the houses together and 'alleged that they were eng.age\d :im.
keeping, m-aintaining and operating the same, and
then aMeges that they combined and conspired "to
permit and allow the keeping, maintaining and operating {)f bonses of ill fame'', knowing that such operation
was in violation of the law. The court .said that the language ".to permit and ·allow" as used in the iooictmen t
should be construed that the officers ''conspired to
~ssist -~nd enable the other parties named- in the indictment ~in maintaining and operating .such hous·es. of ill
fa~e. '~ ~t held that the indictment .as so construed
staJted a cause of .action, on the theory of .~ conspi!acy
to obstruct justice.
This case cited in ~support of its ·holding People vs.
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McPhee, 146 Pac. 522, (Cal.). W(hich case al·so involved
·an alleged conspira,cy between officers, gamblers and
bunco men. It also 'held that .such a conspiracy as between officers and the operators. of gambling working
together, oharged a ·conspiracy to "obstruct justice."
It will be :at once noticed that thes·e ·Cases are distinguis:hable in that here we have no agreement with operatorn whatsoever or with 1runy per:son connected with
the ·Conduct of the various operwtions involved.

Before leaving the M·cPhee ·Case on the question of
ple,arding as ,s,howing the nature of ~the 'authorities reli·ed; upon •as to evidence, it is important. to point out the
holding in that ·case with relation to the question of
evidence a.s here invr.olved.. In that ·casH some of the
ga.mblevs turn·ed S'ta:te 's witnes1s.es and testified freely
as to the conspiracy and introduced a number of conver:saJtions and actions in~olving the •appealing defendants, which alctions and ·COIIl~eiisations took place in 1910
and 1911. It appeared to be ·established thart the appealing defendants were allied with the conspiracy in
1912. The testimony .appea]}ed to be 1ample that the
officers and the gamblers were working togethe·r, the
one protecting the other, rund dividing the "percentages
of profit.''
The ·court fivst cirtes the la.w to the effect that if an
individual is: shown to ha.ve be(~ome a member of a con:spir;acy after the ·conrspir.acy was formed, that he may
adopt the whole ·conspiracy by knowingly identifying
hims.elf with it and thus assume responsibility £or what
has been done up to that time. The opinion recites that
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the trial court so &t.<l.tet-1 the rule, a.nd under his state~
ment of it, and over repeated objections, introduced
the line of testimony a.bove indioa.tPd. The o-pinion says:

"The sta.tement of the foregoing principle
of law, however, presupposes that before the acts
or doolara.tions of one or more of the co-conspirators, done or made at a time prior to the entering into the conspiracy by the particular person charged, can be used in evidence ag,&nst him,
the fact ()f the existence of the conspim.cy a.t
the time such acts were done or doolaratio111s
made mu5-t iha\e been shown by some degree of
proof .sufficient to justify the court in admitting
the evidence of such prior acts or declaratio-ns ;
and that such proof cann-ot consist merely in the
acts and declmratifms of the alleged co-conspirators~ but must be in. the nature of o;n independent showing as to the existence of the conspiracy
at the very ti,1ne when the acts were done or declarations made by which the persons alleged to
have subsequently joined the consp~racy are
sought to be bound."
* * ~ * * *

"It is indispensable, however, that, before
this evidence could have been rightfully admitted,
some degree of proof aliunde must have been
preS"ented tending to prove rthe existence of the
conspiracy ramong those then associated in it,
and whose acts and declarations are ·SOu~ht to be
so used.''

''In the entire rabsence of such proof aliunde
tending to establish the existence of ·such con'spiracy, during these prior year;s, the action of
the court in admitting in evidence the ·acts .and
declarations of the alleged co-oons:pirators durSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing those yea,rs agains~t thes-e de.fend1ants must be
he,Jd vo be· prejudi~cia.l 'e·rror; ''
The ease cited and mainly relied upon by re·spondent in the .contention as to the ,admi~s~sibility or sufficiency
of the evidenee WJas People vs. Luciano, 277 N. Y. 348,
14 N. E. (2d) 433.

·This. is .a rather famous rac~etee~r case. Luci;ano was
indicted with other:s for ·eonspirilng to vioLate Sec. 2460
of the New York Penal Code relating to compulsory
prostitution of women. The opinion recites that the
evidence js:howed the· exis,tenee of ,the ·conspiracy to control prosititution. It ·does nort recite the evidence to ;show
this, but state's that it was sufficiently shown. ·The dis·CUSISion then turned mainly upon the ·connection of Lu~ciano. 'The opinion reciteS' the evidence showing a definite ~connection with the op-eration of prostitution.
Among otheT things, i~t w.as shown that one Bendix applied as a eollootor for the ring amd Luciano offered him
a job as collector. Luciano was with one Fredrico, shown
to be the manager under Luciano ''the boss.''. Luciano
told Bendix that he would tell 'another ·e~stablished member of the ring to put B·endix to work at $40.00 per
week. One Betillo, als'O ,aetive umder both Lu~iano and
Fredrico, introduced a 'vom.an to Luciano, naming Lueiano as his boss. Later, 'this woman wanted to marry
a member of 'the ring and both wished to withdraw from
it. Betillo refused ~nd the witness 'applied to Luciamo,
who ,advised the woman that tili.is ·could not be done until
her husband paid ove~ to ~the ring the money from his
collections. Another . witne,ss ~testifi·ed that twice during
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the existence of the COtlSpiraey ~he ~a''" Luciano in conference with Fredrioo <lnd PetmocJ1io, \\rho \\'"H~ treasurer of ~he ring, ·and ,,,.ohman, a c.ollootor, and in both
conferences heard Luciano recei ,-e reports from the·se
people ·and give them orders. Also that Lucialllo told .this
witness that ·he would be better off to run the ring
himself rather than to trust the management to Betillo,
and that he was going to take over the houses of prostitution and raise the prices and place the madams on a
salary basis.
Another witness testified that she saw Luciano and
the other persons above named together with one Flo
Brown, in conference on numerous ·oocasions and heard
them di-scuss the management of the ring and heard
Luciano give directions to Fredrico. Also this wi.tness
testified ·that she heard Luciano on ~another occasion
say that they hoo better cease operations pending a vice
investigation amd that Luciano, after discussing the
matter with Betillo, consented that the ring continue
operating under certain instructions, which he then gave,
as to the methods to be pursued. This opinion simply
held that the evidence sufficiently connected Luciano
with the alleged conspiracy.
This case, so far aJS we can see, furnishes no ,sup·
port for respondent in the case at bar.

CONTROLLING PRINCIPLES OF LAW

In oonsidering the numerous ooses which will be
cited, .space will not permit a review of t·he difference
in statutes under which the ·cases .are decided. Many
of the :states and the Federal Government do not limit
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conspi:r:acy ·eases as ·does our .statute ·cited. In juri,sdictions following the common law overt act·s are not required.
A gre1a,t many Federal ca,s:es will be eited. It may be
stated :that these are generally more liberal in the matter of punishment of persons ·connHcted with aHeged
conspiracies than are the state oases. One reason for
rthis is se•t out in Marino vs. United States of America,
91 Fed. (2d) 691, 113 .A. L. R. 975, where it is ·stated:
''Although participation in the agreement
must he had by the :accused before he ean be convicted under the statute, he may be punishable as
a princip~al, without sueh participation, under 18
U. S. C. A. Seo. 550, whi·ch prtorvidHs that: 'Who·ever directly commits any act constituting am. offense defined in any 1aw of the United States, or
aid's, abets, couns-els, .commands, induce:S, or pro·cures its eommiission, is a principal.' ''
U111der this s,t,atute persons have been fined where
the knowledge of the ·consp,iracy was not shown, as
is generally required, but a partieipation in the subIS·tantive offens·e which i·t is alleged the conspirators
;agreed to commit ·has been s,hown.
With t·hi's d~stilnction pointed out, we will cite Federal ·cases. without further general ·comment. We have
·already pointed out that here there is no commission
of a ·crime charged, in which it is alleged the conspirators agr:eed to participate. Here the offensH is not the
.accompli.shment of any unlawful d·esign, but i·s. the unJ,awful confederation or agreement ·charged. See People
vs. Billings, 24 N. E. (2d) 339. 'The off-ense here is the
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agreement. This must be kept oonstantly im. n1ind in applying the rule as to ci.reums.tantial eYideHeP and in
consid-ering th(} admissibility or eff~t of the evidence
to be discussed..
As the evidenee is entirely eircumstruntial, there being no claim of any dire-ct evide11ce of agreement or confederation bet"-een the def~ndant s charged, "~e will cite
a few cases upon limitations as to rhis character of
evidence:

State ·v. Cra,wford, 201 Pac. 1033 (Utah 1921):
''The contention, however, i·s in line with certain rules of evidence generally recognized in
this country as elementary amd fundamental. Lt
is consistent with the rule that accords to a defendant charged with an offense the benefit o.f
every reasonable doubt. It is consistent with the
rule applied, in cases dependent solely upon circumstantial evidence, as in the ease at bar, tlza.t
the eircunzstances must be such as to exclude
every reasonable hypothesis except that of the
defendant's guilt of the offense charged that
every circumstance constituting a necessary link
m the chain of evidence must be consistent w·ith
the defendamt' s guilt and inconsistent with his
innocenee. ''

Terry vs. United StUJtes, 7 Fed. (2d) 28, (9th C. C.):
This is a lBading case on this point. Here the matter was presented directly by an instruction to the jury,
which we desire to point out particularly, .amd a holding
that the instruction given was erroneous. The instruction was aJS follows:
''In this case, therefore, even though you
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laratian of purpose on the part of these defendants or the other parties1 ·concerned to unite in
doing the, acts charged, yet if you find that the
acts of the parties were committed or accomplished in a manner or under cireums.tances
which by reason of their situ~ation at the time.
1amd the eonditions ~surrounding them, gave rise
to a reasonable and just inference that they were
done as the result of a previous agree.ment then
you are justified in finding that a conspiracy existed between the11~ to do those acts.''
·The italicized portion of the instruction does
not contain a correct ~statement of the law.
''It is also .true, in case·s of conspimcy, a.s
in other criminal ·ca,s.es, that the: prisoner is pre~sumed to be innocent until thH contrary is shown
by proof; and, where that proof is in whole or
in par:t, cirrcums.tanti!al in its eharracter, the cir~cumstances relied upon by the prosecution must
1so distinctly indicate the guilt of the aoous·ed as
·to leave no reasonable .e-xpLanation: of them whieh
i's consistent with the prisoner'·s. innocence."
United State's. v. Lancaster (C. ·C.) 44 F. 896,904,
10 L. R. A. 333.

Shannabarger vs. United States, 99 Fed. (2d) 957,
(8th C. C.):
This -ca!se ·contains a good statement of the la.w 0111
this point.
'' lt is a s:ettled rule of law that 'In conspir~acy ~caS'es the unlawful combin·ation, confederacy,
and agreement bHtween two or more persons, thlat
is, :the conspi~acy itself, is. the· g~st of the action,
~and is the corpus delicti .charged. ' ·The agreement
must therefore, be established before a conviction
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can be- sustained. Tingl~
38 F. 2d 573, 575.''

Y. t:nitt~d ~tn.h's,

S Cir.,

T:his ''as a c.ase in "-hich the con11nission 'Of a substa11tive Qffense was chaxg·ed and the defendants 'V'ere
charged with confed~rating to eommit it. H,o,vever, the
court said:
'~Where the government relies upon circumstantial evidence to establish the conspiracy, the
circumstances must be such as to warrant -the
jury in finding that the conspirator.s had some
unity of purpose, some common design and undertaking, som-e meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement, and the d-oing of some overt
act t.o affect its object. See Marx v. United ~States,
8 Cir., 86 F 2d 2±5, 250, and cases there cited.
Further, the circu·'ln.stances relied upon must be
not only co·nsiste-nt zcith the guilt of defendants,
but ·m.-u.st be inconsistent with their innocence.
Spalitto v. L nited States, 8 Cir., 39 F. 2d 782;
Salinger v. United States, 8 ·Cir., 23 F. 2d 48;
Langer v. Lnited States, 8 Cir., 76 F. 2d 817."
Because it mn be at once noticed from the evidence
that an attempt wa.s made to show that Mr. Finch
stated that he did not know of the payoff when the
state contended that he did, that this was ad:rnis,sahle as
a circumstance to prove the .agreement here, we cite by
way of illustration the following cases :

State vs. MMasco, 17 Pac. (2d) 919, (Utah 1933):
Arson was ooarged. The building burned contain·ed pel'isonal property of the defendant insured by
him. The ·circumstances were suspicious. He fia1sely
claimed to be in Salt Lake, when. In fact ·he was in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

Carbon County where the- fire occurred and thereafter
·employed a pers;on to drive him :to Salt Lake, and twice,
once at the time .and once near the time of rthe trial,
approa,ehed :this pevson 1and told him to deny that he
had s·een him or had driven him. T'here was clearly evidence of ~some kind of guilt. T'his cour,t held that the
cir:cums.tances, however, did not show guil:t of the offense ~charged. The case was reve:r.s~d, the court foUowIng the rule as. to circumstantial Hvidence.
1

decided also the points ~that when a person W8JS eharged ·directly and tried on that theory, it
.was improper for the ·court ;to instruct or for the jury
to eonsider that they might .convict him for aiding or
counseling and t.hus. try to eonvi~ct him ~as a principal.
T.he

~case

State vs. Judd, 279, Pac. 9,53:
Thi's court, in pointing out ·that it was. not necessary
that one circumstance alone conneet the defendant
with the offen,SJe or be sufficient to -convict, said:
'' The general rule is that the evidence i,s not
relevant or ~admissible unless i:t re~sonably tends
to ·e~st·aJblis.h the f.aot sought to be p~rov~ed. ''

Stale vs. Dean. 254 Pac. 142, (Utah 1927):
Laid ·down the rule which we desrire· to invoke in diseUJssing the admissibility of the evidence along with the
other point now under ,diJs,cussi.on. The opinion in that
eaS:e ~s:aid :
''Evidence to be re~leVianlt or materi'al of
course, mus~t have ~some probative value, and in
:some ·degre~e mus:t tend to p·rove what is claimed
for it. Wherther proffered evidence tends to do
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so or ha8 8uch probativ~ , ..~uue, ·and thus is admissible. is. in the first ins.t.anoe, a question for
the court. ''
TESTIM0~1

AS TO MR.. FINCH:

We shall now refer to the eYidenoe offered as agtainst
Mr. Finch. We contend that for tili.e most part, it was
not relevant or mca.terial or competent .and was, there._
fore, not admi8sible: and, secondly, that in any event
it does not point to the guilt of the defendant of the
offense charged, excluding every re.3lsona.ble hypothesis
of his innocence of sueh offense.
JOHNS. EARLY {.A.b. 22-29) testified for the state,
and when objection was made to an alleged conver.s,ation
With Mr. Erwin in January, 1936, immediately upon
their taking office, as to there then being a payoff,
that -there was no foundation and that such could not
be admitted as against the other defendants, the court
over-ruled the objection anld said:
' 'If there is some evidence introduced of an
agreement to conspire, as stated in :the indictment, then the Court, unless it becomes convinced to the contrary, will probably take the

view that statemoots of anybody, anywhere, are
pertinent to the issues." (Ab. 23)
The witness then testified that he knew Mr. Finch,
.after :he took office as Chief in the middle of March,
1936, and then told him that he bad heard rumor.s that
there had been gvaft going on, and Mr. Finch ·sait<1 he
hadn't heard anything about it. (Ab. 25)
This witness then testified over obj~ootion that he
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thad (~onver~s,ati~on~s with Mr. Browning, a Chinrunan
named Wong, Cliff Jennings and Wm. Oayi:aJs, about
their operations, and that Ben Harmon ·and A'be Rosenblum .called on him. The -eviden·ce ~show·ed that Browning was a.t times a book-maker, that Cliff Jennings had
the rep·ut.ation of being a. gambler, and that Abe Rosenblum was a bondsman. The witnes1s testified that on
one ooeasion Browning, ani(]; on one occasion Harmon
went to the secretary's office, whi.oh "ras the anteroom
to Mr. Finc;h':g, office, ·and that he didn't know whether
the Chief was in or not. ·There was. no testimony that
they ·contacted the ·Chief on these occasions. The witness
testified that he ,afterwa:vds had a ·conver~s~ation with
rbhe Chief but didn't remember mentioning any of the
persons referred to. H·e :said he told the Chief he had
heard rumors of a conside~able payoff and that Mr.
Finch ~s:bated, '' Thos~e p·eople know their own business
an!d would have to operate ~their own husines1s; that it
was 1his duty to ope·r.ate the Police Department and he
proposed to opel'late i,t. '' Obj·ections and motions to
:strike were ~denied. (Ab. 27).
~hi~s

witness ~also te1stified that in. the f.all of 1937
there were again rumors of a vice payoff and that he
,talked with Mr. Erwin .about it and t~he mayor 6aid
h·e hadn't heard anything about it rand there haJd been
n.o repor1t!s. from the dep~artment. Asked the leading
question, ''During any of these convel'isla,tions was it
m·entioned by y.ou. whether the chief 1and the mayor
were involved~'' t~e witnes:s answered no, and being
croHs examined by t,he District Attorney ,said ''that
there were 'such rumors around. It had ,slipped my
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mind for the time being.'' He then testified that hoth
the mayor and Mr. Finch disclaimed all knowledge of
it. (Ab. 28)

AU·STIN SMITH (Ab. 2~)-34), another state's witness, who ''as appointM .secretary to the mayor in J·anuary, 1936, and served for a time, testified. that ·he wenrt
to Mr. Finch's home and w·as admitted bY Mrs. Finch
"very -shortly after ~lr. Finch 'Yas appointed."
''I asked how he liked his job, he made the
remark it was ·alrig-ht. We discussed things generally pertaining to the department.
I direct your attention to the subject:
Was anything said about graft payoff?'' Ohjooti.on was made and overruled.
Q.

''I asked: Approximately what is the payoff
existing at the time and t!he answer was approximately $2000.00 a month. I asked who was getting it, or who collected or what booame of it
·and was told probably Abe Rosenblum would collect it as he ·had had experience along .that line. ''
(Ab. 29)
Mr. Finch emphatically denied that there ever Wlas
such or any conversation at his house, and testified that
Mrs. Finch, who afterward died from her then sickness,
was confined to her bed at the .time testified by the
witness and did not admit anyone, nor was ·she in condition of health to be where the witness could have seen
her. This was not denied.
ffihis witness also testified that in Jwne, 1936, he
had .a conversation with a newspaperman and obtained
a memorandum purporting to contain a list of supposed
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payoffs in gambling houses and houses of prostitution.
-That he left it on the mayor's desk but didn't see it
in the mayor's poss,ession. That hH t·hen talked with Mr.
Holt and Mr. Tag~art about this matter and later
talked wit!h the mayor, but he refused to give the name
of the fellow he had t·alked with. ~hat he then attended
a conference at which he hruc1 Mr. Holt present and at
which the .chief w~as present; that ifue mayor felt that
he 1had talked with people .that he should not have talked
to. T.hat M·r. Holt then said he had informed m·e of 1fue
condition's dis·cuss,ed with the newspaperman because
he thought the mayor should be given the information
and ''that rumors were rampant'' that ther:e was a
p1ayoff ~on houses of prostitution. That the whole statement was. rather brief.
That the witne~s~s then asked if there was any misunderstanding or if they were satisfied with what had
been jsaid, and that Mr. Finch made the remark that
''We should not be washing our dirty linen in the
enemy's camp." (A b. 33) Mr. Finch aft,erwa~ds testified that he had :had some personal disagreements with
Mr. Taggar.t, 1an:d al~so mentioned that Mr. T·aggart's
·daughter was employed in the department at the time
that he went there.
The Holt referred to wa1s the ·only person shown to
have ·collect·ed from ,the house's of prostitution .at any
time, and when question1ed by Mr. Finch denied that he
.had ever ·colle-cted. If anyone was ·collecting he would
have known it because he was head of the anti-vi~ce squaJ
after April 1, in 1936, by hi~s. own .testimony. (Ab. 97)
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D. L. HAYS ( . .\b. 37) "Ta.s the w·ihH~~~ who t.t:\~ti:fied
t.o ,his various g1ambling; oper.ati{)ns oYt\r a long period
'Of years 18Jld including 1936 and 1937, and prior and
subsequent years. He testifil~l that he ask~lld the City
Commission Qn February 20, 1939, "-thy thPy continued
to license the card. rooms d".,hen. it "Tas "Tell known
that gambling went on a.s l()ng ;<ls they were licensed.''
His only reference to any of the defendants "\vas to Mr.
Finch. He testified that in about N·ovember, 1937, he
said to Mr. Finch, ''You must know that gambling i~s
going on in these places either under protection or without regard to law." :l!r. Finch said, "Yes, I know that
gambling is going on here.'' The witness then said he
asked him what he WJaS going to do about it and he
said he was not g<>ing to do anything about it antd, he
gave me hi-s reason:S." (A.b. 37)

A. H. ELLE'l'T (Ab. 75-79), sworn by the state
(Ab. 75 ), te:Stified that :he was a judge in the police
oonrt in 1936 and had a conveflsation with Mr. Finch in
the middle of April, 1936, one month after he became
chief. It appeared that some gambler-s ·had been brought
into polioo court and charged there and that the witness refused to proceed with the oases and sugges.t~ed
that they be sent down to the county attorney's office.
(Ab. 79) That Mr. Finch called on the telephone and
asked to come and talk with him about these g.amble:rs
or gambling eases and that he saw Mr. Finch that afternoon between 5:30 and 6 o'clock in the Public Safety
Building. That in the oourse of that conver:sation Mr.
Finch said, ''Judge, why can't we get together on the
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sentencing of these gamblers~ Let them pay the fine;
let the ·city get the revenue." I s~aid the reason we can't
do thi,s is because rny j1·iends tell me you are taking
$2500.00 a month in your hand behind your book and
I am not going to be a party to it and we can't get together on it.'' That after a minute or two the chief
made some remark and. tlhe meeting broke up.
He ·stated on ·cross examination that if Mr. Finch
took office in M~arch that this was 1about a month afterwafld. That the questi'On of felony charges against gamblers was in his mind. That it was the practice for the
prose-cuting attorney to file complaints and that the
clerk ~assisted the attorney in these cases and that all
arrests were reported to the city attorney, and that he
rej-eoted ~the eomplain.ts ~drawn by the city attorney and
wouldn't sign them. Tbtat it was after he ·sent tJhe cases
down to the county attorney that Mr. Finch talked with
him.
An important point to notice in this connection is
that the testimony of the witness himself Wlas that he
said to Mr. Finch ''My friends tell me you are taking
$2500.00 a month in your hand behind your back.'' ·There
was no admission, nor could Mr. Finch deny that his
friends .had or had not told him thi1s. Obj~eetions and
motions to strike were ·denied.
BEN HUN~SAKER (Ab. 79-92), te1stifying as to
conversations with Mr. Erwin, none with Mr. Finch,
statetdl t·hat in 1936 he had 1a converisation with Mr. Erwin ·at the time Mr. Erwin paid ihim $200.00 in currency
on a debt, in which conversation .the witness claimed it
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was intimated that ~!r. Erwin receiY~i HlP monl\Y involved from opera.tions such IRS are alleged, and in w·h ich
this witness said Mr. Er,Yin ~aid, ··Finch is t.ht\ 1na n
they will get, but I dou 't rhink they will be able to get
Finch because he doesn't do the collooting himself. He
has his men collecting for him.''
This witness also testified to another alleged conversation in the latter part of the summer of 1936,
in which he said the mayor said that he thought the
chief of police was taking in a lot of money and ihe
didn't know if he was getting his right ~split; that he
conldn 't go down to his office and watch him and tend
his offiee at the same time s<> he had just got to take
what was banded him.
This was all there was with relation to Mr. Finch,
except that in another conversation the witnes-s said
Mr. Erwin said he had a chief of police in there that
was bringing him in \ery good money but not ·enough.
(Ab. 79-92)

It should be mentioned in this connection that Mr.
Finch testified that he lhad contributed, and that some
collections fr<>m the men up there were made for Mr. Erwin's campaign fund. That otherwise he had collected
no money and paid no money.
GOLDEN HODT {Ab. 97-124) testified that the
fi]}st of April, 1936, he was appointed head of the antivice ;squad. That in discussing his appointment- witJh
Mr. Finch they talked over the vice situation and the
chief said, ''I don't particularly- ·object to vice but I
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don't want them to get the best of it, not let them run
too openly.''
He also te·stified to the conversation with Austin
Smith 'above referred to and with the mayor 1and chief
in tlhe Public Safety Building in June, 1936, in which
·Conver sation he said he stated ''we :had hea.:r:d a payoff
was going on. ''
1

H·e testified :that he had another conversation
with Mr. Finch the following day in whi·ch Mr. Finch
toltd him to -close everything up. 'Tihat was in the Latter
part of June, 1936. That he went around and notified
them .to ·close, that is. the p·lace·s of prostitution and lotteries, and :said it ~appeared to him that they .then closed
up. H·e te,stified -he had ·another ~convevsation the latter
part of July, 1at whicJh time Mr. Finch "mentioned Mr.
Rosenblum ·and told me to go see him. Nothing was
said ,about the places of vice.'' (Ab. 99)
He testified he· talked again with Mr. Finch about
the first of August antd Mr. Finch said ''he· thought
the heat was off and to let them reop·en ~and not to let
them run too openly. No specific place·s were mentioned.
After tJhen I just let them run until the fir,st of January
with the exception of the lotteries.'' (Ab. 100)
He ·Siaid he had another conve:r:siation with Mr.
Finch about the middle of January, 1937, and Mr. Finch
told him to ~clos~e ·ev~erything up. ·That he was, going to
give me another man on the -squad ~and to see that there
was ,absolutely no more p·ayoff. H·e s·aid in February,
1937, Mr. Finch "told me that he thought I wws the
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one who w·as rnaking the tow·n too hot and that if he
moved me things "~ould calm do,vn. I "~as removed the
first of March and Record "~as put in my place. I was
in the detective bureau for t'W'O ID()nths and ~then I
went back on the vioo squad.'' (Ab. 100) (It will be remembered that it was in the latter part of 1936 and
the early part of 1937 that some of the women were
making report.s to the newspapers of various vices. It
will 13lsD be remembered that when Holt went back
it was a.t the request of these same women, and he was
prrt in under Thacker to look after the houses of prostituti{)n).

This witness then testified to conversations with
Hrumon, and in June with Mr. Paaree. He appear.s t'O
have testified to no conversation whatsoever with Mr.
Finch prior to his commencing collections fr'Om the
houses ()f prostitution again in June of 1937. This
witness testified that h'8 had made these collections
alone. On cross examination he testified that it was the
practice for them not to go alone in the discharge of their
duties on the an-ti-vice sqUJad but it was necessary to go
in pai:vs for their own protection, and that he traveled
with Mr. Boyd and with Mr. Rogers. That they instructed the girls and saw that they appeared for examination and kept track ()f the houses to which they went.
That it had been the practice in the past to book them
at the police station once a month for the Board of
Health. That after M·r. Finch came in he required, that
they lbe booked and examined twice. That the practice
was the same as it hwl been for yeam.
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T!hat Abe Rosenblum \vas a bond,sman. That in
19.36, (when he claimed he was collecting and turning
the money over to Abe Rosenblum), ''we had complaints
about what happened in ~.Rosenblunl ''s p1ace. '' This was
over the Bailey F·eed ·Store. That ''Mr. Finch told me
that they ·couldn't tolerate that p1ace and I was t·o put
a. man there and keep him ther~ to .see that he didn't
indulge in infractions of th·e law. * * * It was closed up
around the first of July and later some time the latter
part of August or September. It wasn '.t opened any
more by Abe Rosenblum that I know of.'' The witness
further te,stified that ''while Abe Ros:enblum was running it the ·chief gave me spe·ci,al o:vder.s to make every
;effort to ·see .that no infractions of the law occurred.
* * * It had the reputation of being a gambling place."
This witnes·s was then ~asked if ·he hadn't been asked
by the chief in the pres·ence of M-r. B·ower, the chief's
:~ecretary, and In:sp~ctor Record and others, ''They sa.y
there has been a p'ayoff in Salt Lake City. I want you
to tell me before these witnesses if I ever asked you
to favor any of the games, bookies, prostitutes, or anyone ·els.e ~ * * * Have I_ ever asked you to coerce or intimitdate any of the1se people~'' H·e was asked if he
didn't answer no to these questions 1and he ·said he
wouldn't say either way. H·e was then ·asked if the
chief hadn't said .to him at the •same time, "Have any
-of these people ever pai~d me any money~'' and the witne,ss •an,swered, ''I don't recall ·everything * * * I wouldn·'t ·say I didn't make. that answer. I don't recall, I
may have done." He· was then asked if the .chief had
not ·said to him, ' 'Have I ever asked you to do anySponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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thing· other than to enforce the ordinances u.nd laws T"
and the witness ans"·~rt"\(_l that he oould11 't ~an~swer that
either. (Ab. 108) It "-as proved by Mr. Finch .a.nd 0.
B. Record (Ab. 169) that these questions were asked
of him and tihat he gave negative ans,vers to Mr.
Finch as above suggested.
The witness also testi:fiOO. that in May ·or June
of 1938 Mr. Hoagland, :anoth-er police officer, and Mr.
Finch were in an automobile in front of Mr. Hoagland's home. That the witness dr{)v·e up from the rear
and got out of his car and got into the ear with these
two gentlemen and that the convers-ation there was to
this effect: '• Mr. Finch said, 'I don't see what has been
d'One that would cause this talk -about taking· money
from the underworld and about the department being
tied up to the underworld.' And I s~aid, 'I don't know
how anyone could have anything on you. You don't need
to worry. I don't know anything that in~olves· you in
thls. '' (Ab. 109)
The following testimony indicating definitely the
character of this witness was then given. This testimony
relates to and follows the foregoing testimony:

"Q. Was it true what you said 1_
A. Well, no.
Q. You didn't even tell him then that you
had been making collections, did you?
A. I didn't; figurea he knew.
Q. .B~t y{)u_ didn't. even tell· him, never
speak to him about it?
A. Only the time· Jhe told me to quit making them; see they quit being mBkte.
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Q. Now, just a moment.
A. Yon asked for that.
Q. Did he tell you to see to it no more collections were made~
A. Yes, he did.
Q. When was that 1
A. In his office on around the middle of
January, 1937.
Q. 1937~
A. Ye;s. ''
I don't remember a conversation with Mr.
Finch in hi1s office tihe I~atter part of 1936 ·or early
in 1937, when he said. he heard a rumor that I
had been taking or accepting money from various people and I said I have never taken a dollar from anyone. I can go right out and arrest
~anyone. No one has any strings on me.
'' Q. Did you tell him you were making colle·ctions in 1937 1
A. He told me to quit making them.
Q. Didt you ·tell him you were making oollections'
A. I didn't tell him, never.
Q. You ~didn't tell him anything?
A. He told me in the office to ·see there was
no more made." (Ab. 109-110)

* * * * * *
The time I said Mr. Finch told me to see no
more collections were m-ade Wlas aflound the middle of January, 1937. That is the time that I testified that he told me to ·clos·e these places up.
"Q. And at t!hat time you said Mr. Finch
said to ·clos,e theise places up?
A. If I recall, I said he· told me to see
there was no more p~ayoff. ''
I testified to this same conversation in case
10785.
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'' Q. And you s&d at tha.t tilne, did you
not, that Mr. Fineh said to close the plaee·~ up 7
A. I did.'' (Ab. 111)

FISHER HARRIS (.A.b.

1~4-59),

after te.stifying
to conversations with Mr. Erwin in "'"hic.h he had ~stated
that h~ had made an inYestigatian in the fall and
winter of 1937 and found operation of houses of prostitution, gambling in card rooms, lotteries a11d book-making, and had also testified that he had talked with Captain Thacker and told him that his relationship with
Ben Harmon and the payoff in Salt Lake City wws
known to Attorney Harris and t·hen a.sked him f.or
information, and had also stat-ed to Thaocker that Thacker
knew there was a payoff in regard to vice and that
Thacker said anybody would know that. (Ab. 133) This
was denied by Thacker. The witness said he asked
Thacker why he di®'t d-o something about it and
Th:aclr-er said, "I can't because I act entirely on orders
from the chief.'' He also testified that he asked, ' 'Why
did you get in touch with Ben Harmon in the first
plaoo T'' and Thacker said, ''Chief's order-s. Chief said
that Ben Harmon knew all about underworld conditions
and in the perf-ormance of my duty I was to take
advice from him. I didn't take any advice and directi·ons from him.'' He also said that ·he stated to IThacker,
''There must have been other occasions when you took
directions from Harmon' ' and ·Thacker ·said, ' ' No there
wasn't. The chief and Harmon would talk thingrs over.''

·The witnes·s also testified that he asked Thacker
not.to say anything to Ohief Finch, but keep confidential their oonvel"Sation, and Thacker said tha:t was im-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

38

poS·sible because the chief knew he -came to see the
attorney.
Mr. Harriis said the chief telephone·d him about
an hour !afterwards and said he understood that the witness had ~accused Thacker of all sort·s of crookedness.
·That he and Mr. Finch then had a meeting. (Thi·s took
place January 10, 1938). (Ab. 135 ).

''Mr. Finch .said, 'I understand you have ae. cus-ed Mr. Thacker of all :sorts of crookedness.'
I s1aid, 'I have stated to Mr. Thacker that there
are all kinds of illegal activities in operation
running in Salt Lake City in connivance with the
Bolice Department', and I said 'I woulldn't have
any argument with you on matters of judgment
~as to how the town should be run. Nobody will
claim that public officials s·hould personally profit from illegal activities.' He said, 'Well, ·the last
thirty yeavs. I have been hearing .stories albout
p·ayoffs in Salt Lake City. How is one to prevent
such stories~' I said, 'Maybe the least that any..
one ·can ·do ·or maybe the most is to see that the
~stories are not true.; but in :this, oas~e the stories
~are tru·e, and public officials ·are profiting from
illegal .activities in ·Salt Lake City.' I went .on to
enumerate them, and I enumerated dice games1

Q. Now, just a minute. At that time did you
know who had ·collected this tribute~

(·Obj-ection to it as incompetent, irrelevant,
imma:t·eri·al lealdd.ng ~and prejudi·cial, calling for a
conclusion).
T'he witnessed answered: 'Oh yes.'
The ans.wer was stri·cken.
Q. Did Mr. Finch ask you at .that time who
anyone was who was involved?
1
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('Objecti'On to thi~ as contrary to t.he rule
as to relating convers·ations. Overruled.)

A. ~ o, he did not.
Q. Did he at any time!
( Objooted t.o on .all gen~ral grounds, without
sufficient foundation, interrupting the witness in
attempting to giYe a oonversati'On, and trying to
put in any and eYery conversation in one question. Overruled.)

A. No, :Mr. Finch ha~s never asked me the
name of any person involved or asked me to give
bim. the name of any persQn involved.

I went on to enum-erate to Mr. Finch the activities, the illegal activities which were being
oarried on in Salt Lake City and which had been
carried on for a long time p:r:ior to our conversation.
(A mQtion was made to strike that statement as a conclusion. Refused.)

Tihe -witnessed then volunteered:
A. Oh no, it isn't my conclusion. I know it
to. be so.
MR. MULLINER: Now, I ask that that go
out.
THE ·COURT: I think I ought to strike it.
(No other order was made.)

I went on to tell Mr. Finch that the activities I referred to were dice games, pool games,
hous-es of prostitution book-making establishm-ents, Chinese lotteries. He said, I don't· see
how :anything of that sort could be true. We have
collected $2000.00 in. :fin·es from gamblers in Salt
Lake City .during the . past year. I :sairc1, 'M·r.
Finch,. one man pays graft protection money of
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$3,600 a year, one man alone, and you talk
about getting $2,000 from Salt Lake City. Here
is one group of people who pay $6000 a year for
prot!eetion money, and you talk about $2000 f:or
S·alt L~ake City. Here is another group that pays
$7200 ,a year to ·Salt Lake City.' I said, 'Here is
card rooms-! hav·en 't figured it up ex,actly-but
they pa.y thousands of .dolLars a year; and here
are the pros~titutes p'aying thousands o.f dollar·s
a year, and you talk about getting $2000 for Salt
Lake City, when all this money i.s going into
the hands of public officials and people interested
in them, in :the underworld.' He .saild,, 'W·e11, I
thought. :the town was run p·retty well', and that
was albout all there was of .that eonvers.ation. I
think that was on the lOth of J,anuary."

(Motion was then made to strike out this
testimony on ~all the- general grounds that it is
not admissible .as an 1admis,sion. That there was.
no sufficient foundation for it; that it was! after
the alleged conspiracy had ended. Denied.) (Ab.
135-136-137) .
The witness stated that he had ~anothe-r conversation a.t the Alta Club at which Mr. Finch and Mr. Erwin ·and ,some newspapermen were pre·S·ent on January
20, 1938. That the parties present, other than the witnes·s, ha1d taken lunch there and at the .end of the lunch
he eame in. 'That J\!Ir. Fish, one of the newspapermen,
~.aid he had heard rumors of an investigation in regard
to underworld activities and official corruption re·Lating
·to them an~d asked if I had made .such an investigation.
I answered that I had and that I ha1d made· a re·port
to Mr. Erwin in writing. He aJSke·d me if I knew what
illegal a~ctivities were in op,eration ·and I :s·ai,d I did and I
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enumerated them-as I haYe Pnumerated them before.

I stated the a.m<>unt that eaoh kind <>f ac.tiv-ity paid
and Mr. Fish .said, '~Do you kilo\\· \Vho gets this money
and to "---hom it is finally distributed·?'' I said I did,
and he said, '~\rho t '' and I sa.id, ''E. B. Erwin gets
$750.00 a month; Harry Finch $500.00 per month, the
amount collected.. Mr. Erwin and Mr. Finch were both
at the table. Neither one of them said anything at that
t·ime. Mr. Finch remarked that this was the first time
he h-eard of any payoff situati<>n in Salt Lake City. Mr.
Erwin sngg&sted that :Mr. Finch resign and Mr.
Finch said he would resign th-e next day. Mr. Finch
-asked me how long this had been going on and I said
it had been going Qn since the l·ast <>f 1937, and it ha;d
been going on before that but that was the scope of
my then investigation. I ·suggested that Mr. Finch be allowoo to resign under circumstances such that ia would
not rappear that it was on account of these charge I made.
I think it was me who made the suggestion. Nobody
opposed the idea. (Ab. 146).
On cross examination this witness testified that
Mr. Finch ·stated at the Alta Club in •substance and effoot th.a.t he had repeatedly told the mayDr in the last
number of. months that if his occupying the position of
chief of police was in any way embarrassing to the
mayor that he would re-sign. (Ab. 149)
He also stated that Mr. Finch, in the first conver,sation with the witness in the Felt Building, stated that he had no knowledge of the payoff. 'That conversation was not -ov-er a half hour.
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He also testified on cross examination as follows:
''In the matter of who gets the money, I rather think
I just wrote that down on a piece of pap·er and showed
i!t to Mr. Fish ~at my lef.t, and that p·aper had on it
$750.00 in one pla:ce and $500.00 in another.'' (.A!b. 151)
E. A. HE1DMAN, a eaptain of police in charge of
the Detective Bureau, ·said that after Christmas 1937,
he was ;called to .the ·chief's office and Mr. Thooker was
there .and Mr. Thacker said he wanted to know why
I ordered a raid1 on a gambling place at an address
west on 4th South. (1This was apparently under the 4th
South Street Ry. viaduct). I said I hadn't made it but
it was made by the Detective Bureau, and Mr. Thacker
said that he had to know about the.s.e raids and I said
' 'what do you want me to do ~ '' and he· 'S'aid to write
it ~down and leave it at my de1sk if it relates to gambling. I said if it is 'a burglary or robbery going on I
would want you to .take care of it, and Mr. Thacker
said that is a different matter. Mr. Finch didn't say amything at all during the conversation.
This witness on eros:s examination said that each
department had ,a s·cope of things it was expected fu
handle and if one dep·artment is making an inrvestigation
and another broke in on it there would he som.e pos:silbJe
resentment and jealously. He .s1a.id Mr. Finch made no
criticism of h·is having made the arrests. (Ab. 65)

0. B. REC!ORD, (Ab. 15-22), in:spe·ctor of police,
testified that around the 25th of August, 1937, he and
officer Burt made 'an arrest in the bas·ement of the At·
las Building but he ·di dn 't know at the time who oper.·
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

43

ated the place but no"~ kne\\~ it was Bill Browning. The
arrest was for book-making and he sa\\~ book-1naking
equipment there, and that he and Sargeant Pierce Inade
an &rrest in the New Grand Hotel a day or two later
of some book-makers. That he \\~as next to the chief in
rank and was in his 'Office a dozen tin1es a day. That
after these arrests the chief asked him if he had complaints about these particular pl-aces and he said he·
hadn't. The chief then suggested that he let Thacker
handle the arrests and not interfere; if they had any
complaints on gambling to let Thacker know and he
WQuld see it was taken care of.
He said the chief did not tell hi-nr to cease making
arrests. (Ab. 16) Objections and motions to strike this
conversation were over-ruled and denied.
0. B. RECORD, s"~orn again, testified that he was
acquainted with Abe Rosenblum. That he was a bonds.man, and that he saw him around the police station severnl times, maybe a dozen. That he saw him 1Jalking to
Mr. Finch three or four times he guessed, and that
he had no idea what he was talking to Mr. Finch about.
(Ab. 20)

This covers the mention by state's evidence of Mr.
Finch in the record.
With reference to the instructions of Mr. Finch to
see Harmon or Rosenlblum or any of the parties operating card rooms or ·similrar places, MR. THACKE·R
testified that Mr. Finch said: "We are having an epidemic of burglaries around the city. I would like you
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to contact Ben Harmon and BeTt Hays and Joe Vincent
- ' ' and I guess he name'<1 over a dozen different places
where there wer:e ·ca~d ~ames :and beer joints-''and
see if you -can get them to give you ~any information concerning suspicious chara-cters hanging around and who
might be pulling these burglaries'' that I might give
it to the Det:e~ctive Bure·au ~a~d h1elp them out. The situation was bad and I went to these places as requested.
(A b. 222) ·The witness :also te·stified that this was in
£act what he told Mr. Harris. (See ab. 224-225)
MR. FIN·CH (Ab. 170-·208) testified hy way of
explanation of some of the·se matters, and under the
de1cisions of this, court in State vs. Converse, 119 P. 1030,
at 1033; State v~s. Allen, 189 P. 84, such reasonable
explanations -cannot lbe ignored in determining the
wei~ht or effect of the eviden~e. That when I heoame
poli~ce ~chief I hald no police experience, I had no acquaintrunce wi,th the officers that werie turned over to me· under
civil service regulations, (A b. 173). I knew Ben Harmon
whe-n Mr. Rodgers and I operated our restaurant on
2nd South ·Street, where we operated for about thirty
years. For some time- he had a place near us. I never
had any business or ~social contacts with him. I did not
bHcome acquainted with Mr. Erwin until about the time
I was appointed chief. I hald no personal acquaintance
with Mr. Pear.ee'; I had met him twice, once some year~
before when h·e had an acciJdent at the Nibley Park golf
lcourse and I was· CommiiS'Sioner of P1arks and once ·while
in office wihen he attempted to get a licens:e f'or a client.
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A good many y~ar~ prf•Yiou~ly Abe R.o~·enbluiu u~t\.(_1 to
eat in our re-st~1ura.nt occa:~ionally. I had not ~t\en hin1
for :a good many year~. I had no a.cqunint.anee or a~soei
ation with him except as an ot?oos.ional cu~to1ner. I had
no conversation ''ith Cliff Jennings. Bill Browning, and
a -Chinaman named \Y. ong. (.A.b. 173). I sa"¥ Bill Cayias
and Abe Rosenblum a fe\\~ times. They ""'ere bondsmen.
Ben Harmon talked with me the first thirty days I was
up there, twiee. Xothing ''as eYer said about graft or
payoff. He wanted to know if he could not keep the
card room open after midnigilit and I told him no that
he oould not get ru1y privileges. (Ab. 17 4).
I never did tell Holt to see Abe Rosenblum or take
or deliver any instructions from him. I did tell them
to see these and other men and get information to help
the detective bureau. I did tell Holt that I had information that gambl.4Ig was being carried on in Rosenblum's place and asked him to check up ·on it closely.
I took this matter np two or three times 1and told him
to -see that unlawful acts were not carried on, and withill a week or ten days after the last order Rosenblum '·s
place was closed. I did take Mr. Holt off and put Mr.
Record on as head of the anti-vice squad in the spring
of 1937, ''the newspapers were ril(Ling us over the women's clubs.'' I put Mr. H. K. Record ~as head -of the
.anti-vice squad. I· began to have reports from various
sources. Mr. Early informed me that Mr. H. K. Record and another officer were interested in a crap game
on 4th South. The mayor's :secretary :rn.ade the same
report. One member of the anti-vice squad gave a sim-
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ilar report, Mr. Hoagland. I removed Mr. Record for
the reasons above stated and 1\fr. 'Thacker was then
appointed. I :appointed Mr. Thacker ·after discussing
rthe matte,r with lnsp·ector Record, who was in charge of
personnel. ·The instructions I gave were to the effect
that we wanted the place's run as closely as they could
regulate them and no infractions of the law that they
coul~d help. (Ab. 178. Mr. Thacker verified this).

I took up the matter testified to by Mr. 0. B. Reco:vd booause Mr. Thacker said that these arrests had

been made in his d·epartment and he thought they ought
to talk to him, or something to that effect, it aroused
a little jealousy. (Ah. 178)
After I removed Mr. Holt the women's organization, which had taken quite an a·ctive part in vice
conditions, came to me and they wanted to know why
I had removed him. 'They felt that he was doing a
good job. They s~aid they had never made complaints
of him, or words to that effe-ct, and felt I had made a
mistake in taking him off the vi·ce sqUJad. That influenced
me 'vhen I came to put him hack on the squad undfr
Thacker.
E.arly in 1937 I S'aid to Mr. Holt in substance "I
have heard rumors that you have be·en collecting, or
accepting money from various peop·le'', and he said
I have never taken a dollar from anybody. I can go
right out and !arrest ·anyone. No one has rany strings
on me. ( Ab.181)
After hearing Judge Ellett, I recall that I had a.
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conversation "-ith hin1. I Inet hbn in thP hall and we
went into my room. lly offict.lrs had been tPlling methe conversation "-as about fines being levied against
gamblers and the question had :been raisrd by the judge,
not in my presence, that they should~ be prosecuted
on a felony charge. I did tell him that he could fine
them up to $299.00 and give them six months in j•ail
and if they were brought in on these charges twice a
year that probably would answer and 've could get the
fines in the City Treasur~~. I also told him that we would
just as soon furnish our evidence at one place ·as another and if the city attorney felt so disposed it was immaterial to us where the cases were tried.
He brought up the rumors of graft. I told him
I had been on the street down there for thirty-five year.s
and heard these rumors ·all my life. I never could get
to the bottom of them. It w·as not expressed in the conversation that I had my hand behind my book that I recall-'' not in that way at all''. I had only been there
a few days. I did not take it that his ·statement applied
to me. I do not recall that ~any amount was mentioned.
(.A!b. 182)
T·he witness denied that he had the conver-sation
stated by the witn-ess Hays with relation to card game·s.
(Ab. 182) The witness denied the testimony of Austin
Smith that they had any conversation at his house, or
that Austin Smith could have seen Mrs. Finch there
or be admitted by her because ·she was not up and
about the house at that time; and t·estified that he nev·er ~stated to Austin Smith that there was a payoff of
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$2000.00 a month in Salt Lake, and I never at any time

to anyone said in substanee that I guess,ed Abe Ros·enblum "would" collect graft in ·Salt Lake City. (Ab.l83)
This witne1ss testified that he did say something
albout taking the affairs of the department into the enemy eamp, in eonnection with Holt '·s alleged conversations with the newspape·rmen and with Mr. Taggart
in his offi·ce, ~and what lhe had re.fe.rence to was that he
13111d Mr. Ttaggart had had words ~a!bout a matter of employment in the poli(~e dep~artment and that Mr. ·Taggart
had said ''I will re;member you when the time, comes·.''
(Ab. 184)
Conce·rning the conversations with Fisher Harris,
Mr. Fish took the ex1amining position anld the discussion
was be:twe·en him and Harris. Mr. Fish warnted to see
the slip that Mr. Harris :had taken ·out of his pocket
and Mr. Harris ·showed it to him. When he brought up
the proposition that I was getting $500.00 ,a month I
said that I had n:o knowledge of any payoff and I certainly had not been a party to it. I did s~ay that any
time I stood in the way of the mayor in any way I
would be glad to resign. I had tendereld1 my resignation
to the mayor once before. As we we-re going out I said
I had no objection to re,signing but rthat I would not
resign unde·r fire.

I never re·ceived any money that was ·collected by
Mr. Holt or ~anybody else. (Ab. 186) I never gave any
money to Mr. Erwin, except th~at he told me. that during the campaign of 1936, he had ·a certain amount tluwt
the Democratic Committee had. asked him to rais'e and I
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gave him two percent of one month's salary. I never
received any money fron1 any source·, except ~some life
insurance when Mrs. Finch died and my salary, and
possibly a couple of small loans paid to me $100.00
apiece. {Ab. 186)
On cross exa.mination this defendant said, I did
not know Bill Browning or Cliff Jennings.

TESTIMONY AS TO MR. PEARCE:
Before commenting on the admiss.iblity of portions of this testimony and the effect of it, we will set
ont the testimony as againBt the defendant Pearce and
consider them both together.
The witnesses who testified as to Mr. PearcH were
H. K. Record, Golden Holt, Jacob Weiler and Fi·sher
Harris.

_E.

K. RECORD (Ab. 95-97) testified that he had
been -in the police department fifteen years. ThaJt he was.
placed on the anti-vice squad about the first o.f March,
1937, and was there for two months. That he saw Mr.
Pearce arollillld the middle of April. Mr. Pearce called him
on the telephone and he went to the office ; that B-en Harmon was there. Mr. Pearee said he had been responsible for having me placed head of the vice squad; that
tke mayor had instructed him to 'YIUllke collections from
gambling hous-es and other forms of vice. I asked Irim
how much .they expected to get. He said $1700 a month I
asked him where; he said $600.00 from lotteries, $600.00
from book-makers and $400.00 from card game·s. I S'aid I
wouldn't be a party to it. He ~said, if you will string ailiong
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with us keep thi!ngs in line you will get $165.00 a month.
I told him I wouldn't want to be a p1arty to it. He said,
alright, we will get someone el1se to do it. I related this
s.ame ·Conversartion in the previous trial of Mr. Pearce,
case 10785, I never ·did report this matter to the chief
of poliee. Thi~s was the first conversation I ever had
with Mr. Pearce· and~ the last one (Ab. 96) I didn't
report this to the eity attorney or the district attorney
or the -county attorney. Fi1sher Harris talked with me
about it about D~e:cember, 19-37.
GOLDEN H·OLT testified that previously to collectin-g in 1937 he talked with Ben Harmon and Harmon said he was going to put him hack on the vice
s~quad to work under Captain Thacker. (Alb. 101) That
}Je talked with Harmon later about collecting from the
l{rpis·es of prostitution and-. the amounts they were to
pay. That he then started ;(l!aking collections in June
'Of 1937, about the 3rd or 4th. ·That after he had collected he talked
with Mr. Harmon and Harmon told him
c.
LiO take it ~·. er to Mr. Pe·arce 's office in the Continental
'
l
B·anir BuildJng.
i'}l_·

''When I got to Mr. Pe1arce's office Mr. Harmon was
the~re, the doo~ '
··open. I ·entered the lobby of his office ·and .
me- to ·come .in. I laid the money on his
de:sk. \.._
--~d me if that was all of it and I told him
it was. He picked the money up and put it in the -drawer
of his. desk on the left side. Mr. Harmon was sitting to
the left of the desk, about six fee~t from Mr. Pearce. It
was ~around $500.00. '' (Ab. 103)
J

About the liatte~ part of :September ·~r the first of
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October, 1937, Ben Ha.rmon called me. I oouldn 't give
the date ~any nearer. I " . ent and sa.\v hiiu at the Mint.
"Mr. Harmon told me that Mr. Pearce had told me to
go to Mr. Pearce's office and see him.''

I went. He had a slip of paper with a list of places
on it and :he asked me the amounts 'Of the different
places of prostitution I had been oollecting from and he
had some othe-r addresses. There was no collootion made·
at thes·e. He 'B.Bked me why. I told him they were residences and those girls weren't making a living out of
it and I wouldn't collrot from them. He said it was~ alright, thought I was doing a fine job, and I left. (Alb.
103)
On cross examination thi-s witness testified that
when he met Mr. Harmon in Mr. Pearce's office he kne-wthat Mr. Pearce was an at~orney. He had seen him iu
court off and on. He couldL. 't say whether he had se·en
him representing Mr. Harmon. I never had any dealing.s
wih Mr. Pearce whatsoever before. ''Th( ·;B- was veryt
little conversati'On in his office. I took ;so.me . . vney. and
put it on the desk; they .asked me how I was; I was
there a minute. Mr. Pearce put the money in his. desk
'and I left. That is about what happ;;;;;i~.·' ~ (Ab.113)
,

:

(

.

The only other conversation I ever:~ :~;.~·~d':- ·-·-) him
•
, . ,_f·; . - r·
was m September or October of 1937. I ai\va-y·s went
alone when I was collecting money and I went ~alone
when I turned the money over to Rosenblum (1936) and
I was alone when I turned the money over to Harmon
{1937), except the occasion in June when I s·aid Mr.
P-earce was there. ( Ab.114}
1
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I never had a conversation with Mr. Erwin. I had a
convel'lsation wi·th Ben Harmon around the middle of
January, 19·38. (Ab. 104)
(This testimony was obj·e:ct.ed to on the general grounl(hs and that it was after
the .eonspiracy is alleged to have conclulded. The obje·ction at that time was sus:tained.)
Mr. Holt was reealled (Ab. 121) and this conversa.~
tion offered again and objeetion over-ruled. He testified : Ben Harmon ·called me on the telephone around
the middle of January of 1938. He -a~sked me to pick
him up at 1st South and Regent ·Streets. We went out
along 4th or 5th North, ·down by the U. P. tracks, and
he said, ' 'For God's. sake don't take any mor:e collections· whatever because· Mr. Harris and Mr. Lee have
got hold of Pearce and accused him of being in the payoff. For God's s~ake see. t.hat there i1s no more of it.
Don't take ~anything from anybody, be,eause it may blow
over.'' (Objections· were ma;de lhy each of the defendants separately and motions to strike as to thi~s convelisation all over-ruled.) ( .A!h. 123)
· The wi tne,ss said, all that I have testified to re.J,a,ting to Mr. Pearce in this ease was testified to by me
in case 10785. (Ab. 124)
JACOB WEILER testified that he was a deputy
county ·clerk, and in Judge Thurman's ·court on Ma.roh
19, 1936, in a ·case ·that consumed ~two or three hours,
Mr. Pea.:vce was one of the counsel. That he s:aw Mr.
Erwin there .and he ·took the witne1S·S stand and cou:risel
for both sides .examined him.
sat in the spectator's
se·ction before he went on the witness stand,· and. the

He·
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witness could not reineiuber 'YhPbher he 'vent. hn·ek to ·the
spectator's section or sat at tht.~ coun~t."l table afteT·.,
wards. It "~a.s stipulated that l\l.r. Poo.re.P put ~Jr. Erwin on the s-tand and exa1nined hiin, and that any insinuation that Mr. Er"in employe·d Mr. I\~'arce a.s atto~ey in the case "~as eliminated. It "~as also stipuJ.ated
that the civil case was first filed on July :25, 1934, (this
was in the city court).
(Objection and motion to strike on the ground that
there was no folmdation or conspiracy shown were
over-ruled.)
FISHER HARRIS (Ab. 142) was allowed to
testify generally that he had made an investigation
and ha.d found out that the operations hereinabove referred to, of card playing ·and licensed card rooms,
houses of prostitution, lotteries and book-making, were
carried on in Salt Lake City. He had written thes-e up
in a letter and the letter was offered and received and
then the letter was rejected by the court, and then the
witness took it upon himself to tell, ·and was allowed
to tell the contents of the letter and kept the contents
in the record.
This letter and testimony, in addition to the. statement that he had found out that these vices. were carried on, also contained :statements that he knew there
was a payoff and that he knew who was in it. Thi~ testimony was 1also entirely inadmissible and pre,judicial.
It involved conversations with Mr. Thacker, .above re·ferred to,. wherein he stated to ·Thacker that ·his oon.;
nootion with it .and with Ben Harmon was well known,.
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also a eonversation above referTed to with Mr. Finch,
a's well as conversations. with Mr. Erwin.
He later gave the following testimony with relation
to Mr. P.earce. Before this, ·conV1evsation was given,
obj·ection was made 'and at1tenti 0\ll' was called to the
·court to the fact that it had been given in c3Jse 10785
and that the transcript was ·available and the court 'vas
invit1ed to examine the transcript and see that there
was no admission contained in it. Overruled.
1

The witnes~s testified that he had the conversation
with Mr. P·ea.rce in Harold B. Lee's office in: January,
1938. It was t~he day lbefo:r.e or the day after he talked
with Mr. Thacker and Mr. Finch. He called on the tele-phone ·and. arranged the convers ation.
1

H·e '8 aid, "Mr. Pearce, I have been making an investigation of the illegal activities in Salt Lake· City
and the official connection with them and the· paroff
that I have found exi·st.ed. '' I 'vas just introducing the
subject to Mr. Pearce, teUing 'vhat I wanted to talk
to him about, telling him ''I had made an inve~stigation
and that I had found cert:ain illegal activities. rand payoff si tuatio:n' ', and then I told him I kne~w of his relationship with it and I I~ep·e~ated, as I have before, that
the princip,al thing I am intere,sted. in is the official oonneetion with it. The persons in the official body of the
city who ~are ~connected with it and I told Mr. Pearce
that I knew of hi1s r:e~lation with it ~and that hJe is involved
with Mr. Harmon and othelis, and I think it would be
to his intere,st to make a full and complete discl10sure of
all he knew about it. (Ab. 142).
1
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\Vhen I first ~aid tl1at, ~fr. P~n ret\ just ~~at thHl~
a.nd sajd nothing for t"'"o or thr(le n1inuh\s or morP. He
then ~aid, "\Y"l1o ~ays that I an1 inYolYe·d in thh;; thing?"
And I said~ '~Dick, I a1n not a.t libPrty to tell you precisely, but I will tell you the namP~ of ~tnne of the
persons who say you are inYolYed. '' I enumerated perhaps fifteen persons . .Among them "~as the name of H.
K. Record. Mr. Pearc.e said. \\Tell, Mr. R.ecord might
say this about me beeause he has it in for me. I S'aid,
I didn't say Mr. H. K. Reeord \Yas one of them, I 'S aid
he was among those. Why did ~~ou pick him out1 He
said, because ·he has got it in for me. He said, "Well
maybe I can help you stop this payoff situation. I can
talk to Ben Harmon. I am his attorney.'' I said, ''I
don't need anybody to stop the thing, it is probably
stopped no\\-." '• Rat·her than have J!OU speak to B·en
Harmon about it I w·ant you to promise you won't
speak to him or anybody else that I have talked to
:ou on the subject.'' (Ab. 143)
1

The next day I called him over the ~lephone aiD.d
I said, ' 'Dick, I am ·S'Orry you have taken the attitude
that you have in regard to this thing. You may trunk
it is clever to say nothlng but I t·hink it is not to your
interest. I think you ought to make a full and complete
disclosure.'' He said, Why should I talk to you 1, and
I said, because if you don't y<>u are going to be indicted as ·sure as hell. He said he would call me in the next
day or two. That w-as the end of the convHrsation.
A few days later I called him again and he !said,
"I told you I would talk to you about it. I will talk
to you some other time.'' (Ab. 144)
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On ·cros·s examination the witnes·s testified that the
·oonvers,ation with Mr. Pe·aree was about the lOth or
15th of J~anuary. He started ~out and made a long 'statement to Mr. Pearce. I said I wanted information from
him, as .he ·could give it to me, and I was particularly
interested in the public officials that might be involved.
At the ·close of the ·conver;sation Mr. Pea,rce told
me that he didn't knovv anything about it. He told me
t~hat he was attorney for Ben H·armon and asked if I
wanted him he would talk to Mr. Harmon and see if he
could get ~any information.
I told him twice in the early p·art of the conversation t[t,a,t what I 'vanted was information. I told him
that I kne~w the fa!cts ~an:d that what I wanted was cooperation. I w,ant~ed his inflor1nation to ~corroborate
what I knew. I did ask lVlr. Pearce f.or information.
That was what my question was dire~ct'ed to ~and that
was 'vha.t the conversation was for. (Ab. 153)
This is all the testimony that refers to Mr. P·e.aroe.
It may be ·c1aime·d that the f·act that Mr. P·e.arce s,aJid
1n subst:an·ce that 1\!r. H. K. Record would be· removed
f1~om the anti-vice ·squad, and that he· was in fact removed thereafter, vvould ·crea~te an inference of a connection between him and Mr. Finch. However, the evidence is positive ~that that all·eged eonve.rs1ation was nev~er ·communicated to Mr. F.in:ch, or .any reference to it
made to him until long after Mr. Record had been removed; and that the testimony is positive that Mr.
Finch gave as his rea:son for removing him, the connection of Mr. R-ecord 'vith th·e gambling p1ace and that
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he had reports. as hert:-inalmYe rited. fron1 different. officers of that condition. In nny ~v·ent, it \\~-ould have no
tendency to prove the agrt~em~nt. herP allegPc..t.

Before applying the law to the foregoing testimony,
we want to cite a recent case to correct. an ilnp~res
sion clearly carried 'by the trial court in this case and
which "W"aS erroneous.
People rs. Rodrignez. 99, Pac. (2d) 263, (Cal. 1940):
This was a oonspirae.y case tried to the oourt. It
was a different kind -of cOJJ.Spiracy in that a .substantive
crim-e was charged and the appellant was charged with
being a conspirator to commit the crim.'e of robbery. He
furnished the car and the guns us·ed. One of the al,leged conspirators, Carroll, testified that defendant
said he ''could bring the car and guns to Los Angeles
and give them to two guys there who would take them
and bring him in money." He stated that his reason for
testifying was because he th.ought the appellant was trying to get the girl they were both interested in and that
he would like to get rid of him. The court said, ''Thus
it ;appears that a treacherous influence threatened Carroll's veracity.''

In the course of his dooisi<m the trial Court said :

"I always .approach a conspiracy case· with
·a •searclring attitude of mind, because of the very
nature of th~e charge and. the presumptive rules
1Qf evidence-much .testimony is considered which
would not be considered
a charge of an iSIOlated offense. ''

m

''I merely state that

~as

a human situation
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witih which I reaJize ytou are ·confronted, and I
·can only ·s1ay in that ·connection that like all emir
'Spir,acy .cas1e'S the te,stimony may not he as fulIS'ome a.nd ·complete· as. is the cas'e in any ·other
~offen.Be but conspiracy.''
Commenting on this the appellate· court said:
"It appHar.s .tim:ely that 'some conside~atio!IJJ
be given to the popular but erroneous belief th~t
1ess ·convincing evidence i·s required to support a
judgment ·of guilty wher·e the offens'e of conspir'acy is ·charged. Such 1a belief is wholly unwarranted. Mo~eove·r, to ·charge· conspiracy produces nv
,a;dvaJilltage £or .the' plaintiff, nor does sueh a
·charge ·Create burden.s for the defendant, any different with regar.d to each than might be exp·e,cted in connect~iorn. with the trial f.or other
offenses. The crime of ·conspir.acy is no more
heinous, ill(Or is it fraught with gl'laver consequences, than othe'r offenses. ~ancied handicaps
inci,dent to the prosecution of other offenses
cannot be overcome in the trial of ·a criminal HCtiOOll by merely ·charging conspiracy.''
The ·ca1s'e was reversed :on the ground :1Jhat the evi·dence W1as not sufficient to e~stablis.h the ·conspiracy as
to the 1appellant.

TE'STIM.ONY UNDER :CLASSlFICATION (2):
We shall ll'OW ·cite l.aw upon the proposition that
the testimony here ·cited does m1ot tend to support the
:allegations of an agre~ement ·to p1ermit and allow the
operations as. alleged, but that it was itself erroneously
~dmitted. 'Thes'e 'authorities refer to €vidence of the nature indica ted in ·clas,si:fica tion (2) .aJbove. It includes
the alleged statements of Early t·o Mr. Finch that there
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were rumors of a payoff or that there "rere rumors that
he "~as involYed, which 'vas disclahued; -of Austin SmHn1
concerning the aUeged statem~nt by Mr. Holt tand him
~hat 1lhe rumors of a payoff were rampant in 1936 ;
of Hays that Mr. Finch must know hlu1t gambling was
going on in card rooms; of EUett, within the first month
of Mr. Finch's employment, My friends tell me you are
taking $2500.00 behind you.,- back; of Fisher H·arris,
that he had investigated and round out that there were
viee operations and a payoff in regard to v:ioo oand hi1s
alleged enumeration of payoffs, a:nd nir. Findh 's re. .
isponse that he had heard such stories for th'e last thirty
years 18Jld could not get to the bottom 1Qf it, that he did
n10t know of the condition -stated and that he thougili.t
11he city was pretty well run; and the further statement
of Mr. Harris at the Alta Club of the same nature and
that he, addressing himself, no.t to this defendant, but
to Mr. Fish, •had noted on a piece of paper that Mr.
Finch got $500.00 per month ·and Mr. Finch's repeated
responses, according to Mr. Harri-s, that he did lll!ot know
of this condition and his question as to how long this
had been going on and hi.g later denial of any participation in the affair.

It also covers as to Mr. P-earce the testimony of
Fisher Harris that he made a long ·statemeDit to Mr.
Bearce that he had been making an tinvesti.gation of
illegal activities and official connection and a payoff,
and requested Mr. P·earce to give him information, and
in the course of the statement said, I know of your connection with Ben Harmon and others, and Mr. Pearce's
hesitation, and Mr. Pearce's response, "who says I
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am involved'', his ofier to get infonnation, and his later
denial of any personal knowledge of the payoff.
It will be recalled that most testimony of this nature ·came from Fisher Harris. H·e i~s 1aa11 'attorney and
it is n:ot too much, we think, to ,s,ay ·that he was consci•ous of the e:ffiects of his long statements and letter
in ·crBating ·ervidenee which was very p·rejudicial in this
eas·e. All of thes1e were after the .conspiracy is alleged
to 'have ·Ceased and after he said it was stopped. None
of the.m charge the offense alleged. ·Of .course, :a;s to Mr.
Finch in ihis official position things weTe ·constantly being
,s,aid as to rumors of 1aw violati10n, etc., ·or of things
that the persons had been told or had hear.d from other
pers~ons about public and police office~s. He was not
called upon to d.eny, when someone Slaid they had been
told ·some1thing.
In 80 A. L. R. commencing at page 1235 there is a
note ·collecting numeiious cases on the admissibility of
inculp1atory ·conduct of the accus,ed. At page 1235, after
diSrcus:sing tihe hroad proposition that failure .to dooy
aJil. accus,ation rna y he us,ed, the author s:ays :
''A s.tatement 1so made, of itself, would be
ohj·e·ctionahle ·as hearistay testimony, being oa statement made at .some time other than at a pre sent
trial, offered to prove the truth of the matter
the,rein .asserted, and bas·ed ootirely on the credibility of a ·declarer not tlhen befol"e .tihe court.''
1

H·e then goes ·on to state that such ·st.a.te·ments may
be us~ed only for the purpose of introducing the re!flction
to the .charge made in t.he s:tatem,ent, when such is per·
tinent evidence.
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..At pa.ge 1250 com1nences a. dis<'.ussa·on ~1nd ci t.a.tion
of cases on limitation, 'On a.thnissilbility. It would S(\rve
no purpose to reYie"· all these cases. Herejn are cited,
some of these in the note and so1ne "·hich are later.
:These mll sufficientlr indieate the nature of the holdings
in all this class of cases.
Tate ~·s. State, 95 Jli~s. 138. ±S So. 13, holds that an
incriminating statement inmlving accused, addressed
to bystanders when the a.ooused was present did not
call for an answer and there was no admission by silence.

People vs. Bissert, 15 )..1 • lT. S. 630, affirmed 172 N.
Y. 6±3, 65 "}..~. E. 1120, held that a statement accusing a
public officer 'Of taking a bribe to protect operation of
houses of prostitution was not admi,ssible.
"because a public officer, whil-e ·acting [n the discharge of .his duti€s imposed by law, is not
bound oo deny accusations th·en made ~against
him in ·order to rebut inf~rences ·of his -acquiescence by .silence.''
1

McCormick vs. State, 181 Wis. 261, 194 N. W. 347:
In this case the facts were somewhat analogous.
Letters written by a former attorney for ·the accus,ed 's
murdered wife and f.or the accused were introduced in
eVidence. These lettens statoo the attorney '.s conviction
that the ·aoousoo had poisoned his wife and made other
inculpatory staJtements. The accused, Shaw, attemprtJed
to employ this attorney in a matter involving the oontest ·of his wife's will. When he did that, tihe attorney,
who had previously written these· letter1s :to ~the di·strict
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attorne~y,

read the, letters to him and the· aroused made
no 1denilal ·of the ·cJha1rge. He simply ·sai~d that it was not
n1ecess:ary for the ~a.ttorne~y to consider such thlings
1since no ·criminal proseeut~on ·had been instituted. The
~opinion 1Baid:
''We then ~come to the vital and controlling
conside~ation ,as t10 whether .run ordinary, pru·dent perrson ~srimilarly situated would naturally
make 1a reply as to his. guilt wi1th respect tD the
numerous incidents. involving crime contained irn
thes:e lettens, and particularly whether tlhe def,endant, in re~mairuing 1sile,nt, ·can be deemed t<>
acquiesce in 'Such insinuations ~so as to constitute
·thes'e lett.ers ~compe1tent evidemtce against ihim. ''
The ·court held that they could not and that their admissi·on Wla,s er.voneous, ~and in reve,rs~ing the case Baid:
''·The very nature of .the information contained in the le:tters w.a.s prejudicial. Numerous
[neriminating incident'S Wel'\e! referred to rn the
let:te·rs, none of vvhich \vas bas:ed upon personal
knowledge of the witness, but on the coiDJtrtary,
l~epre,sented 1hi1s ·cornclusions from ·all'e~ed inv.estigation mad·e, aniL re·ports and conclus!Uons, of othe~s. The silence :of the, de.femdant unde'r these
·eircumsta;nees the court hel~d would 1amount wt
mos1t to 1an ~aequies,cence in the ID'ental ope,1.'1ations
of the witne,s.s,, S·haw, and of otthefls. rtefe,rred to
iin rthe letters which he was in no positi'on to oOillitrovert. ''
The error of the court in adm~tting tili.e· l~etters was held
~sufficient Wla.rr,a.ntt flor a re·v-e~rsal of the ve~Ddiict..

State vs. Evans, 189 N. C. 233, 126 S. E. 607, inVIolved a homicide, in the trial ·of which iJt became
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impor1lant to proYe tha.t the de<-Pasr·d t;axi-JdriYl'l' had
boon .h!iroo by the ·acusPd to n1ake a trip to gP:t somP
w.hi8key..A. 'citness te~1ifi~d. t.hat the dece·alsf'd taxidriver ilru .the presence of the def~ndant stated t:hn~t he
bad hired him to make the trip tinYolYed and hlra1t the
aooused did not deny it. The holding "'"as 1~hat this
was improperly admitted. because it did not oharge nor
involve an ·assent to the commission o.f the aotual crime
eharged.

Geiger ~·s. State, TO Oh i.o Sf. 400, 71 }..:. E. 721, was
a case mvolving a conversation' behvoon one of the of:fioors present and the infant -son of the aroused, who
was questioned by urre of t.he officers as oo what ocenrred on the day in question. In the courne of the OOIDIvel'ISation the son made a statement which aooused the
the defendant of :havring killed his wife by stabbing ,her.
It was iestifi:M that the defendant mad~· Il!O reply amd
was irome<hii8Jtely taken away. ·The court held that by
reason of the nature of th~ oonversa1Jion and the per·sons to whQm the answer of th'e ·son was addressed,
other than the defundaalt, this did ll!ot naturally induce
or provoke a deDJial and was improperly admitted.
The fuUowing tw() cases h<>ld that an accused is.
not roquiTed to deny ·statements not involVling a &root
oharge of the offense alleged, and parrticularly whHre
th~ demal might involve a oontJ'Ioversy.

People vs. Hartwell, 175 Pac. 21.
People vs. Countryman, 195 N. Y. S. 728, 49
N. Y. Crilminal Reports 34.
This app·ears to· apply to the statements of the·
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witness'e's Elle·tt and Fi,slher Harisi ·concerning what
they ·had he,a:vd ror ftound out or, in th~e lratter instance,
thrut invesrtri.gation had disclos•ed.
Ha.nna vs. State, (Tex.) 79 S. W. 544 he,ld a statemoot not m·ade· to the aecusted ·directly, but to a by.srtande'l", was. improp,erly admitted. The opinion said:

"'To e·nttitle' the· st:rut:e to :imltroduce in evi·dence the declar.ations of hy.standers:, it must be
clearly ~slhow.n tha1t def·endant. unde~stood himse~lf to be IB.IOOUS·ed of the criminal act committed,
•and tlue ci.•rcums;tance,s. must have· beren ~such as to
veqruire of hiln a. l'le,spons~e."
At page 1272 of 80 A. L. R. the;r·e 1s. a note addressled dire,clly to the matter of admi's's:ibility of statements. not made dire,ctly to ·the ·accused but in conve·rS!ations Wli:th .third p·ersons. The author says:
"W!hen alll! incriminating statement is

mad~

i1n a ·conve:r.siat]on beJtween third pel"sons, in which
~the ~accus,ed is not included, and when the· remarks are not spooifi·cally addT,es.s.ed to him, it
is frequently held that his £ailure: to deny does
not rendetr evidence of the ~s~tatemetlllt and his silence ·admis-sible agwinst. him, for the retason tiD.at
thets1e .ffircums,tances neither afford him an opportunity to deny, nor .are they such as ·to call
£or ~a :veply. In ~s~1:ch crustes i:t i:s held ·that it might
be a ma.nifest irutrusion 1and improp·r~:ety for the
accused to £orce hims.e:lf imlto the conver.s~tion
for the purpose of d·enying a remark, while in
othe~s. it is· held that the r:emark ma.y be ~a mere
impertinence of ttlhe declarer which might best
be answe~~ed by silence. ' '
This rule would s1eem to apply to t·he· conve]}s&tion
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ibetween Mr. Fish M.d Mr. Harris at thP Alta Club,
where th-e latte-r ".,as attl\lllpting to relnttt~ to 1\:fr. F'isih
maJttel'S of his inv-(ls.tig-ntiffill, and for Mr. Finch to immediately ha.ve intruded 'rould have constit.ut;ed an interruption of tha.t narra.tion.
The auth'Or cites a number of oases directly ih.olding
~b®t SltatemenJts made to thlrd persons are not admissible. 80 ~4. L. R. 1272-1273.

At page 1278 of 80 A. L. R. there is a note citing
·a number of auth'Orities discusaing the matter of the
nature of the statement and the nooessrity of it being
directed to a charge of the offense alleged. w.e will
cite a few of these cases directly in pocint ihere.

People vs. Page, 162 N. Y. 272, 56 N. E. 750:
A few days after the crime of l'lape, for which the
accused. was being prosecuted, a witness ·stated that
a fuw dtays afiter the crime was alleged to have oomured, she said to the defendant that the ''pl'losooutrix had told her that .the defendant had committed the
crime of nape on her and that :the defendant did IllOt
deny it.'' It was held that this testimony should be
excluded foc the reason that it was not a direct accus(J),tion of tke crime, b'Uit was a mere repetition of rwmor or
gossitp.
Stach vs. State, (Tex.) ·260 S. W. 569:
Defefllid!anJt was arrested for violalti!on of the prohibition law. The officer who arrested him testified that
some time before he said to the accused, ''You have /been
boot-legging. Fmnk, take a fool's OO.VIice and quit or
you are going to get into trouble.'' ~he officer 1also tes1
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ti:fied that a moment before tlhe arrest he said, ' 'Frank,
I have warned you about 1this. '' That t!he defenK1ant r~
mained s,ilen~t ]n each in.s~tanee.
The ·court held

~the

S'tlatements

inadmi~ssible,

SJa)1lng

that
' ' the ·s:tatemen1 Wlhi·eh 1an ·accused is ·called on to
deny is such as eontains a direct accusrution relating t~o the particular offense with which the accused is charged iJn, the indictment''
and Slaid that neither statement dive·otly ch1arge1<1 the dedefendant with t he present offense. 'There was no such
·accusati on in :all the mass of tes:timony here.
1

1

People vs. Figara., 219 N. Y. S. 73:
In rthis ·case the ·defendant was charged with having
·stolen bags: of £eed and :an adding machine. Previously,
when the ·owner 8Jlld poli·ee officefls went to the defend-

ant ''s farm, ·o;ne of the officel"s openEtL the door of the
barn ~and :slaii·d, ' ' There, tJhat looks. like a Sibo1en car.''
T1hat the de,f.endJalllt was sil.ent. J,t was he,ld that suoh
stBJtement t('harged another crime and not the one ~or
which the d~e:£enda;nt waS' beiJng tried and was therefore
incompevent.
State vs. Ha;milton, 5·5 Mo. 520:

The def·e~dJarut wws; 1a1CCU!8ed of
mony w~as that the office,rs we-nt ~to
was. •Susp,ecte!d, and on eoming out,
defendant one of them ·SJallid 'thrut he

murder. The ~testi
his hous-e when he
in the pre~·eiDOO of
had found a J»s.tol
up~stai!'ls between ~some bed cloitllle,s.. The defendant did
not ~deny that he had found the pistot This was held
im.admi:SISible.
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The foregoing sufficiently illustrate the 'holk:hlng
that ·the accusation must be a direct charge of tili.e
offense charged in ·the aoti-on on 'Vhi6h the defendants
are being tried. None of the sr.atements inYolved i~n
tthis ease could be admitted under these limi twtions.
Their admission W"as error.
People
(Cal.):

rs.

Ka.zatsky, 63 Pac. (2d) 299,

This is a later case inv-olving a f.aked automobile
accident. The evidence rec.eived on the trial was that
of oo officer. He testified that he said to th~ accused,
''We know that it was no aooideni. ' ' This is a very
similar .statement to those made by the witnes's Fis:her
Harris. The opinion says:

''The statement was not directly aoous'Mlory
in form; to the contrary, before defendant could
1have understoOd that he was being accused of
the commission of a. criminal offense, it would
!be necessary that he indulge in a cours·e of reasoning of facts as he understood them to exist,
coupled with rthe law as ·applying thereto. As i·s
ISbaited. in People v. Davis, * * * 293 P. 32: 'Before the failure of a person to deny a statemoot
of f:act can be received as evidence of ·an admi~s·
sion of guilt or of oonsoiousn81&s of guilrt:, it
must appear fuat he understands that he him·Self is accused of the criminal act.' "
('The- Davis ~case cites after ·this quoiation,
Wharton on Crim.i!Dal Evidence, lOth Ed., Vol.
2, ·Sec. 680, p. 1407).
''l'he introouction of ·sta:tements !allege'dJy calling foT"
admissions .almost inv:ari~ably result in reversal of the
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casre becaus!e of the .effeCJt of int,roducing a s~tatement
made by .a witnes~s to the accused. The' statements here
imvolv:ed we,I'Ie particularly damaging for ~t:he r.easons
1s,ta1ted in ~the ·cases, that the jury ·does not dis,criminate
as ·to the offenS>e charged nor differe·ntiJate sufficiently
to get out of its: mind the allegHd f~cts: ~stated. This
would be e·speci~.ally true in this. ~cruse, where a major
portion of the evidem.·ce' was maJde up· of damaging recitials of this. ·ohai'Iacter.

Garner vs. State, 83 So. 83 (Miss.):
ThiS> wrus: 1a ea1s·e· in which the :accusati001, the court
·heJ,d, was. in effect ·denied, but it was claimed that the
e'rror w,as. harmles'S'. The opinion said:
'' The admis,s ion of this: ·evi·de.nce was mMlafes.t error. Brown vs. ·State, 78 Miss. 637, 29 So.,
519, 84 Am. St. Re·p. 641. The learned at;torney
gener,aJ,concedes the· Hrror, burt insi.s,ts t1hat it WBJS
·harmles1s erroT. It may 'he :s1aid, in respons,e to
1iliis suggestion ·of ·th·e rHpi'Ies:enJtrutive of the state,
tbhrut it i·s .s10metimes. e~c;e,etdilngly difficult :to ·say,
wilth ·oonfidemice, jusrt what maiJ influence tili·e
vei'Idi,ct ·of ~a jury; burt we· think the· e~or was
not haTm1es:s, ·and besides, the error thus commit·
1

ted does not stand alone with an otherwise spot·
less record to cure the error.''

It will be

note~d

that Mr.

H~arris ·adllllitted that

in
the cours-e ·of the eonv.ers.ati10n with bo~th Mr. Finch and
Mr. P·e~a~ce, ·they ·denied ~any of the intimrutiollliS· of 1lbe
statement of the witne1sis re·1ating ,fjo them.

Pinn vs. Commonwealth, 186 8. E. 169:
In this· OOISie the opinrion says :
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''It ought not. to be necess,a.ry to note that
the party's denial of 1ilie third per8'0n 's statement d.estr{)~'":S em.tirely the ground for u~ing it.''
\Vigmore on e•vidence ( ~d Ed.), Vol. ~. S.ee.
0
1" •)•) c • J ., p. •)•)(j,. ~t
' \ ('').. .J
'}6•)"'""•
VI -• .p. 5~.f
U'±. 0t?E\ 8 ~0, -l tv":'•)
note 3(a); Com. Y. )lazarella, ~~~l P·a. ·-Hi5, 1:24 A.
163; People Y. Harrison. ~61 Ill. 517, 104 N. E.
259; Com. Y. Kosi or. ~SO ~lass. 418, 182 N. E.
852; State v. D' Adame, 84 N. J. La".. 386 A. 414,
Ann. Cas. 1914-B, 1109.
t.)...;

People t·s. ~ itti, 143
7

"}..~.

,

E. 448:

~his

case i'S oomewhat ·analogous in that the stattemffillts made in ·the presence of defendant were of considerable length and the charges not very well marked
or pointedly directed. It did c.ontain statements concerning one Qf the defendants present amd also other state. .
ments a:ffooting the sever.aJ. defendJants present. T:he
Qpunon says:
'']ill; order for the acquiescence 1Jo have the
effect of an atdmission it mnst exhibit some act
of the man and show that the aool18€d purposely
remained silent. * * * Furthermore, it must appear that the aroused not only had an opportunity to speak :for 1himself, but was in a &trualtion
where it would .have been fitting, suitable rand
proper for him :to speak, or where he would have
been likely, according to common experience, to
deny the imputatioo of guilt. rThe liability of mis~apprehension or misrooollootioo or misrepresenrtation is such that the authorities uniformly aillow that this kind of evidence should be received
with great caution. (Citing several cases')

* * * Since the demeanor of :a peTISIOn uptOill
'hearing statements of others charging them witbh
crime i:s lia'ble to great mi'SOOiliStruotion, evidence
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of this dJescrip.tion ought to be regarded with care.
In discus1s!ing this. que,slt::i!on ·courts of.ten say
·that silelnce, under!' the oir:cums tances, may be
cons;trued a:s ~am. ~admissi:on or 1a confession. Because of this loose phraseol~ogy confusion has
tari_,sen, and the ·cil'lcums~tances arising from the
·conduct of ithe aecus·ed in remaining silent is oft·en ·tr·eated ~aJS. though it were ~a -confession. This
is cle:f!aly an ·erroneous view.''
1

The ~ca1s'eiS .also um~£ormly hold that where a pei\son
has oDJce d·eni~ed hi'S. guilt of an offense ·charged, he iJs
not called upon 1-Jo ·deny it ~eveTy rtiime it is mentioned,
and ~that his fiail ure to do s10 when, the matter is re-

peated is not admi_,s,sible. It will be rel(~;a.ll~ed th~t F~islh
er Rrur:cis ,and M·r. Finch both tes,tified ~that Mr. Fimcll
de1nied knowledg·e of any p~a.yoff jus1t prior to this meeting ~t the Alta. Clu!h.

People vs. Collins, 137 N. E. 753 (N. Y.):

m

T:his ,inViolv:ed 1a1gain quite a lengthy statemoot
which 1the ~defendant wa.s -charged ~a n;umbeT of ~times
with guilty eonduot and remained silent. Tihe opinion
s1a.y;s:
''Collins had a.lr,e~ady told his ·&tory. He
,had already ·Contr!adicted the ~s:tat'e,ments made.
U ndJe,r such a state of facts:, the failul}e· to renew
his 'Cbenial wHs no indication of 'acquies~oonce in
1any event. * :!:, * 'Collins may or m~ay not have
been guilty of the ·crin1e ·charged agains:t him.
Wih~ther guilty or not, he WlaS· entitled to a fair
~tri,al. Thi's 1he did not re.c~etive' and the judgmenrt of ·conviction ~appealed f1rom mus1t be re~

veT'S'ed. ' '
People vs. Barney, 184, N. E. 612:
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This ''as simil,~lr to the ea~Q ·n,t bar in tha:t tthc defense ask~l the rourt. to hear tlu} t'e~tin1ony of ·an alleged admission firs.t atnd deteiinin~ it~ adnli'~·sibility;
just as w'as d'One h~re in the <.~l$e of ~[r. P~t~.rce (lnd
also Mr. Erwin, where transel"ipts of ~the testimony
were present. The court refuse-d, and ·the testimony
was given bef-ore the jury. Here the defenst.• \Vlanrted to
9how that the defendl8n1t had preYiously denied the accusation that hte bought a g-allon of gasoline from the
witness.. 'l'he mtness "\YaS allowed to te.&tify that at
the time in question he identified the man as the one
-wtho bought a gallon of gasoline from him and thaJt the
man:L being so identified didn't deny it. ·l'he court did
afterwards strike out the aceu....~ng portion of the testimony 13Jld the defendant's previous denial of the
purcha..."-e, but :all-owed the identifiootion to stand. The
oprmon says :
''Such statement will never be admissible
where the accused unequivooally denies the truth
of the statement or where ihe shows clearly that
he dl(}es not aequiesce in it." ( CitiiDg 143 N. E.
448, 113 N. E. 113) * * * Unless the words or
conduct of the IOOCused under the circumsrtancejs
are such that there is a nwtural and re,asonable
infer-ence that he &Thnitted the truth of the
charge, such stmement is ioodmissibl·e. * * *
104 N. E. 259. The testimony Df Feldman, was not
only incompetent 'but highly prejudicial to de-

fendant.''
People vs. De Bolt, 256 N. W. 615:
Is another case holding that the de:£end:ant, having
previously deni~ that he 1md anything to do with the
robbery, the foot that he failed to deny a statement 'by
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a (~o~def,endant accus,~ng him dir<e·ctly of participation in
the robbery was n01t admiss[ble and the case w~s reversed he(,aus·e~ :of i1ts: admi's'ffi,Qin.
~See

Johnson vs. State, 296 8. W. 887,

a later
cas;e on the ·point thla!t the accll!s;ati on was not of the
3JS

1

offe.ns:e· charged.

Commonwealth vs. Smith, 161 Atl. 418;
Is :a later ~case involving the question. of hesitation in oanswerilln;g. This W1as rthe only basis :for any clalim
of alle,ged ·admisiSiiOillSi by Mr. Finch :and Mr. P1earoe.
In this eas1e one, Fish·er, made a ·con£eS:sion of .setting
fire to the building tand ~s:t!atedl cfuat the defendJaJillt pro'eured him to burn it for $1000.00. ·The confe.ss~on contained other .allegatii~orns ,accusing ilhe ,defendant. This
was vead to 'the def.en.darut. The witne,s.setS· tesitified tlhat

the ~defendant remain~ed silen•t fbettwe,en five and fifteen
minutets aftter ·thes1e accus:ations "r:er<e, re,ad. T:he· defendant them: s1a]d} Fisther w~as ta ''na't" alllJd a liar. 'Th:e court
[held thaxt it was ,e.rr.or to admit. 'the ~confesiSion because
the defe.ndant d~d ~deny the truthfuln·e's's' therieof, that
her ·conduct (~oul~d not be dHs,crihed as an 1as;sent by silence to ·the accunaey of ilie st~a:tements, in the· comfessti.on. ·The case was. reverned.

Commonwealth vs. Maza.rella, 124 A.tl. 63, is another eas~e 1holding that comp~licity having been p~revi
ously d:enied, ~s.ubs~equent refusal to de~ny oould not be
in:tl"odru.ced.
·T;bJis ratte~mprt to make ad.mistS:iOOlls by the use of
long ~and damaging recital'S, pal'lti cu1arly as rbo what
1
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persons had been told on an inv·estig.a;tion, <>r had found,
or a friend ha.d told them, and "~lH:~re the convt'rs.ation8·
result in a denial ins•tead of an implied admission,
are usually condemned as the foregmng authorities
show.

In 3 Jones' OollllOOntaries on Ev. (2d. Ed.) 1063,
Mr. Jnstic~ Field is quoted:

'·Every admission upon \Yhioh a party reis to be .taken as an entirety of the f!OOt
which makes for his side, with the qual.ificatio'DJS
-which limit, modify, or destroy it.s effect on the
other side.''
li~

In 22 C. J. 41±, relating to admissions it is said:

"The triers of the faot * * * are not at liberty to disbelieve the self-'servillng paTt capriciously and without any reasonable grounds; and it
·has boon said 11hat they cannot beliew part and
d!isbelieve another pari unless suoh pa·l"'ts. are
distinet and relate tD different matters. or £acts. ''
The vice 'Of introducing a statement made to a defendant that somebody else lmd said something and
lbhen trying to claim as an accusation WJhalt the other
person ·said, is illustrated in Risdon v. Yates, 145 Cal.
210, 78 Pac. 641, where the .situation is discus;sed, that
a pu'blisher of the Bible might be cbarge<t f.or printing
"1.'he fool hath said within hi'S heart, 'there is no God',"
and by ·selectim.g only the words "iflhere is no God" an
indietment for b181Sphemy be sustalined thereon.
Here we have a long recital .to Mr. Fish in the
ooture of a report of investigation by Fisther Harris, a.
claim that 3 single item was palSSed over without Mr.
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Finch's ·denying it "·at t~hat time", amd th.a:t he did deny
it when 11:Jhe- re·cirtal was finished ~and he started to talk.
In the ·case 10f Mr. P·e:ar:ce, a long reci:tal dJirecledi t~o and
involvling requested informatiton .and makim;g one or two
incidental refe:re:nce:s ·to Mr. Pearce. Naturally he
would hesi.tate, to think about the mrutt,er of infQrmati,on reque~s1ted, and again we have only ·the cLaim thrut
he ·did mot deny partH 10f this r~ecHJal immedia.te,Jy, but
~did indicrut~e his ,denilal by asking, "Who says I am involved?'' And ·then ·dlenied being invol~ed. 1T1o introduce these reeitals not ·accusing ei:tJher of rthe of£ense
·charged, a's well as the other ·srrmilar ~eciltals herein a;gstigi11ed .and obj,ected to, is cl,early shown by the foregoing authorities. to !be prejudic]al error.
TESTIM~ONY

UNDER CLA·SSIFICATION (3):

Tlhe following dils~custsion is in ref-erence to ~he
'above tes1t·imony wi•th reJ,arbion ,to ·diffe.ren·t .acts or irregul~ar ennduet or eonvne:r.s1a:tiuns- involving ir're·gula.r conduct of the illlldividual defe::rudants ·.them·s.elves. It is our
positiJon :that none of this·, unde~r the rule 1a1S to circum'srbanJti,al evidlence', ternds to establish in any degree the
exiJs,ternce of t;he :agre·ement and eonspira,cy alleged and
that it was als.o erroneously admitted, and was hi~h
ly p·rejudieial.
Tihis include1s t:he· testtimony of D. L. Hays that
ihe told Mr. Finch that gambling occurred in the licensed ~card rooms ~and tha;t Mr. Ftinoh said he knew
it ~did !and that ·he was not going to dkJ ·anything ~about
i·t ~and ~ave his- reaS'ons. The tes:timony of Mr. Ellett
concerning the dis·cussion ·as ~to ~the payment of fines
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~f

book-makers so that the eity could get the bene·fit
of the fines. The testimony ftS ~to Mr. Fin<ili that he
didn't particularly objecl to Yice but <li.dn't \\:<tnt them
to get :bhe best of it, and aloo ~tthat 1001 t"~o or thflee
oooa.sions he ordered ·some ·opera~tions to close, and
these later reopen-ed. T.ha1. he told the 'vi tness Holt he
was making the town too hot, .and the remoV'al of Holt,
and the -appointment and later removal of Record, and
11he later appointment of '!'hacker; and also HQl:t 's ~tes.................. timony that Mr. Finch told 'him :to ·see Rosenblum and
some of the othe-rs who operated ·places where there
were card Tooms, at different times. And also ~the tes'""
tiioony of Holt in which he intimated that Mr. Finch
had told him to quit making oollootions, but wthich simmered down to the testimony that Mr. Fim.cll had told
him to close some pl;a-ees up. The testimony of Fisher
Harris that :Jir. Finch had stated, also in 1938,
on two occasions that he did not believe there
was a payoff or had not heard of a pay-off, and at
the Alta Club that ihe said it was the fiD&t that he had
heard of the payoff situation described and .asked how
long it had been going on, and also Mr. Finch's willingness to resign. This involves also ·the testimony of Mr.
Hedman that he and Mr. Finch discussed in Mr. Finch',s
office the maJtter of an arrest by HedUnan ':s departmoot
in 1'hacker'•s department, in whidh Mr. Finch listened
but didn't say anything. Also the testimony of 0. B.
Record' of a similar character, .and discussion with Mr.
"11hacker in the pres·eooe of Mr. Foinoh oonoorning arrests made by ;him ·of book-makers. Also the testimony
of 0. B. Record that he saw Rosenblum, who was a
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bondsman, ,t,alking wrth Mr. F~inch three or four times
but that he had no idea what they were talking about.
T.his, in brief, show.s thiS' cl!ass of 1testimon.y as to

Finch.
T.her.e is .also in this ·cl•as,sification witlli relation to
Mr. Pearce 1Jhe t-e.s:timony of Go1den Holt that in June,
1937, he p~laeed on Mr. P ear.ce,'s ·de.sk aprp·roximately
$500.00 in money whi·ch he 1had collecteru fr.om houses
of prositituti!on and that Mr. P·eta:vce put it im. a drawer of
hi.H ·desk on the side that Mr. Hiarmon Wi3JS !Seruted and
~asl{!ed rthe witne•ss Holt if ·that was all of it. Also tlhe
1at·er testimony .of this. wi·tnes~s thlat in September or
O·ctober of 1937 that he again wernt io Mr. Pearee'•s office ~at the instruction of Mr. Harmon .rund the·]}e was
asl{)ed by Mr. P·eavce why he didn't ·colleCJt from certain
girlS' 1at ·CBDtain vesid!ence's~ ; ttha t ·the place's mentioned
by M:r. Peavce were on ·a ~slip· of pap·er which he !had.
1

1

T1his includes also the te,stimony of Mr. Harris

that in ms rCOnVle.r.s:atioTIJ asking for infonnation ood in
the following telephone eonversation, Mr. P·e1arce did not
giv;e him ·the, information he demanded.
In ·this ·cl,as:s[fi,ootion, as to Mr. P·earce, al·s.o is t·he
te.stimony of H. K. Reeord that in a conversation in Mr.
Pe a:f1ce·':s office around tJhe middle: of Ap·ril, 19·37, wlhen
Mr. Hannon was: pres.ent, Mr. Pearce s·tated that he
h18Jd be-en re1sponsiblje for having Re·cord placed on tfue
vice squad and p:r:opos.ed to him that he ma~e· oolloo·
tions, not from the hous1e's. of prostitution but from <Df·
f.eremlt gambling pl!ace1s.
1
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From the te-8tjmony here ·a~ againsi ·thes~ defendants one must "~ou..1er llo"~,-Rfter N1e t..\xelusion of every
hypothesis of innocence of the actual offense charged
and under the lJa,y .as lai(l do",l in Terry YS. United
States, (9 C. C.) I Fed. ( 2d) 28, that it i8 not ~sufficient
thtat a reasQnable inference ma.y be dra.",l ~supporting
the charge, but that Hcircumstantial evidence * * *must
be of ·such character as to exclude eYery hypothesis but
that of guilt of the offense imputed to ·the defendant''this evidence tends in any degree to support the convi.cti'On of the charge of the oonspiracy and agreement
between the defendants charged, to permit and allow
the opemtioll!S alleged.
It may indicate that Mr. Finch did not stop prostitu.-tion, or card gambling in licensed card rooms. Tlu~re
may be ·a difference of opinion as to whether prostituiiw could or should be stopped, but there is ·certainly
no evidence tending in the slightest degree to .show an
agreem~nt by him with the other ~alleged conspirators to
penmt and allow these opemtions.
As to Mr. Pearce, if the testimony of H. K. Record is believed ii may be inferred that he attempted to
enter into a ;smaller tamrl different conspiracy, not to
permit and ~allow operations but to extort money from
some of ·them. However, this conspivacy never materialized, 18.Ild !it is not the one alleged. lt may further be
claimed ·that if the testimony of Holt be believed}, it may
he inferred that ·there was some 3J!Toangement betweoo
him and H:armon ~a.nd Pearce in ·the lafttter part of 1937
to extort money from thouses of prostitution. We ,s,ay,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

78
if Holt's testimony may be believed, because we shall
contend t:hat Holt was :for thi:s purpos~e 'an admitted
accomplice and there ·was no corrolbora tion of his testimony. In any ·event, this 'vould be a. smaller and a diff.ere,nt ·con:spiDa1cy fl"om -that all~eged ~and one oot to
aid pr:osrtit:ution but to ,hamp,e·r it by extortion, involvitng an entirely dfi.fferent agreement ·and offens~e.
We will not ~attempt to ·cite ~all the oas~es bearing
upon t.he que,stion of the inadmissibility and the in-sufficiency of :this evidence as to ~diffe~~ent intimations
of varilous wrong doing, but will ·Ci t:e some rece111it authority wihich w·e hope will !help to emphasizH our position.
Wilder· vs. United Stales, 100 Fed. (2d)
177, (10 C. C.)

Ls ~a ~cas:e alle~ging 'a. (~onspiracy 1t.o vi·olate the Na:tionJaJ. Prohibition Aot. Judge BI"atton revi'e·ws :a lot of
testimony such as we ha.ve in t~his ~cas·e indicating delfinJite wrolllg doing by th.e defendants, including the sheriff, and ·c1ear1y sho,ving extortion of money from peopl'e engaged! in t~he .stale of liquor. The opinion :S:ays::
'' I't was no1t. pos,sible under any conceivable
view of ·the ·evidence for the jury to d~aw the
im1£erence or deduction tha;t. the convers,ation and
contacts with them ten:ded remote~y to show
~concert of 13JCJtion ~to violate the re'Vlenue l~aws· of
the United S ta:t~es. ' '
* * * * * *
'' Vci!ewed in the light most favor1alb~e to the Government, no substantial ~evidence Wias~ adduced to
:s how tha:t ~thes-e .appellants formed a conspiracy
or ~aided others in ·carrying out one to viol~ate ·tiDe
1
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laws of the lTnitoo
:Metur~.

Statl~~ rt.~la.tiing

J><k~OO~Ion,

or

sale

to tlhl\ 111lall1Uof intoxicBJting

liqu'Or.''

''Laying aside the qu~~tion "·hethe-r they a.crt:ed
toge-ther in .e~orting money from others f.or p·rotootion against prosecution under the laws of the
state or otherwU.s~ pa.rtieipa.ted in a concert of
aoti'On to prevent t~he enforcement nf suclh laws,
there was no sub:Sta.nti.al evidence from which it
reasonably could be inferred -or deduced. that
they formed or furthered am; agreement or unde.rstanding, express or implied, having- f.or its objoot and purpose th~ TI.olat.ion of the laws of the
United States.''

Weniger t·s. United States, 47 Fed. (2d) 692
(9

C. C.):

Is a very pointed case on the point that evidence
must point to the agreement and the particip~a:tion. wirth
knowledge of tilie agreement ralleged before a conviction
can be had thereon. Tllis ease in,olved bootleggers a;nid
memberrs of the Board of Trustees ·and police office~r of
the ·town of lrullan, Idaho, and also the County Sheriff
Weniger 'and hi~ deputy, Blo.om. The sheriff and deputy
appealed from the conviction. The ·offense ·oharged was
conspiracy to violate the Kational Prohibition Act. It
was clearly vliolated and the town ·collected from it.
lt was shown •that ;the sheriff mingled with, protected
and patronized the vi·olators and ·aided them against
raids and on one oooasion arreSJted a Federal agent
and warood him no keep out of the ·county. The· other:s
did not appeal. Tihe opinion reversed the judgment of
conviction as against -the Slheriff and his deputy. It says:
1
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''The ~crime of col1lspiracy ('titl~e 18 U. S.
Code, ·SHe. 88 (18 US~CA Sec. 88) consists in the
~combining ·Or ~cornf:ede:rtasting 'Of two or more perISOI1JS wi,th the· purpos'e of -committing ta; puhlic offense. It ~~s d:tstinct f·vom the offense iDJtended to
he ;aecomplis1hed as 1a resul:t of ~the conspiracy
'and is ~complet.e upon the ~orming of the criminal
agreemelflJt ana the p;erforming o.f '3Jt least one
ov;ert act in furthe:va.noo of rt:he unlawful de,sign. ''
(Citing 'authority).

"THE F~AIL URE ·O·F A PERSON T·O PREVEN·T THE ~CARRYTNG OUT OF A CON.SPIR.A!CY, EVEN TH'OUGJH HE HAIS 'THE POWER 80 ·T,O D~O, WILL NO'T MAKE HIM
GUIL·TY OF ITHE ,O,F'FENSE WITH~OUT
FURTHER PRO·OF THAT HE HAS IN SOME
AFFIRMATIVE WAY CO,NSENTE1D 'TO BE
A PART·Y 'THERET~O.''
1

r.Dhe opinti!on t!hen eomments th~t the United States
Aitorney '' relie·s l~a.rgely upon a showing of inactiolllJ on
the p1art of the sheliiff 'Of the eounty and his deputy in
enfor-cing the liquor Laws .a.s establishing ·Coliln:e~ction of
these .appell~ants \viith t!he .conspi:rta,cy ~charged", and then
points out that t:he evidence d:id Sihow that the sheriff
and his deputy kno\vingly p.e,rmitted :the violation of
both the Sita:te and Federal ltaw, arnldl holds that 11Jhis, was
not suffici,ent ·to ·connect 't'hem with the iagve~ement alleged, the~ir m1scond uct did not show :that they we~re
parties to the agreement all'eged. ·On :the- question of admissibility of ~such evi·dence of wrongdoing, the, opilnli~n
1

1

say;s:

'' T.he ·cross ex,a.mination of ~appellant Bloom
resrpecting \hi's knowledge of the prev.alency of
gambling in Mull~an had no 'reas1onable relation
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to ·the chta.rge

b~ng inYe~tig·a.te-d *
Bloo1n, ~ an officer,

* •. The inJtiano,ved orhhter

mation ·that
form-s of la"'" violation to b~ carried. out without
interference would tend naturally to e.roote in the
minds of·the jury a prejudice a.gains~t him ~and his
superior officer. These fa>e.t·s "·ere not relevant
to the question ·as to whether •the appell~ant ha.d
engaged in the conspiracy • • • . ''
Dono·vam

r~.

[inited States. 54 Fed. (2d) 193:

Is a g'OOd case on th:e sufficiency of the evidence and
of the necessity that it point to the guilt 'Of the· offense
charged and n'Ot other wrongdoing.
Previously Wells and Beals were convicted under
a liquor charge. Defendant Donovan and Wells and
Beals and R.ossiter, an attorney, and one Pat:r.one were
here chlarged with ·a OOilliSpiracy to conceal ·a pe~son f!OT
whose arrest a warront .had been li.ssued, by concealing
his true identity ·and by obstructing and impeding the,
United ,State-s. What taciually ·happened was that when
it came to the sentence on ra plea of guilty of a lesser
dharge, the defendants substituted Patrone for W·el1s
and Patrone was sentenced, 'standing up with Beals: who
knew what the arrangement was. They were all coiitvictoo 1and: the appeal is by Beals an~ Rossliter, the attorney who represented Wells and Beals and who mas
present and pleaded Beals and Patrone, who were
sentaooed. The court held that Beals knew of the ·arr.angement; that it was not .s·hown 11hat he was instrumental in bringing about the 1agroement ; that he had
full knowledge and stood mute, and that this was mt
sufficient.
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'The main diseus:sion !then turne-d ·to Attorney Rossiter. Ros,siter had ·taken Wells and Beals. ·out of jail on
bail, ~then f·or a peri:od of time was away and did illtot
repres-ent :them. AttorneJiS in 1a.nother town 1arra.nged
with the prose~cutors ror ·these two defendants to make
t:he plea ·of guilty on a lesser ·charge. Rossiter returned
and me~t W eUs and B:eals rullld Patrone at the court house
with ~some clients of his in other ·cases. Wells did
not g~o before the court, but R·ossiter took in Patrone
~and Beals~ in thi1s cas~e and two 'O'r three other c1i·ents in
utheT ~cruse's. When this ~ease "W!a.s ealled thes~e defendamrts
S'tood up and he represented them ·and 'they pleaded and
were sentenced.. The 'bail money put up by Wells was
then withdrawn 'and Rossiter went to lunch in a hotel
room with Wells and Donovan and the other attorneY'S
and there it was testified that Rossiter s:a.id, "We have
put it ·over." The bail money wrus the~re divided. The
opimtion re·versHd the case as ·to Rossiter, holding that
he undoubtedly knew of this substitution but under t,he
rule of evi·den~ce it .could not be inferred .that he wa·s a
party ~to the agreement to make this subs1titution. The
Opill10n 1Sa.JIS :

"BEING AN ATT·ORNEY-AN OFFI~CER
OF THE C·OURT-IT W AiS UNQUESTIONABLY RO·SSITER'S DUIT·Y TO APPRI~SE
THE C:OURT O:B, THE FRAUD. YET, IN REVIEWIN·G HI·S TRIAL, WE ARE NOT il)EALIN·G WITH OFFI~CIAL D·U·TY, PROFESSIONAL ET·HI~C~S, OR MORALS. WE ARE COLDLY
CON·CER.NED WITH IT·HE LAW TO BE APPLIED T 0 :THE F ACT:S AND WITH THE
P·ERMISSIBLE INFERENCES OF GUILT TU
THE EX!CLUSJON OF EVERYTHING ELSE.
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

83
IF THE F.A.llTS ,,.ERE EQlT.ALLY ~USCEP
TIBLE OF INFEREN0ES OF INNOCENCEINN{1-CENCE IK R.ESPECT TO THE SPECIFIC OFFENSE FOR. ''THICH HE 'VAS ON
TRIAL-THAT DISPOSES OF THE ~IAT
·TER, Graceffo Y. l:nited Statt.~s, (C. C. A.) 46
Fed. (2d) 852, 853. FINDING IN THIS REC·OR.D NO SlTBSTANTIAL EVID-ENCE OF
FACTS WHICH EXCLUDE EVERY OT'HE•R
HYPOTHESIS TH.AX THAT OF GUILT, WE
.ARE COKSTRAIXED TO HOLD THE EVIDENCE DOES KOT SUST.A.IN ROSSITER'-S
CO~TVICTION. ''
ComJnonzcea.Ztlz
Pa-.):

~·s.

Benz, 178 Atl. 390, (1935-

A oonspira.cy was alleged to defraud the oounty by
nsing gasoline procured on county orders. for private
use. The oourt renews the showing in the ·evidence of
irregularities, some use of publie gas thy individual defendants and their families, failure t·o enter -orders., etc.,
and points out that s-ome of the thirn1gs dlone were improper and irregnJ..ar. The opinion reversing the conviction ·says:
''The charge of com piracy i1s easily maJde.
Mere suspicion and possibility of guiliy connections is rroot to be received as proof in such oases.
* * * A f-oundation must fiTst be laid by proof
sufficient to establish the unlawful agreement between the parties. The connection being thus
,shown, the subsequent oots in purs113.IOOe of .that
.agreement are then original evidence against
them. But the ·subsequent ·acts are immaterial and
are not compentent until the ~agreemelnlt is -estarolished (citing authorities·.) T'he g:m¥amen of the
conspi:t"acy all·eged lies in ·the agreement with
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~criminal
rto p~vove

intelllt to def:r1aud ~the county; ftailure
the agree·ment with s.uch imltent defeats
·the charge (~citing au1Jhoritie1s). * * * The Commonwealth thus failed to show any combination,
certainly failed to prove an unlawful combination, and such failure defeats the conspiracy
1alleged. * * * The f,acts and ~civcumstamtees must
not only be ~consis1tent with and point to ~the guilt
of the accus~ed; but ~they must b~ inconsis~tent with
'his innocence. (Citing authorities).''
Da~vidson

vs. United States, 61 l?ed (2d)

250, (8 C. C.):
Thi,s. caSJe indi~crut·es Wlh·erein the eVidence here is insufficient. ·T;he eonspir~acy ~ooarged was one between Davidson, Brummell and W~eber, d-efendants, and tw<> oth~er indti.viduaLs, Gillette a1nd Latimer, to violate the Natiol)!al M ortoT V·ehicle ·Theft Act and on IS:econd count
~<to transport the stolen motor vehicle ·and on the third
'count to knowingly receive and store, etc., a certain car
knowing it to be stolen.
1

1

Tlhe dris,cus~sion on the ap·p·eal relates to Davidson
and B·rummell, ~constable and deputy constable in 'a tnwn
in Missouri. ·The ear was stolen in ~Oklahoma, stored in
Kansas City, M·o., and afte:nvards delivered by Gillette
to DaviJdson and Brummell, who sold the car, as the
opinion isa.ys, knowing that it was a stolen car. They told
the 'buyer that it had been pieke:d up and held f.or a
long p~eriod of time and was he·ing s·old unde~r aiilJ order
of the Jus:tice of the Peace to pay the charges, and ~they
is,sued a cons,tahle '·s bill of s,ale ,so ilhat the buyer could
get official ti,tl'e'. They 'a1so tol~d the same story to the
go¥ernment insp·ector, ~and afterward admitted that it.
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was false ·and ·tha:t they "'l'\re S(\llin~ the r~1 r f.or themselves upon :the solicitation of Gillette "mo ha.d stated
that it was a hot ca.r s.tolalll from an Indil(Ul. Thfl opinlon, reYersing the conviction~ sa~~s:

''Of coursE\ it is apparent that Davidsom1 a.nd
Brummell kne"· that they "\Yere :handling 'a soealled '' h()t '' car, and that they adopted this plJan
-of issuing a constable ',s bill of ·S'ale in order to
sustiaiD apparent tiJtle in the hands of the purchaser. The oonclusion is irresistible that both
Davidson and Bummell prosti,tuted their official
position as offieers in furtherance of a sche-me to
dispose of a car t.hat they knew to be sfulen.''

*

* * * * * *

''One may suspect or conjecture that D!avidson
and Brummell were :acting as ''fences'' for stolen cars transported in interstate commeree in
pursance to some conspiracy, but the evidence
will mot justify such a conclusion. The evidence
1.vould zoarrant the veiw that these defendants,
Davidson and BrummeU, conspired with Gillette
to sell a stolen car, but that conspiracy is not
the one charged in. the indictment.''
''The subterfuge employed by these defendants
in disposing of tbi'S car by issllii,ng a constable's
bill of 1sale, andi the false statements mad·e rto the
officens with reference to the matter, strongly infer that they knew that they were handling a
stolen car; but such circumstances cann<>t supplant the absence ·of testimony or circumstance
connecting .these defendants· with the conspiracy
charged in tbi1s indictment.''

Young vs. United States, 48 Fed. (2d) 26:
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conduct of ·defendants. in 1a eornspir,a:ey ca·s,e, even thougili.
their conduct may relate ~to the charge, a.s not proving the ~agrHement.
Here s·ix defendants were charged and conveioted
of a ·conspir'acy to possess and .sell utE~nsils fo-r bootlegging 1and ralSro substances, including corn ehops, sugar,
~and -ot1her mate.rials. T:he· Government proved that .h\~o
of them .sold wholesale these· things and delivered them
to two other defendants who had 1adjoining stores with
an ellltra.nee between, and that the·se ·two ~diefendants
s·old the·m to customers. for us.e, ·the .cus~tomers including
the orthe·r ~two defendants. eonvri:cted. The ·court points
out that no connection was shown between the customers
and the wholes1ale sellevs and no 1agreement as alleged
shown be~tween any of them. ·T:he opinion s~ays.
''The conviction of the selleDs ·canmnot be susrbained on the ground :that t!hey had knowledg'e
of the· intention of ·the purchaHers to use· the ~sugar
rand other artic.le·s in conne~ction with the uruawful manufacture ·of liquor. ·One ·cannot be held
as ·a member of a conspiraey upon proof merely
that he had knowle·dge of, or nega1tively acquies,ced in, a ·Crime that was a/bout to be oommi·ttedl; but, in orde·r to :ra1s:t·ffill guilt upon one accused of being a ·coconspirator, it i~s neces~sary to
prove that he ~aet~ve~ly participated in the con·Spir.a~cy ·Charged. Bishop's Criminal Law (9 Ed.)
Sec. 633; 5 R. :C. L. 106:5; McD~aniel v. United
States, (C. C. A.) 24 F. (2d) 303. There was no
evidence that Lee Frankltin and ~Campbell were
' ~app:ears, ~each \\18S
actim1g in ~concert;' foT· rail tlhat
acting only for .himserlf. The colllspiracy charged
w:rus not proved ~against any of the ap~pellants."
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12 Corpus Juris 5-!3, Pa.ra. ;), Sec.

~:

·~To constitute ·a. ~onspirnry -t-ht:rP n1nst be
unity of design and puq)o~e, for the caJu 111on d~
sig·n is of the esse~u·e of the conspiracy. The confederating together is so nece-ssary a!s a. constituent element of the crime, tha:t it has been held
that seYeral pers.ons mtay, simultaneously, actually do, without ineurring liability t·o puni.shment, that "-hich if it ,yere the object of a preconcerted de-siga although m~ot d<>ne or attempted, would render the participant's Hable to indictment for conspiracy; nor zci.Zl e1.·i.dence that each
of sereral defendants acted illegally or maliciously zcith the sanze end in 1.~ieu: support a charge
of conspiracy, 1.1;nless it appears that such acts
zt·ere d_o-ne pursuant to a Jnufual agreement."

12 Corpus Juris 551:
"Tthe overt act, when es•sential to a conviction of conspiracy must be a sulbHequent independent act following the cOOl!spira.cy and must
be one committed .to effect the object there:of. ''
united States vs. Corso, 10 Fed. (2d) 604,
(9 C. C.):

It was held that evidence that one .accused} cashed
a check obtained from the victims by ·other~s who w-ere
eng.aged in tand convicted of w.hat WJas called an ''eye
fraud", ·and also deposited checks fior collection in a
lbank whi-ch forwarded the items :through United States
mails, was insufficient ,to sustain a convictioo againsrt
·him for conspiring Wlitili. others ·to use the mails- ~to defraud, in the ''tabsence of evidence that 1accus~ec] hOO
knowledge of fraudulent scheme at time he ·eashed check
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or that it was a p!art of .a seheme of
should be used. ''

other~s

that mails

United Sta.tes vs. Gr·ossmatn, 55 Fed. (2d) 408:
The ~charge was that Gros:sman tas chief of police
,of the City ·of Long Beach, and other perso!IltS, agreed
to give protection to violation of the prohibition law.
·The court, after di1s-cussing the elements of conspiracy,
~said:

''However, before the oveTt act can be taken into ·conside:vation, it must be found that the
defendant·s wefle parties to the •conspiracy. The
overt act must be entirely imiliependent of the
conspiracy. It must not be one of a series of acts
constituting 1the agreement, but it must \be a subs!eque·nt, indep,endent ·act following a complete
agreement or ·conspirocy :and t.emd .to oarry into
·effe:ct the obj-ect of the original ~agreement.''

Turcott vs. United Sta.tes, 21 Fed. (2d) 829,
(7 C. C.):
Here several persons were eharged with conspiracy
to viol,ate the F·edeml Prohilbition Law. The opinion
s.ays:
'''The law is "\Vell settled tihat active P'articipation mus·t be e~stablis!hed. Mere knowledg·e of
illegal acts of others· is not ·suffici·ent. ''

Langer vs. United States, 76 Fed. (2d) 817,
(8 C. C.):
ls a ease revevsimg .a convicti·on for .conspiracy to
·corrupt ·the admini,s.tr.a.tion of certain laws of ·Congress
rela:ti:ve to relief funds. It was ~claimed .that the defendant politi·cal party workers .agve•ed to a plan to oompel
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ing the relief footls to eontribute to tlu'\ political w·orker~s
and their political funds. The o-pinion n1nkPs a di-sttinction that we haYe atte1upted to 1nake beh\.,t:\Pn substantive offenses ;and a mere ehargll of eL'n-spi racy. The opinioo s~ys:
''Th'e gist of the offense is the alleged conspiracy to obstruct the adminisf rafi.on of a government fu.nctio·n... It is not claimed that the overt
acts charged in thems~lYes eonstitute substantive offenses. U nles.s t-here "\'\'":as such a conspiracy
the conviction o()f appellant oo.nnot be sustained.
Whatever "~e may think of the ethics or propriety of the pl'W}tice employed by appelaJillt to secure f1mds for political purposes, it is not a matter of concern to the got~ernment unless some
lawful fu'nCtion was thereby obstructed. * * *
* * * So far as the direct ewdence of any plan of
conspira.cy for the collection of fl1'nds is concerned, it was confined to ass:essment of state
employees.''
Tthe government contended that a. conspimcy may
be inferred from the overt acts 6f the parties~, it being
shown that one of them solicited cl'erks in the Emergeney Relief office. But the court said, that gra;nting that
this was done, it was no proof of an agreement to do
this.
People vs. Brawn, 88 P(J;C. ( 2d) 728:

ItS cited h'ere more particularly upon the point that
the introduction of these alleged matter,s of misconduct by individual defendants separately BJS evidence
against all, not only did IIlJOi tend t·o sustain :tthe conviction but was prejudicial ·error. ·The case has ~a good
discussion on cor.robo:ration of ·an accomplice·.
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·On the point now under consideration amd under
the indli·ctm.ent for roblbery, particip·ation of different
de:fendant1s in different robberies w'rus im,troduced. Not
all of the· defendant's partieip1ated in the.se, so that it
could not he for ·the purpos.e of .showing a~ssociation between the a;lleg~ed eonsp~ra:tor.s. The ·appellant was shown
to have p·arti~cipa:ted .imr one.
''Timely obje-ctions and appropriate motions
rto ·s,trike were made on behalf ·of app:ell!ant, and
this testimony should ih.Jave been limited by the
•cou~t in i~ts appliooti,on to the defendlants who
p·articipated: in 'the re·spoective robherie'S, amd
1ilierefore ·should have been -eX!cluded a:s to the apP'e'll!ant, ~ex·ceprt in the Dairy case, in connection
with whi·ch there. was competent evidence· of appellant's participation.
''That ithis line of testimC){lliY was prejudicilal
to ap'P'ell,ant ·cannot he questioned and is evidenced by the fact that Mr:s. Ann Groves, one of
·the defendant's w.hose participati,on im1 the Beehive
·Cafe robbery was akin ·to that of .appellant, Wla's
acquitted, while the lrutter was convieted. M:oreOV1er, •and in conneetion with this type of evidJence,
the eourt if a retrial i s had should be careful
to insitruct the· jury that the defemdants are on
trial solely for the offenses ·Charged in the inform~ti·on, to-wit, mu~der .and .attempted murder,
alleged ·to have be·en .oommi,tted on March 21,
1938, a,s ·set forth in the inftorm:ation, 1and are not
.em tri·al for ·conspiracy, nor for ~any offens·es odl·er than the ones ·Clharged in the informati,on;"
1

TESTIMO·NY UNDER CLASSIFICATION ( 4):
We come now to the offer of declarations by some
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tion that any ~uch declai"~1 ti.on "-ns inad1ni~~~ilble until
the conspiracy w·as other"-i~t"\ establishetl, and t.ha:t ·such
evidence could in no 'Yay be ·adnlit'tt.~i :to establish it .

.r.Dhiis evidence was introduce-d by "-itne-gs "-ho testified that one of t.he defendant~, or .a. third peDson, had
made a statement to the witnes·~ -wi.th rellaJtion to another alleged defendant. ~lr. Hunsaker testified: that
Mr. Erwin had said, ~ 'I now ·ha Ye my ohlief of poli~ce'' and
that he might not be getting his full split from the chief
and that th~y couldal•'t get the chief because he didn~t
make the collections. Holt testified that Harmon in
1938 made ta statement to him that Fisher Harris and
Mr. Lee :had aooused ~r. P·earee of being in-\nolved in
collecti{)ns. The "Witness Kempner said that Abe Stubeck had told him that Harmon was dividirrr.g the money
collected with Erwin and his crowd. '!'here was also an
intimation in the testim-ony of H. K. Record thai Mr.
Pearce claimed he was authorized by Mr. Erwin to arrange for making collections from gamblers.
Assuming that these had related to .the offeiDISe
charged, Wibich they did not, still,adm.ission of this character of evidence must rest upon 1ilie theory of agency.
.A!s stated by the cases, a conspiracy is a pafltne·~ship
in crime, :and a statement of one caDflllOt be used against
another until the relation is established. It goes wiilbout
~&aying that the statements· alleged to have been made
by Mr. Thacker to Fisher Rarri.s abourt Mr. Fin~h are
definitely out because Thacker was ,acqui,tted of being
a COOlJSpirator.
We will now discus·s this question of f:oundation,
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and the ·cases go both to the state·ments of alleged consp[ra tor1s ·and also 1t:0 the strutements ·of third peDsons
about alleged ·eonspirato:Ds, and also to the conduct of
alleged} ·eoiiJspirators~ .as lbeitllig binding upon other.s. Some
of the authorities therefore overlap classification (3),
:above.
16 Corpus Juris 647, para. 1287:

''PRO·OF OF C0NSPIR.AlCY- a. NEC1

ES1SlTY. In order that t·he act~s or dec1arations
ane,ged {~onspir:ator may be admi~s·sible
ag.ainst an alleged •co~conspi:rtaJtor the existence of
rthe •Conspiracy must be .s-hown ; it a1s o must be
shown that the ·def.endrul1!t 1against whom the evidence is offered was. 'a p~arty to ~such conspioocy.
the same ru1e app·lies rto acts· and declamtions
of one ·Charged ·as .an •aider or abetter of defendant. ' '

~of an

1

The cas~es on this 1are too numerous to cite in full.
T~he principle is S0 well established th:at we will colllfine
oul"selv·e·s. to .some of .the pHrtinent ·authoritie•s.
1

Not only ean s.uch .statements not establish the
agency or the .cons-piracy, but if the sam·e were established, such 'S'tatem,ents anet .eonduct o.f alleged conspi:vatorrs ·can o~nly ihe introduced as aDe made or done in
furtheliance of the ~conspiracy. In other 'vords, they
are not binding unle1s:s. within the scope of the agency
or authority.

Witherow vs. Mystic Toilers, 130 Pac. 5S
( Ut. 1913) :
'

.

''Of eours.e agency cannot be shown by dec·
Lar.ations of ·the ·agent. And, before declarations
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of the ~agent 1nay be rPee-iYL"\,d n·~ ~l~tln1i~·~ions
against his principal, the ng-enc.y and the authority of the agent nntsf first be sho1cn. Hen\ neith·er
was shown. Xor is it true, as the eonrt ~t'enl:S. to
indicate in the charge, that de·elara1ion~ of an
.a.geD~t to sho"~ •agency, go merely to the question
t()f sufficiency of the eYidence to sho"T such relation, ·and hene.e may be considered for such relapose, in connection "~ith other evidence. The authorities, we think, are to the effect that such evidence is inco'lnptent for such purpose, and that
the fact of agenc11 m u.st be establ i~~h ed by evidence dehors the declaraf-ioJl.S of the agent.''
Looney t·s. Bingha,rn Da1:ry, 282 Pac. 1030
(Ut. 1929):

Is a case in. which it was held that admissions by
a1n ·alleged partner were improperly admitted because
nQt made in. pursuit of any partnership business or
while he was acting for or on behalf of the partnership.
the opinion says, at page 1033:

"We think the contention is well founded.
Tthe rnle is that th-e admissions of one ·copartner
:lint respect to :the joint business are competent
18.g13.illst the firm and its members, but to render
such admissions competent he must be acting as
a partner about a partnership matter, or the Hdmission must be made in rel·ation to ma;tters within the soope of the partnefiS'hip·. 1 Ency. Evideooe
p. 579; 22 C. J. 403; 1 Elliott on Evidence 369!
2 Jones, Comms. Qn Evidence (2d Ed.) 1712. T!he
rule is w·ell. illustrated .and stated in :the oo.;g,e of
State v. Salmon, 216 Mo. 466, 115 S. W. 1106. ''

Smith vs. State, 171 S. E. 578:
In this conspiracy ·case ·conversatiomis with var1oU1s
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defendants and others were admitted, and the- case was
vHve~sed beoa use the eons.piracy had not ibeen otherwise
·established. It also des~cuss-es the ·point that ·Some of the
alleged !admissions \vere af!ter the ·conspiracy had Hnded..
The op~nion ·s·ay's:
''declarations and acts of individuals cannot be
introduced aga.inst the defendant for the pu.rpose
of proving a conspiracy, but that such 1nust be
shown aliunde to render such declarations admissible as declarations of co-conspirators, and quot]Il!g from Wall v. State, 152 ·Ga. 318, 112 S. E.
142, 146 : 'No man's connection with a conspiracy
can be legally established by what the others did
in his absence arnd without h'is knowledge a1~d
concurrence.' ('Citing U. S. v. Babcock, 24 Fed.
:C·as. 1913, No. 14487.)

The court further

.s~tated:

''The Supreme Court of c~alifonnia .s~aid: 'IT:o
admit sueh de·clarations 1and such hear~say te·stimony in proof of the conspiracy itself, would in
civil matters ''put every 1narn to the mercy of
rogues.'' * * * and in charges of .criminal conspiracy, render the innocent am:d helpless victims of
villainous sche1nes, supported and proved by the
prearranged arnd ma:nufa.ctured evidence of the
p1·o1noters thereof.' P.eople v. Irwin, 77 :Cal. 494,
20 P. 56. Again, it has ibeen said: 'A spe-cies or
form of evidence \Vhich is in its nature inadmisi-lible, unl~ess s:ome prior or other faet is proved, cannot be. received to establish the fact proof of which
i~s an iiilidisp,ensable ·condition of i·ts. own admissibility.' Cuyler v. M·eOartney, 40 N. Y. 221; Id.
33 Barb. 165. Tthe ~criminal ·conspiracy cannot be
Slhown by declar~ation.s of alleged con'S'pirators,
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edge of, vtJH.:~:rs sought to :be boumd thereby, but
must be e~tablished by aliunde proof ·sufficient
to establish prima facie the faet of ennsph·acy
between the pa:rties. '~
State t·s. Hopkins.

~19

Pac. 1106 (1llon.t.):

Here the sheriff Hvpkins, \\ilsQn, the chief of police, and Bennett. a pool ·hall opera.tor, ""ere involved.
Bennett oontraeted \Yith a boot-legger, B·arroch, to buy
$1600.00 w-orth of liquor. The boot-legger, who testified for the ·state, drQve the liqu-or around back <>f the
ihotel near the pool hall where he met Bennett. Hopkins
tand Wilson were there ''ith guns and they took him,
al~ng with his party, and lookedl·t.hem in jail; they al1so
took the liquor. The~- kept the liquor ·and turmed the
prisoners loose and told them to get out of town and
never issued any eomplaints .against them. Bennett
went with them to the jail. The sheriff made no return Oil! the liquor sized. Conversations between Barrooh and Bennett were introduced involving the sheriff
and chief of police. The opinion said:

''It is ran elementary general rule that a defendant in a criminal case cannot be bound by
conversations between -third parties· not in his
presence, hence the rnlingH permitting Barroch
to testify to the conversations he ha;d with Bennett were prima facie erroneous. An exception
to the general rule, as well esta;blished as the rule
itself, permits evidence of the a·cts and decLarations of a coconspirator done or made in further31IlJCe of a common design to be .admitted
against tall the other parties to the conspiracy,
whether the ~acts or decl:arations. were done or
made in their pres·enoo or with their knowledge,
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provi,ded only that they were done or made during the life of the -conspiracy (,State v. Allen, 34
Mont. 403, 87 P~ac. 177), but the evidence of such
acts of ·de~clara;tions· is admis·sible only after
·proof of the ~existence of the ·Conspiracy, ( Subdiv.
6, ·para. 10531, 1and ·para. 11977, Rev. Code's 1921;
State v. Dotson, 26 Mont. 305, 67 p,ac. 938).
'' TheTe is not any pretense herH tha.t the
·exist,ence of a ·conspiracy between Hopkins, Wil~s<m and Bennett. had been .shown .a:t the time· the
objectionable evidence was admitttedJ; and the
only evi,dence introduced at any tim~e tending to
P':fiO¥e the exi,S'tenoe ·of such a conspiracy is that
B·ennett contra:cted to purchase the liquor from
Barroeh; ·that he was prels·oolt when Hopkins and
Wilson took the liquor from Barroch; that he ~ac
companied Wilson, Barroch, an~d Harrold to the
~city jail, and was pre.s1en t there when Barrooh
~and H!arrold were released f-rom custody.

' 'A conspiracy i1s' cons ti. tut~ed by an agreement, :and is a partnership im1 ~criminal purpo'ses.
United 'States v. Kiss;el, 218 U. ,s. 601, 31 Sup.
Ct. 124, 54 L. Ed. 1168. While it is not es,sential
that the agreement !between the parties· should
be formal, it is nHces.s:ary ~that their minds. meet
understandingly, ·so as. .to bring about oo intelligent 'and ~delibe:ria.te agreement: to do the ~acts . 12
c. J. 544."
1

Thom.as vs. United States, 57 Fed. (2d) 1039:
Is a eaHe which so ~cle:arly 1s1tates the principl~es ·~re
·contended for, and ·cite's the authorities. in ·support. thereof in the followiiillg three paragrap·hs, ~that we quotP
the opinion ·and ~call the attention of the court specifically to ·each separate paragraph quoted:
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(1) ''To rende-r e,~ideiH.•e of thl\ acts or
declarations of an allege·d conspirator ndtnis,sible
against an alleged co-conspirator. the existence of
the consp·ira.cy tnu.st be shou·n and the cofllnection of the latter there~uith establi~~hed. Pope v.
United States, (C. ~c . .6.-\.. 3) ~89 F. 31~, 315; Kelton v. United States, (·C. C. A. 3) 2H4 F. 491,
495; lsenhouer '· United St~tes, (C. C. A. 8) 256
F. 842; United States '· Goldberg, 7 Biss. 175,
Fed. Cas. No. 15,223; United States Y. Mcl{ee,
2 Dill. 551, Fed. Cas. No. 15,686; Burns v. United
States, (C. C . .6.~. 8) 279 F. 982, 986; Dolan V.
United States, (C. C. A. 9) 123 F. 52;
Stager '·United States (C. ·C. A. 2) 233 F. 510.

(2) "Declarations made by one conspirator
to anDther are not co 1npetent evidence to esOOJblish the connection Df a third ·person with the COIIDspiracy. Kuhn v. United States, (C. ·C. A. 9) 26
F. (2d) 463; L"nited States v. McKee, Supra.
(3) "The existence of the co'YIASp~racy
charged cannot be established against an alleged
conspirator by evidence of the acts or declarati-ons Df ·his alleged eo-conspirator done or made
in his ab-sence. Hauger v. United States, (C. C.
A. 4) 173 F. 54, 57; United .states v. Richarill3,
{D. C. Neb.) 149 F. 443; Uni·ted States v. Goldberg, supra, United States v. McKee, ,supra.''
Stager v. United States, 233 Fed. 510 (2
C. C.):

1s a leading case upon the questions under d]scus...
·sion. .Stager was employed ·as an examiner of merchandise at the appraiser's stores in the 'Cust'Oms House
in New York. He and his clerk were the only ones who
had access to the invoice Vialuations and the appraisals.
He WaJS aoous~ed of oollllspiring with certain dealem in
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~mported

quill's 'and: of defrauding the Government by
colluding with and f,avoring the firm of ·Sciama & Co.
Evide·nce was introduced that he condemned the quills
of others .and ·sugges,ted that orders ror such may roo
filled by th]s particular firm. Silva, who was another
dJealrer, wrus also alleged to be in the com1spiracy and it
was found tha;t ·Silva had confidential information from
the defendant Stager, which Silva di·sclosed to Soiama.
Another importer of quills, claimed 1Jhat Stager objected
to him, that he was· bringing in quills too cheap. Another deal~er, 'as ·sta;ted, had had his quills condemned.
When a 'subpoena wag SJerved upon ·Silva to appear
before the grand jury 1Stager wrus followel<t and he went
to :Silva ''s. place. The officers p·rocured lett·e-r~s from Silva
to ·Seiama, w;bich were very damaging, and ,Stager did
not record his visit to :Silva immediately in a book, as
was the cus~tom when he visited importers.
'T'he ~court s1aid .tha,t the ·conduct ·of Stager in comnecti'On with Silva. 'ce~rrt:Jainly arous~ed Suspieion. The letter
of Silva to Sciama was ~admitted and this wa1s very
dtamaging, reciting .am·ong othBr things tha,t ".the two
hundrelcb doll:ars to 18 tager are we·ll placed and we will
have to give ·him more at the ·end of the year, if he
·contim!lleSr to keep us informed p~roperly. ''
1

The opinion says :
'' Wh,en a rCOilJSp,iracy is once· establis,hed aot.s
and 1adnrission:s: of iany one of the conspirators
in pur.suam.oo of the (~onspiracy and while it is
continuing, are 'admi,s.sihle again's't the others, upon
the theory 'that the consp[r,atons are agents f()r
one another in the· common enterpri'S'e. Ooruru.
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Mutual Life InB. Co.
L. Ed. -!-16. * * *

Y.

Hilln1an. 188 U. S. :218, 47

''But the prelhnina.ry queBtion \vhether sufficient evidence of a. oon~pii'!Rcy has 1been adducedl m.u'-~t td.zrays be am~stPered by the court in.
the affirrna,tive, or the general rule of eviJen.ce
excluB,ing hearsay zcz~U ·re-nder atz. adtnission of
one of the co1z-spirators inadmissible against the
others. Inasmuch as we do not think the exis~tence
of a COOIBpiraey Wlas established these letters were
wholly incompetent and inadmissible as agaillls.t
Stager."
The opinion then recites that the evidence outside
of the letter was not sufficient to establi'Sh the coll'spir,acy, and then with relation to the letter, said:
"If S'lteh a letter is competent, a conspiracy co'ldd.
be proved by the mere letter of one man that
another was iJnplicated. The very object of the
rule against hea-rsa;y was to prevent a jury from
bei-ng influenced by statements of persons who
coUld not be subjected to cross-examination.''
~ * * * * *
''The facl is, the incompetent letters wer~e
the basis of the judgment of conviction, whieh
fDr the foregoing reasons must be revertS'eki ''
State vs. Paden, 202 N. W. 105 (Ia.) :

This is a good ease where conJduct attributed to
rsome of the conspirators in the nature of overt -acts was
admitted over objection without estaJblisfhing the agreement between the three defendants charged, and without connecting the appellant Paden with the overt acts.
·T.he case arose out of industrial trouble between the
operators and the :m.tanager of a theatre. A stink bomb
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was exploded in the theatre and simultaneously in another rthe·a tre electric light rund power wires were cut,
e'tc. T.his ·evidence after being received was, ·stricken by
the ·court. The opinion said:

''A consptiracy ne·ces1s arily :imwolves two persons, and neither the~ nature nor the ess·ence of
the erimH can be esrba bJi.s:hed hy the acts or dool.al'la·tions of one (~onspir.ator in tthe ahsemce and
without the knowledge· and ·concurrence of the
other. * * * The ~comp·etency of .such teistimony i~
de~pendent on .a p!rope·r foll'Illdation having been
laid. In other words, a p·rima facie ·ease of conspira~cy mus1t be :estahli,shed. ''
Tihe ·court then 1says fhiat .the ·order of evidence to
.some extent i~s in ·the ·dis~cretion of the trial oou~t, but,
however, t1he lbetter p·ractice is to require a p~rima facie
.showing of ·conspiracy befor•e receiv]ng ISUJch eviidlence.
~citing 35 L. R. A. (NS) 1084). The opinion then says that
if :such judieial dis:eretion in the order of evidence i·i
abused, "we will nO't he1sita.te to re-verse".
1

The opinion then says that the evidence re•ceived
.and .strickoo: was ''toxic in ·character'' and it is beyond
muman pos:s~bilirty that the mind 'Of the jury wa:s not
influenced the.reby and that the .striking of the ·evidence
did not .cure the p·r'ejudice resulting from its improper
rudlmis,sion.

State vs. Carlson, 22 Pac. (2d) 143 (Ida.):
The defendrunts were ·charg.ed wi•th ·conspiracy to
commit forge'ry. In an attempt to p:vove the ~conspiracy,
.s;tatements of Oarlson, one of the alleged conspir~to~,
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ent were offered and rPC.eiYed in
that it was not admissible.

~Yidence. ·Th~

r.ourt held

"unless the evidence esta.bHshe.s the fnct that
the appellantJS ""e-re acting in concert in the conlmission of the- crime charged. We do not consider the evidence snff'icient to establi-sh such fact .
...-\.11 of the evideooe tending to connoot B€ntley
mth the crime is .sufficient to ereate a strong :suspicion -of guilt, but ~hat is not •suffici·ent ·to sup-port conviction. The evidence ",.a.s circumstantial, and, in order .to sustain a conviction basHd
S{)}ely on circumstantial evidence, 'the cireumstance·s must 1be c.onsistent with the guilt -of the
defendant and inconsistent With his innocence,
and incapable of explanation on any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt.' Brosihears
v. State, 17 Okl. Cr. 19:2, 187 P. 254, 256.

'If the eviden-ce can be roooneiJ.ed ·either with
1Jhe theory o.f inarocence or of guilt, the law requires that the theory of innocence be OO'Opted.'
State v. )larcoe, 33 Idaho 284, 193 P. 80; State
v. Burke, 11 Ildlaho 420, 83 P. 228; State v. Sorenson, 37 Idaho 517, 216 P. 727."

People vs. Linde, 20 Pac. (2d) 704, (Cal.):
Here the def·endants were charged .and convicted
of burglary. Tires and tubes and money were s.tolen and
found in the possession of .one defendant. Thi's defendant plealdied guilty and implicated the other defendant,
Linde, as :a participant in the burglary. The question
arose on his evidence that he wws an aooomplice and
must be corroborated.
They then intr.oduced a letteT written by the witness involving the other defendant, which letter wa:s~
not mailed. The ·opinion revel"lsing the case, .said :
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T!he difficulty which arises in .attempting to
apply the rule to the proffered evidence is that
in or.der to make such evidence admissible there
must be proof of the existence of the conspiracy.
Marnifestly, the decla.rat~on of co-conspirator may
not be used to establish the fact of the existence
of the conspir.a1cy, for the declaration or statement is pure hea.rsa.y wn.samctified by the solemnity of an oath a;nd incapable of being subjected
to the test of cross-examination. People v. Doble, 203 Cal. 510, 265 P. 184; People v. Zimmer.man, 3 ·Cap.. App. 84, 84 Pa. 446. Tihe olbvious
·danger of p·ermitting evidence of this -character
to be received is that the jury might accept it a.s
proof of the existence of the conspinacy and then
use the same evidence to establish a defendant's
guilt. P·eopJe v. Irwin, 77 Cal. 494, 20 P. 56."
"

1

'T'he op,inion then reViieiWs the evid·ence independent
of that of ·the, accomplice and the letter 'S:howing that
the two were in .the company of e~aeh other on the aft·ernoon and .evening of the burglary and that thereaft~r
·the de:fenJdlant who did not te~stify was. looking f:or the
other defendant, rund ~said that .the·se cir~cumstances furnished no proof of conspil'lacy and ·the ~cas:e was rev;ersed.
State vs . .LllcGonigle, 258 Pac. 16, (Wash.):
The ·defendant named was charged wtith othe~
with ~conspiracy to violate the Alien Land Law by combin~ng with Japanes·e land owneT to p·ermit. the control,
pos,s:esision, etc., of land ~cont,r,ary to law. It was con'tended that the ·evildlence Wlas. ~suffici·ent to ~sustain a convi~ction, and sHv,eral .admi,s'Sions. iand de·clarations made
by the individual par.ties were reli·ed upon. The opinion
said:
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'~It jg true, tl1ere need be no £lYidt\neo of a
formally express~d Rgreeinent bet,veelll the al~
leged conspirators. Conspiracie-s are ~eldon1 sn8ceptible to su<?h proof. But if there is e·vidence,
ciroumstancial even, of a nzeefiJl·g of the mi1 1Hi~~
and ·unity of design and of cooperative conduct
'Which could ot~ly nrean that there u·as such <m
agreem.e-nt, that ''ould be sufficient foundation
for the admission of evidence of suhs·equent inde~
pendent acts and declarations of each of the
parti-es as against any one of them.'' ( Ci!ting authorities)

The court then quote6 with approval :

"The et·idence tending to show a conspiracy
must be outside of and in addition to the declarati.ons of the co-conspirators u.:·hose declarations
are sought to be introduced.''
16 Corpus Juri.s p. 652, Sec. 1291:

"DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED.
Prima facie proof of .the existence of the conspiracy is sufficient to let in evildlence of the
acts nr declarationS' of a co~onspirator, ·and indeed there is authority for the view that slight
evidenoo of conspiracy i·s sufficient. But in order
to warrant the consideration of ,such evidence by
the jury a higher degree of proof is required,
and it is necessary that the ·existence of the conspiracy be established fully, or shown clearly, and
indeed it h~R~s been held that such evidence can be
considered only where the conspiracy is established beyond a reasonable doubt.''

Territory vs. Turner, 37 Pac. 368:
Defend8ll1ts were charged with conspiracy to eng:age
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session the hides or brands or earmaks contrary to the
Benal ·Code. Evidenee was introducelru of a conversation
by one Taylor and Lyall rega.r:ding ·on~e of the defend:ants offering to 'SHll the wi,tness an interest in the cattl~e bou~ht by working toge-the:r and bmnding everything
~they ·could, amd thus making up· ·a herd. !The court sraid
that ~the )statement was· in the .absence of such defendant
1and that no evidence hald be:en introduced s.howing that
a ·conspiracy had taken pl:a,ce of which he was a member, Mld rthe evidence ·could 01nly ~s-erve to p:ve.judice the
Jury.
1

The court further srbated that it i's a. rul·e of ancient
~standing that a ·cons:pira,cy 1s:hould fir1st he e.s,tablis~hed
he·ftore the acts 'and declarations: of ia co-1consp~i~ator can
be ,admitted in evidence against the other. The court
ci,ted Loggin1s v. State, 8 Tex . .&pp. 434, anldl quoted as
foll·ows the~efrom :
" 'ordim.a.rily ·the mere proof that two or
more pa·:r.ties wer~e a,ctually eng·aged in the commis,sion of a crime does not lead to the necessary
infe'rence that, da,ys or w'eeks or months before
its. commission, they had rnutuaUy undertaken
and agreed to its commission. * * * It would be
a doctrine- fraught with mis;chie-vou:S' vHsul>ts if
the mere p~roof of an actual commis~sion of a
·cri.minal act by two or more parties, was~ suffici'ent, in its·elf, to justify the conclusion that a
~com.spil'lacy !has been formed, a we~ek or ·a month
be·f,ore, by .the :s~ame~ p·artie:s, to commit the particular of£en1s-e in question. ' ''

State vs. Roach and 0 'Do'YIInell, 57 Pac. 1016,
(Or.):
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Defendants were charged jointly \vith ·stealing a
oow 18Jld a calf 18Jld tried Qn the theory of conspiracy.
Roooh. had possession of the st'Olen eo\v and calf and
thereafter sold the calf to the butcher. The co,v, which
w.as left in ·the pos·sessio11 of 0 'Dom1ell, followed the
calf and was returned by Ro-ach to his place. 0 'Doillnell
went to the butcher and told him that Roach wanted ·the
calf butchoered right away. 0 'Donnell 'vas at Roache's
place when he drove the calf to the slaughter house. The
question arose over the ~statement of O'Donnell that
Roach wanted the calf killed right a"~ay. The opinion
says:
· •But iJ is equolly eleme-nttary that a foundation must first be laid by proof aliwnde sufficient to establish prima facie the fact of conspiracy or common design, and in this case there was
no such proof. ''
* * * * * * *
''It is als'O claimed that the admi·ssion of the
evidence, if error, was ·harmlese, but the entire
theory of the prosecution, seems to have beern
that the defendant anil O'DonneU were acting
together in the commission of the critne, and the
ruling of the court in the admission of the evideMe over the objection of the defen.rl,ant, lllftd
its subsequent refusal to strike it out, or instruct
the jury to disregard it, was tantarmount to advisimg them that this theory was, at least prima
facie, supported by the testimony. In this view
the acts and declarations of O'Donnell were very
donnagilng evidence as against the defenda/YI)t. It
fullows that the judgment of the court. below
must be reversed, and a new trilal ord~ered. ''
1lli~ following cases indicate the error of the court
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in admi:ttling evidence under classification ( 4), of statements tC~oncerning the ,alleged conspimtors. here made by
other alleged· ~conspirators, after the conspiracy is alleged to have ·eeas·ed. This re.fers to such statements as
the one ·claimed to have been made by Mr. Harmon to
Mr. Holt :concerning M.r. Pearce having heen charged by
Fis.her Harris. and Mr. Lee, ·and also rto alleged statements by Mr. T1hacker With re~lation to Mr. Finch.
·The foregoing cas'e's e,stahlish the rul·e· that t<> be
wit1hin the scop~e of 'agency any act or s-tatement must
lbe in furthei.,ance of the· alleged .conspiracy. The theory
with relation, to s~tate·ments made afterwaros is that
·they l{~ould not be in fur:therance of the cons.piracy and
there:Dore could not be binding upon any ·other alleged
·conspi~ator. It is .the .simple rule ex·cluding acts or statements of agents ~after their agen1cy has ce,a.sed.

State vs. De Angeles, 269 Pac. 515 ( Ut.):
·This ·cas'e s~eems to 's:ettle tihis question. It wa,s an
1arson case. The day after the fire the sheriff ha.d a
~converswtion with two of the defendants in which on~
of ·them stated in the presence of the other that "iilie
reason he and Mike wer.e- ~at ,the !store at the .tim·e of
the fire was at :the· request of John D·e Angeles'', the other d·efendant. This court revers·e·d this ·case f.or this
error, ·and .citing People vs. Farrell, 11 u.tah 414, 40
P·ac. 703, quoted the following:
'' ' On ·the- separate trial of one ·of two who
had beien indicted to-gether for larceny, it i's a
fiaJtal error to aldrrnit against the one on tri~al the
acts and ·statements- of the other made iafter tbe
crime :bad 1be:en ~completely ·committed.'
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The rule or prineiple of law· there stated
·ha.s been recognized and applied. by thi~s court in
·at least three subsequent decisions; S·tate vs.
Gillies, 40 l:tah 541, 1~~~ P. 93, 43 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 776: State Y. Inlo"~. 44 lTtah -!85, 1-tl P.
530, Am. Cas. 1917 . ..-\... , 741; State ,~s. B.arretta,
47 l~tah 479, 155 P. 343. ''
* * * * • • •
'· The admission of the she1iff as to the conversation bad on the morming following the fire
with Mike De Angeles and Nick Galanis, under
the authQrities, must be held to be error. As the
evidence so erroneously admitted was ·an important part of the state's case in its efforts to establish a conspiracy and in ~this wa.y to COIIllllOOt
the appellant with the offense charged, the error must be held to be prejudicial.''

Feder t·s. United States, 257 Fed. 694, 5 A. L.
R. 370:
Here a conspiracy to defraud the United States by
procuring the u.niawful ·acceptance in the war department of barracks bags which were not properly made
was charged. The defendant Feder took the stand and
the prosecutor demanded whether or not sihe had made
certain admissions to a representa1iive of .the United
States, which admissions or declarations inv<>lv.ed the
other defendants !and tended to prove the existence of
the conspiracy. She denied making some of the statements, whereupon the prosecuti{)n produced 'a .stenographic tl'lanscript of the statements anJd, ·the .statemeDJts
were admitted in evidence against both ,of the defend,ants. The court &aid thaJt at the ~time these staJtements
were mooe by the witness Feder the conspira-cy had
ended.
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The attorney for the defendant Polsky requested the
·court to ins.trnct the jury that none of these statements
made by the d·efendant F·ede-r were ·evidence against the
defendant Pol~sky and must not be so considered. The
opinion s~aid :
''It is; true ~that the· ·es:tablis,hed rul-e of Log.an v. United State's, 144 U. S. 309, 36 L. Ed
445, 12 ·Sup'. Ct. Rep. 617 (recently reiterated
by this· ·Court in Erlhe·r v. United .States, 148
C. C. A. 123, 345 Fed. 228), was not specifically
bl"ought to the .attention of the triail judge when
thes~e requests~ were· p·roffered. But that rule, to
~the ·effteot that onily those 1acts ,and decl,arationsof ~a co-consp~i~ator are ;admi,s.sibl'H against his
f,ellows 'which are done arnd made w-hile the conspiracy is pending and in furtherance of its object', was plainly violated in a way as plainly
prejudicial to Poi·sky. 'This ·conspiracy had come
to ~am ·end, and when that occurred, 'whether by
~succe's's orr by failure, tihe .admis.s[ons· o.f one oon~sp~rtator by. way of narrativ.e of past f,acts are
not ad:rn.issible in evidence against .the others.' ''

State vs. Goyens, 204 Pac. 704 (Koo.):
An automobile was. stol·en by a hired man and taken
to the farm of the def.endan t ·Goyrens., who there aS·Siisted
in getting a mechani'c to put it into sh~wpe 'and in con·Cealing ilt. The hired man was 'arrested in Colorado ~and
t:here made .s.ta·tement~s~ to the sheTiff that '' his boss
told him to d·rive the car out there'' and that he drove
'
the ·car out :there f.or hii.s. bos.s. The court revers·ed the
case on account of the admis·sion of this testimony. The
opinion s~aid :
'''The Bogue. ·Ciruse followed the case of State
v. Johnson, 40 Kan. 26-6, 19 P~ac. 749, where Mr.
1
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Justice J ohnrst-on, speaking for the ennrt,
the opinion :

~aid

in

'To make the d~lnra.tions of one eonspirator
evidence against the oth~rs, they must be 1nade in
furtherance of the common crimil1181 design * * *.
Wh'en the conspiraey has * * * been consummated, the admission of one in the absence of the
other colliSpiMltors that he and others participated in the crime, is a mere narr.ative of a past
occurrence, and ean .a.ffe-ct onlY the one who
makes it.'
See, also, State v.

R.og~rs,

54 Kan. 683, 39 P·ac. 219.

In the Rogers Case it was urged that the error was unimportant because there was an abundWlce of competent evidence t<> suS'tain the guilt
of the defendant. In the opinion it was said :
'Can we !assume that the jury gave credit to·
the testimony of one, or of a number of witnes~ses,
rather than to another' By what process o.f reasoning can we reach the conclusion that the conviction of the defendant is really based on the
competent testim'Ony rather than the incompetent 1' Page 695 of 54 Kan., pa.ge 224 of 39 P1ac. ''

Saunders vs. State, 244 Pac. 55:
Was a case where evidence of misconduct other
than that charged was admitted in evidence. It was conduct on the part of one of the alleged conspirators.. This
Wias held error, and the optiniDn says:

"The evidence of acting together is 9on{ined to
the offense charged in the information. The· law
i& well ~settled that, where the guilt of one of
several defendalllts j·ointly charged with a felony
is sought ·to be ·established by evide~ce of oon,spir.acy between him ~and the others, ·evidence ·as
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to 1act~s and ~st,a;teme:n:t's of others mus~t be ·Confined
to such acts and statements done and made at
times when the proof permits a finding that a
conspiracy existed. Declarations or ·acts made or
·done prior to the :formation of a ~conspiracy or
1after its termination, and not in furtherance of
any plam between the parties, is not .admissible
in evidence in t;he s·ep;arat·e trral of one of the
partiels. The admission of acts of the codefendants at a time prior to a;ny connection of the defendant, under the proof, with his codefern,dants,
was erroneous.''
.A!s.suming that .the alleged st~atlement of Mr. H·armon relating ~to Mr. P·earce, and testified by Mr. Holt,
migftlt have ~e~en us:ed as against Harmon in some way,
and it is impossible to see how this might be done in
view of the fact that the statement had no tendency
to prove 'the ·Conspiracy 'alleged, ·and wws :afterward.
Harmon was dead and was not being tried ancL so this
statement had absolutely no place in the r·ecord. It was
:a damaging statement in view that it ·Charged Mr.
Pearce with having been ·accused by 'the ·city attorney
and by a prominent ·citiz·en, Mr. Lee, w1ho was then a
member of the City Commi,s:sion. Its admis.sion was
without any excuse and it was clearly pre.judici~al un·der the :authorities cited.
People vs. Walther, 81 Pac. (2d) 452:
Is a recent cas-e somewhat in point here, ·and partieul·arly s·o with relation to the alleged ~statements of Mr.
IThacker ·concerning other defendants being entirely out
of the ·CaJS•e.
'Dhi~s ~case was an alleged conspiracy to

violate the
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Corporate Soouritie-s Aet. The ease depended upon the
testimony of one of the a.Ileged conspirators. The oourt,
in discussing the contention of the state that one of the
conspirators, Vl ebb, might be ,held under one of the
counts of the indictment, said tha.t to be held under that
he must be guilty of the sale of the security involved in
that indictment, and that he could not be so held because by being acquitted on another count of the indictment "he was formally acquitted of t1hat very charge by
the same jury at the same trial.''
Mr. Thacker was a~uitted of being a conspirator
by the same jury at the .same trial. This point is also
involvM in th~ later discussion as to the acquittal of
Mr. Pearce and Mr. Erwin.

The case now under conffideration discusses the
point that

''It is unsatisfactory that the conviction of
'()ne of two conspirators to commit a crime should
depend so completely as does the present oos.e
upon the testim'Ony of the co-eonspirator, * * *
:such evidence is open to suspicion lest the temptation to thus escape a threatened penalty of la.w
may result in irreliable testimony.''
This feature of the case involves the later discussion of the testimony ()f Mr. Holt, upon wb:os~e testimony
the cas·e of the state here largely rests.
The opiniQn then discusse:s the testimony of W eblb,
the conspirator who turned .state '·s witness, and particularly statements made by him with relation to the other d~fendants, and ·said:
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''It ils. fundamental that

t~he

f.act. of the ex_

istelllce of a ·conspiracy to commit a crime ·must
firs•t be estalbli,she.d before the decla:vations of a
co~cons.pirator with relation thereto be·come comp·e:tent or admissible. When .suoh declarations are
p·rejudi·cial, as they certainly are in the pres.ent
case, their ad.mis~sion in evidence ne·ce:stsitate'S a
rev.ers:wl of the judgmenJt. Code~ Civ. Proc. Sec.
1870, subd. 6; P·eopl·e v. !Doble, 203 Oal. 510, 517,
26·5 P. 184; Peop.Je v. Linde, 131 Cal. App. 12, 19,
20 P. (2d) 704; 5 Oa;l. Jur. 517, Sec. 21."
Before proceeding to attemp·t to show the court that
principal portions of the ·evidence herein should be eliminated on additional .gvounds, we summariz.e briefly as
to ·classes ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) , ( 3 ) and ( 4) .
The evidence as to operations under c1ass (1)
ar·e ·eliminated by the insitrnction of the (~ourt, the law
of .the cas·e, as w·ell a1s under ·the ~authorities cited on the
rule that it must point divectly to the guilt of ~he offens-e ·charged and be inconsistent with any other hypothe·si,s.
(1)

(2) ·That ·the evidence under cla.ss (2) as .to alleged admissions involves no ·admission of the offense
charged. and wajs inadmis.sibJ.e.
( 3) 'Tha.t the evidence of mis·conduct by separate
defendants under ·clas~s ( 3) did not tend to prove the
agreement and was inadmissible and •should be ·elimin·ated.

The rule is well settled, and w·e will not go into a
reci·t,al of 1fue ·cases that even where other offens·es. may
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tablish criminal int~nt, that the other offenses tnust. be
established at least prima facie. There "~as no question
of criminal intent here. If an ·agreement \YPre proved it

would carry its own intent. So that this evidence served
only the purpose of confusing 8Jld prejudicing the jury
and preventing the defendants from haYing a fair trial.
1

The leading l . .tah ease upon tihe proposition that if
other offenses are material they .themselves must first
be established at least prima facie, i.s

State vs. Judd, 279 Pac. 953:
That the authorities ·establish that statements·
by one defendant, or by third persons as to another defendant, cann-ot be admitted for the purposes of proof
of the existence of the agreement or of 1ftle connection of
any person so mentioned with the conspiracy. And again
these statements did n-ot go to the offense charged.
(4)

The foregoing show the errors in 'admis.sion of evidence under assignments 14 (Ab. 336), and 15(c), (d),
(e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (1), (m), (n), (o), (p·),
(q), (Ab. 336-344), ( w), (x), (y), (z ), ( aa), (bb), (oo),
(dd), (Ab. 347-350), (jj), (kk), (11), (mm), (nn), (oo),
(pp), (qq), (rr), (ss), (tt), (uu), (vv), (ww), (xx),
(yy), (zz), (aaa), (bbb), (coo),
(ddd), (eee), (fff),
(ggg), (hhh}, (iii), (jjj), (kkk), (111), (mmm), (nnn),
(Ab. 353-371), (qqq), (Afb. 374), (uuu), (vvv), (www),
(xxx) (Ab. 378-379).

Any reasonable limit on the length of tJhls brief
would not permit a discussion as to each of the sjeparate assignments of error as to testimony. W~e have
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attempted by classifieation to p.res.ent this matter within
reasonable limits.
None of these assignment·s is w1a.ived.
Kempner Testimony as to Stubeck's Conduct and
Statements Erroneously Admitted.

The te·stimony of this young man Kempner, whose
name was not on the indictment ·aJs. a witness, but who
:apparently became attracted by the prospect of publicity and ·contacted the ·district attorney sho.rtly !before
lhe testified, testifi·ed with relation to nobody ever attempted to he <(~onne-cted with the ·alleged conspiracy
whatsoever, by any proof" aliunde" or at all.
The -assignments on this testimony are No:s. 14 a.nd
15 (r) to (v) inclusive. (Ab. 345-347). The testimony is
s:et out fully (Ab. 40-64). It ~comes under ~classification
( 4) .above, as ·conduct and ·statement of a third person,
which was iilltroduced without limitation over the s·eparate obj·ections of each defendant and was introduced
as binding up~on all.
W·e p~articu1arly ~ask the court ~to examine this testimony .and the re·cord that was made in connection
1fuerewith, !and shall not take the .sp BJCe here to state it
at length. It was this· testimony ~concerning which the
court :s:aid that ''the ·Comp·etency of it hasn't yet been~
mrude manifest", but the dis,trict attorney s~aid that he
would ·Conne.ct it up. (Ab. 42)
1

The court also ·s:ai·d that this tes~timony was so important tha.t if "it should develop tili.1at it isn't pertinent
I presume it would be a mistrial. I am not saying it
would, but I presume it would.''
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The witness testified to a time whieh he fin1ally
fixed as "around in March, possibly April" of 1937.
It will be noticed that this 'vas ·at a thne when even
Holt was not collecting-he didn't ~tart until June.
H. K. Record was head of the vice squad and Holt wa;s
not in it at all. (Ab. 95). :The indictment in alleging what
were termed overt acts alleges that collections were
mad~ from houses of prostitution from June, 1937, to
January, 1938, and from operators of lotteries, dice
games and other games of chance from April 1st, 1936,
to January 1st, 1938, (Ab. 3), and the Bill of Barticulars recites approximately the same dates (Ab. 11),
and recites that the collections were made by the defendants with the aid and ·assistance of Golden Holt
and Ben Harmon. Even Ben Harmon was not connected
with any collections until June of 1937.

This testimony very briefly was tha-t Abe Stuheck,
who operated a billiard hall, met this witness and took
him to the Ace and Peter Pan Billiard Halls. In the
Peter Pan, Stubook talked with a man who was racking
pool balls and asked hlm if he had the money ready.
The man said something and Stubeck told ·him he had
better get it in a hurry or -he kntew what tlhe results
would be. The man said he would be back and he went
and got some money. At the Ace Billiard Hall he S'aW
no money collected, but when they got back ont to the
street Stnbeck took two bunches of bills from different
pockets and put !them .together. The witness tJhen was
allowed to testify that Stubeck told him that card games
were payinJg off and that he· took the money over to Ben
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Harmon ~and Harmon split it with Erwin and his crowd.
The witnHS!S then testified that ·Stubeck took the bills
and l1aid them on the counter in Harmon '·S pl'aoe before
the cus'tom-ers. and employees, and on1e of the cashiers
put them under the ·counter, that Harmon was present.
(Ab. 40-64)
There was never any foundation by showing any
agreement as alleged to permit ana ~allow the operatio1lls
alleged. There was no foundation by .showing that any
defendant had ~any connection or acquaintan!ce whatsoever with Albe Stuheck. This was ·conduct of a person
not in any way ·connected with the defendants, or any of
them, in any ·shape, manner or form, and statements
made by him with reference to the defendants or implicating some ·or all of them, and its intr.oduction is not
only condemned by all of the foregoing authorities,
but we believe by a.ny authority that can be found; so
that its admission giv·es no support to sustain the convi~ction here, although, a1s indi·cated, it was ic1oubtless
very effective in brin,ging about the convi,ction by the
jury. That its ·admission was erroneous ·and prejudicial
requires no further argument and the ~citation of no
authorities additional to those ·cited under the pre·ceding
·dis~cussion of ~class ( 4) te·stimony.
If, as it may lhe con1tended, the ·Op~eration of gambling in licens·ed ~card rooms 1and on licensed, card tables
is proof of an agreement between the defendants here;
or if ~as will be ~contended the ~collection of money is the
'
'
·offense being tried or is evidence of an agreement by
and wi~th the parties here to '' pennit, allow, assist and
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enable" houses of prostitution, ete., to operate, on tJhe
theory that some of the defendaJl ts 1night have instituted an investigation and brought a bout prosecution of
the operators involYed. then this testimony "~oula point
first to the guilt of H. K. Record, "~ho 'Va!S head of the
anti-vice squad, and 'vould point also to the guilt of the
city attorney and the district attorney, who w·ere so perwnally concerned in this prosecution. Because certainly
they could institute investigations and bring about prosecutions, just as this record sho·ws the district attorney
did, in connection with this case, prosecute a number
~f prostitutes and operators of places of prostitution.
1

·The fact is that this evidence had no probative value whah~oover to prove the agreement alleged. 'Tihe simple collection of money in no way ·assisted the operatioo from which it was collected, and this testimony
was utterly incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and
highly prejudicial.
Testimony of Golden Holt Erroneously Admitted.

The assignments as to this· witness are oovered by
the foregoing authorities, and from 15 (kk) to 15 ( vv)
inclusive have been referred to above. These as-signments as to the testimon'Y of this witness require, however, separate treatment, in view of the admis.sion and
·claim by the prosecution here that he was an oooomplice. This testimony will also be now separ.ately con·sidered under the later contention, and later under the
heading as .to prior adjudication of the matters testified

to.
Eliminating, as we clearly must, the te·stimony of
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Kempner ~as to Stuheck, just oons·idered, the only testimony as to !colleetions of mon1ey was the testimony of
Hol.t .and, 'Of ·course, the women who paid it to him.
:Thes·e, as we shall prese·ntly sh10w, were also accomplices in this matter, .and in any event had nothing to
do with the ·charge alleg-ed. The argument to the trial
.court, based ervoneously upolll the theory that the
eharge here was ·one of ·collecting money from these
operations, was grounded upon the· p·roo.f that money
was coUe~cted lby Holt. This, as stated, depends upon
the testimony of Holt alone. No knowledge of his colle·ction was ever shown to have been communicated to
anyone eX!cept Mr. Harmon. Unles.s, of ·course, it may
be .assumed that the testimony of Holt that •some money
fvom prostitution was paid to Mr. P·ear.ce, who was
attorney f,or lvlr. H·armon, in Mr. Harmon's presence,
was proof that he knew where the mon~Hy was collected.
It was not so testified.
Mr. Pearce had been previously tried 1and acquitted
of the charge of reeeiving this money from prostitution
kno:w-ing that it was so received. This matter will be
treated sep.ara t.ely h·ereinafter.
The point "\Ve desire to emphasize now is· that the
claim of proof of an agreement has been\ rested and
doubtless will he upon the te~s!timony of ·collection of
money by Holt and the presumption of knowledge
thereof, and then the fur.t.her inf.erence ~attempted to be
!based on this inference, that there must have been an
agree.ment be·tween these particular d·efendants otherwise these collections would not have taken place.
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This involYes also the que~4ion of sPparatl' conspiracies, which "~in be hereinafter con~idered, but for
the present we "ill discuss the tt>stin1ony of thi~ accomplice in the lig'ht of the contention. that he is ~an accomplice and uncorroborated.
'llhere was no corroboration of the testimony of
Holt with relation to any defendant here in the matter of thes,e oollooti()ns. This question of corroboration
of an accomplice is difficult to discuss because it i:s impossible for us to see any proof as required by the
rules of evidence hereinalbove supported as to the existence of the conspiracy alleged or ~as to the connection
of any defenoont with it.If there is a.ny such testimony,
the testimony of Holt must be the principal, if not the
only testimony iu this connection. That he was an accomplice may be assumed. That his testimony was not
oorroborated in any material aspect must be 'admitted.
We will now point out cases indicating, first, that
in the absence of corroboration the evidence cannot be
considered but should have been withdrawn lby the trial
court as a matter of law, and :also ·caS'es illustrating the
point that there was no corroboration.

People vs. Southwell, 152 Pac. 939 (Cal.) :
Is a case holding directly that where money was
paid to ·an officer by plooes of prostitution upon 1Jhe
understanding or coOOition t·hat he would not arrest
or moles~ such '()peration, that the women paying
the said money for immunity were a·eeompliees. The
opinion says:
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''·The ·COUr't at the request of defendant (office~r), adviis:eru :the jury rthat ·Coulter was. an ,acoompH!ce, hut refus'e1d instructions advising the
jury ~that the Martin ~and M~cMonagle women
were 1such occompli~ce:s. :This W1aJS undoubtedly error and of a p:rejudiciial kind. ·That this error
·s~eriously interfe~red witih ~the right of defendant
to a full and fair hearing is made apparent when
it is conside·red that the ~corToborative teSitimony
offered in the. cas~e wa:s not of a p~articularly
'Strong ~charact·er. ' '

State vs. Coroles, 277 Pac. 203, (Ut.):
Is ·a ca:se squarely holding that whHre .the· ·evide'Illce is
without dispute the :court •s.hould instruct the jury that
a witness is :an ~aecomp.lice and that it is the duty of
the ·Court to d-eci1de whether the~e wa,s sufficient evidence in ~corroboration of the ruccompli~ce to meet the
requirements of ~the statute, ~and if not, to dire-ct the
jury. The opinion of this Court says:
''If 'the £acts. the,.msel¥e:s are. in dli'spute as
rto wheth·er the witn:ess: did or did not do the
things whieh, if 1he did do them, would make
him an a'ceomp~li~ee, then it i:s: £or the jury to de~termine whe.the:r he is in :flact an 'a;ooomplice or
not.. Whe~e- ~the fa~cts. are not in dispute, whe·re
the acts :and :conduct of the witnes1s. ar-eo admitted,
then it is a matter of law for the court to say,
.amd to instruct the jury, whether the witness,
'UIYWJ,er the circwmstamces, is an accomplice. People. v. Coffey, sup,~a. Upon the· pre~s~eDJt ret(~O~ it
wa1s the duty of the trial court, aft,e:r determining
from the undisp·uted evidence that the witness
Gar.re:tt was: an accomplice, to decide whether
there was sufficient evidence in corrohora·tion of
the accomplice to meet the requirements of the
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stat·u.te, am;d, if it leas ·not, to then di.rect a verdict
for th.e defendlnlt."
Staters. Gardner.

~7

Pac. (2d) 51, ([Jt.):

'.Dhis case, while not particularly in point because
the corroboration there "~as found in the ~admissions
of the defendant him5elf, 5ets out the 5tatute in part a:s
follows:
"A conviction s.hall not be had on the teostimony of an accomplice, unless he is corroiborated
by other evidence which in itself, and without
the aid of the testim-ony of the accomplice, tends
to connect the defendant mt.h the commission of
the offense; and the corroboration shall not be
·sufficient if it m-erely shQws the commi·ssion of
the offense or the circumstances the-reof.''
The opinion then cites apparently all of the UtaJh
eases at page 52 of the report, prev~ously decided.
'These cas·es are not particularly enlightening here because in most, if not all of .them the corpus delicti was
proved and it was a question merely 'Of connecting the
defendant with the crime by testimony independent of
that of the accomplice.
Of course, the very purpose of this rule and of
such statutes is to prevoot a conviction wpon the testimoney of a person inte-rested in absolvimg himself from
prosecution by implicating someone else. The essence
of it is that such a witness shall not be believed to the·
extent of permittmg a convictio11J thereon 'wnJess his
testimony is corroborated as required by the statute.
It would seem to follow logically that the testimony of
Holt carmot be considered here, either as proof of the
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offoose charged or as connecting any defendant with it,
unless this testimony is corroborated by other independent proof of the offense and' other independent proof of
the connection of these defewdants with it.

H·ere there i1s nothing that (~;an be considered as an
admission by an;y defendant that we can find in the
record, other than that which is involved in the testimony of this same 1acoomplice.
In the opinion of Justice Str,aup· in the Ga:nc1ner
cag.e the following statement is made and supported
and is con1sistent with the p·rineipal opinion therein:
"'Thus under rthe ·Sfta tute there must be evidence independent and without the aid of the tes~timony of the •accomp'li·ce to show the corpus deli~cti, that an ofrense was commi tt·ed !and to conneot !the defendant with it. Roseoe 's ·Criminal
Evidence, 122; ·State vs. Geddes, 22 Mont. 68, 55
P. 919; .State v.s. Lawson, 44 Mont. 488, 120 P.
808."
State vs. Laris, 2 Pac. (2d) 243:
Was another lavceny case involving the point as to
whethe·r recent pos·session was sufficient corroboration
of 1an accomplice and holding that undeT the circum'stances of that ease it was not. 'There is language and
'authority in this ease in line with our above· contention
that the reorr·olborating testimony must tend to sustain
t!he truthfulness of .the accomplice's. testimony as to the
very offense involved. The opinrion quotes from Weldon
vs. State, a T·eX!as ·case, at page 246 as :DoUows:
'' 'Elimina.te from the cas·e· the evidence of
the at(~compli·ce, and then examine the evidence
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of the other \Yitness or "'itnes·ses with a view to
ascertain if there be inculpatory e\idence ~ • •
if there be no inculpa!t<>ry evide·nce, there is not
corrolboration, althoug~h .the aooomplice may be·
corroborated in regard to any number of facts
·sworn to by ·him.' '' (Citing als() People vs. Morton, 73 Pae. 609).
The opinion in the Laris Case also quotes· with approval from an Iowa case, on paoooe 248 :
'~

'The accomplice may state any number of
facts, and 1fuese facts may all be corroborated by
~the evidence of otlher witnesse'S ; stiN, if the facts
thus corroborated do not tend to oonnoot the defendant with the crime, or if they do not point
pertinently to the defendant as the guilty party
or as a participant, this would not be such corroboration as is required by the Code.' Weldon
v. State, :supra; State v. Cowell, 149 Iowa 460,
128 N. W. 836. ''

State vs. Somers, 90 Pac. (2d) 273 (Ut.):
This is the most recent Utah case that we have
found. It was an arson case again considering the
-statute quoted in the Gardner Oase, which is now 10532-18 R. S. U. 1933. The opinion held the corroboration
insufficient, and said :
''Under the above sootion a conviction cannot be based on the testimony of an accomplice
alone. There must be corroboration -of his testimony and t-he corroboration must be as to some
material matter or fact which ·is inoonsis.tent
with the defendant's. in'IllOCence." (Citing a number, of Utah and other cases).
The opinion also states again the rule quoted from
the Coroles Case, -supl"'a, as follows:
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''While it is :a quHstion for the jury to determine whether the eorrohorative evidence is suffi~ci~ent, in eonnBction with the te:srtimony of an
~aecomp,lice, to justify a eonviction, yet unless
tJhere i:s corrofborative evidence of a material
fact tending to eonne~ct the def,endant with the
·Conrmis1sion of the !crime, a oour~t ~should direct a
verdict for the defendant. P·eople v. Viets, 79
C.atl. App. 576, 250 P. 588, S'twte v. Arhorn:tis,
:supra.''

Stale v-s. Elmer, 161, Pac. 167:
I~s

another Utah case holding the corroboration insufficient .and pointing out that the jury should have been
instructed that if they found that the witness Curtis
was an accomplice, that then1 the defendant ·Could not
be ~convieted. In other words, that the ·cour·t should
have ~de~c:Uded whether the eorrobol"ation of the evidence
was sufficient.
State vs. Thompson, 87 Pac. 709:
Is a case holding that proof merely that a crime was
·committed, in that an unmarried wom.an wa.s pregnant
.a11Jd the charge was adultery, ·could not he considered as
in any way connecting the defendant with the offense
charged.
State vs. Powell, 143 Pac. 588:
Is ·another Utah case emphasizing that in determining the question of corroboration\ every item of testimony of the accomplice him·s~elf must be entirely ex·
eluded.
State vs. Sheffield, 146, Pac. 306:
Is another Utah ~cas-e involving the charge of adult.Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ery, and holds that admi~sion~ or intimations of other
wrong doing of a laciYious nature cannot be considered
as corrolboration ~ that it n1ust be eYideuce of the specific charge laid.

It w·ould serYe no purpose to cite additional cases
giving rules so ''ell understood by this Court. Ho,vever,
we call the court's attention a.g<1.in to two comparatively
recent Calif.ornia cases:
People v. Walther, 81 P. (2) 45~.
People '· Rodriguez, 99 P. (2) 263.
In these cases the appellate court refused to sustain
convictions because the court said they depended so
substantially upon the testimony of an interested aooomplice, who, while clearly guilty himself, was securing immunity by ginng the testimony involved. This is cl early the cas~ with the witness Holt, who was solely responsible for the extortion of money from these women
in prostitution and solely responsible for the collections
made. He made them and he alone. They were made
tOnly when he collected and ceased when he ceased collecting, aooording to the record in this case. Yet he had
and has entire immunity.
1

The Testimony of H. K. Record was Inadmissible
and in any Event Could not be Considered as Supporting the Verdict.

This matter inv-olves assignments 14, and 15 ( jj).
It was the conversation ref,erred to in which the witness said ·he talked with Mr. Pearce in .the presence of
Mr. Harmon, and Mr. Pearce p·roposed that he make
·collections from gambling houses, not prostitution, and
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·offered $165.00, and the witness testifield that he would
not be 'a p·arty to it.
·This e¥idence, if believed, indi~cateid, a willingness on
the part of Mr. Pe:ar.ce to enter into an agreement wi.tlt
this witness. The discussion w·as in the presence of Mr.
Harmon a111<1 the term ''we'' was allegedly used, so that
it may be said that it involved Mr. Harmon ·also. It
·certainly was illladmissilhle as to Mr. Erwin and the
other defendants. This attempted ·conspir,a:cy was nQt
one to p·ermit or allow operations, it w.as one rather to
extort money from the gambling operations, which
was prohably .an offense- but a different offen~s·e entirely,
and definitely involved different conspirators.

Thomai/3 vs. United States, 57 Fed. (2d) 1039
10 C. 0.):
Is a ease in our own Cificui t ·definitely ho1<1ing that
under an indietmen t for ·a larger conspiracy involving
a number of p·eople, evidence ·of a smaller conspiracy
involving som·e of them to do something similar t·o the
alleged purpose of the main conspiracy, and which
.small·er and possibly included a.rr.angement was dis·cussed hut never ·carried out, is not evidence of the con·
spir.acy alleged and cannot be us·e1d to sustain a conviotion thereunder.
A number of d·efendants were indi·cted for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act thy roam·
facture, transpor.tation and .sale of liquor under protection from F·edera.l officer,s. Gorges, through another per·
.son, arranged to pay one Madden, ·assistant prohibition
administrator £or Kansas, $1,000.00 a month, and sent
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him a list of locations of a nu1nber of ~till~ to w·hioh
Madd-en was to furnish prote-ction. ThrPl) mQnthly payments of $1,000.00 'vere made to him ·a.nd the list furnished. Arm~trong, anQther prohibition agent, was sent
by Madden as a representa.tiYe in the matter of protection. Most of the defendants carried on the agreed operations on a large se.ale.
l'he appellant Simons was a brother-in-law of
Gorges, the principal mover in the conspiracy alleged.
Simons was frequently in the company of Gorges, knew
of the arrangement to get protection, was present at conversations respecting the buying and selling of liquor.
The opinion says :
''The endence established that Simons had
knowledge of the conspiracy. It further proved
that Gorges desire-c1 :to extend the conspiracy to
Oklah-oma, and he and Sim-ons planned that the
la•tter .sh{)rnd take charge of the business there,
but there w:as no proof that the conspil'lacy was
ever oo extended or that Simons -ever entered it.
Furthermore the indictm-ent charged a conspiracy
to manufaclure, possess, transport, and sell intoxicating liquor in Kansas.
Mere knowledge or approval of or acqui·e:scence in the ·obj-ect and purpose of a conspiracy without .agreement to cooperate to :accomplish !such -object or purpose is. not enough toconstitute one a party to the conspiracy. Lucadamo v. United States (C.C.A. 2) 280 F. 653, 657;
Miarrash v. United States (C.C.A. 2) 168 F. 225-;
·Turcott v. Unit-ed State:s (C. ·C. A. 7) 21 F. (2ru)
829; United States v. Lancaster (C. C. Ga.) 44
F. 896; 10 L. R. A. 333.
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The mo:st that ca:n he ·s:aid is that ,simons
knew of 'and acquie,sced in the :conspiracy and
was willing· to enter it p-rovided the org~anization
was !exJt'ended 'to Okla;homa. This was insufficient
tbo 'COnneet him with the CIOI11Spiracy ·charged."
This -case also eontains a good statement and cites a
number of authorities upon the point that.
''to render !evidence of acts or declarations of
:an :alleged ·conspirator admissible ,against analleged ·co-·conspirator, the exi'Stence ·of the conispiracy must he ·shown :an:dl :the -connection of the
latter therHwith estahlished. ''
Also the further point:
''Declarations made by one {~onspirator to another ·are not ·competent evidence to e;s·taJblish
the ~eonneetion ·of 1a rthird person with the cons.piracy. ''
The que:stion now under dis.cussion is so closely related to the next topic that we will take that up and
ask the Court to eonsijder the ap·plication of the cases
thereunder ·cited to the present matter, of the testimony
of H. K. Reeo}}d.
Evidence of Different and Smaller Conspiracies Was
Not Admissible, and the Failure of the Court Upon
Request to Instruct on this Matter was Erroneous.

This involves the assignments .as to evidence with
relation to alleged ~condu:ct or 'agreement tbetween Holt
!a.nd Rosenblum in 1936, when Holt was hims·elf head of
the anti-vice squad. And separately to his alleged ar·
ra:ngements or agreement with H·armon, or any con·
neotion by Mr. Pearce in 1937, s·everal months· after the
alleged 'arrangement with Rosenblum had ended. Of
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oourse the incident of I~empner and Stubeck and. Ha.rmon, if it ha.s any plnce in the case at all, was still another arrangement, at anQther time.
We have pointed out that the indictment here was
not for the collection or extortion of money, and of
course insist that these separate collections by Holt had
D.Q legal tendency to prove the general :agreement alleged tQ permit various operations. \Y e no'' urge the
further ground that these collections. which a.re mainly
and almost entirely relied upon. inYolved other distinct, and substantive offenses, and if they involved
any conspiracy. involved different and smaller conspiracies.

The dealings between Holt and Rosenblum are
just as se-parate and distinct from his dealings with
Harmon in a later year as any two trans•actions could
be. Mr. Holt was then himself head of the vice squarl.
11here was never any connection shown between Rosenblum and Harmon, or for that matter, any connection
with any defendants ~at any time by Rosenblum in the
matter of any agreement, or even any colloot~ons in
1936 or at all. The only other defendant concerning
whom any knowledge of collections could be claimed
was Mr. Pearce, and he was never connected with Rosenblum or heard of, in the case, until June, 1937. No defendant was connected in any way with the operatiorns
of Holt and Rosenblum in 1936.

Tinsley vs. United States, 43 Fed. (2d) 890:
·Tinsley and four others were indicted on eight
counts, the finst seven counts being for larceny of
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horses in the Indian country and the· eighth being conspiracy to commit the larcenies .set for~th in the first
seven -counts. Two defendants were nolle prossed by
the U. 8. attorney, thereafter taking the stand £or the
Government, and the three were convicted on all eight
counts.
It appeared that Tinsley, a farmer, had engaged
two Indians (the one·s testifying) to steal horses from
the reservation and bring them to him at night; that he
would then kill the hovses and feea them to his hogs,
and that one of the two defendants remaining aided
and abetted him iri the feeding and ·concealing of the
hi·des, br,ands, etc., and was p-resent when horses were
delivered by the Indi-ans.
1

T1he ~conspiracy :count was based on the proposition that there were many transactions, and that
Tinsley hwd made arrangements with each of two Indians· to steal the horses ·and pay them for the thefts.
The reour:t on this point ~s~ays : (page 893)

' 'W-e are fo reed to the eonclusion that the
~evid·ence

doe-s. not :show any mutual under-standing of plan w;hereby app·ellants and Paul \Vidow
and Phillip· Lone Eagle (the .two Indians dismissed) were to ·coopera1te in the, stealing of horses
from the In1dti:an res·erv;ation, nor that the minds
·of the:s:e prarties met understandingly to oa.rry
out a dHlibe.ra~te agreement to eommit the lar·eenies ·eharged in the indi~etment. The evidence
tellidts to 'show a .conspivacy between Tinsley and
Widow, and .a rCOnspiracy between Tins~ey and
Phillip Lone Eagle, hut they are separate and
distinct conspiracies .and not the conspiracy
·charged in the indictment. 'Thi~s is not sufficient.
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Terry v. U. S., 7 F. (~d) ~S; '':ya,tt. et nl v. U.
S., ~3 F. (~ttt) 791; Stubb~ Y. lT. S. ~-t-~l Fed. ~)71. ''
r~nited

Sta.te8

t'~.

Byers, 7~~ Fed. (~d) 419:

Defendants were indict~d and conYicted for conspiracy to defraud the United Sta.tes by obtajning surplus war materials from the Government by false pretenses; the false pretenses •being they "~ould turn the
materials over to needy persons at e.ost, \vhen defendants intenlded to sell the materials at a profit. The trial
court instructed :
''If you find the sale of these goods by defendants was made as claimed by the government, knowmgly and wilfully by thes·e defendants, then you will oonvict. ''

The appellate court said (p. 422):

"Here the defendants were indicted for conspiracy to defraud the United Stat.es lby buying
goods under false pretenses. By the charge of
the trial judge the jury was permitted to find
them guilty of con!Spiracy to -sell goods in vioLation of their contract not to sell. In n<> way can
· the latter conspiracy lbe said to be the former.
While, as the appellee argues, the indictment
need not be precise in charging the time or place
of the conspiracy, yet it is necessary that a defendant be found guilty, if at all, only of the.
crime charged in the indictment. A conviction
for one conspiracy cannot be 'Sustained under an
indictment for 'a separate and dlistinot conspiracy."
Lefeo vs. Uwited States, 74 Fed. (2d) 66:
"'Fhere is nothing new in this defense of
multiple conspiracy, and nothing uncertain in
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~the-

law ar1·s1ng from such a defense. Of cou~se,
to :sustain a verdict on an indi~ctmen t charging
one p1articular conspiracy the evidence must establi,sh ;the conspiracy eharged. Evidence that establishe's another oonspiraey ·or serveral other contspiracies will not ·sustain the verdict.''
1

Wyatt vs. United States, 23 Fed. (2d) 791:

Was a ewse where it was alleged ,a -conspiracy existed over a p·eriod of about four years by a group o.f
persons, to violate the National Prohibition Act. The
·court .says the ramifications were many and the interrelations of those who participated in furnishing prote,ction and collecting money from boot-leggers was varied. It was ·clear that the officers involved did afford
prote:etion and did make ~colle·ctions and did on occasion
·arrest people who ~did not contribute. It was even contended that this p-roved enforcement of the liquor law.
It was. indieated tha,t some were guilty of extortiDn
and othHrs might have been guilty of substantive offenses
:agains,t the N~ational Prohibition Act. 'rhe court refUised t:o revi~ew the testimony, but made two very pertinent statements of the law, as follows :
'' H a.ving a responsibility for the enforcement in this circuit, not only of the N atio1Val Prohib~tion Law, but of federal law·s generally, we
are strongly of opinion tha1t the conspiracy statute should not be stretched to cover and be mi.sused to convict for offenses lfl).Ot within it terms,
·OII'ltd that, when resorted to, the conspiracy alleged must be proved as charged. When, as here.
one large conspira.cy is specifically charged proof
of d.ifferent arnd disconnected smaller ones will
not sustain conviction; nor will proof of cri,m~)
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committed by o-ne or n1-ore of the defrndanfs,
wholly apart [ro1n. a~nd zc·itho·ut relation· to others
conspiring to do the thinp fo~rbiddr·n. sustain
convi.cfion. TerrY Y. United StatPs (C. C. A.) 7
F. (M) ~S. 30; Uniited. Statf'S Y. ~reConnell (D.
C.) :285 F. 164, 166.
~
* * * • •
·'Keeping in nz.i-nd that the one crinze which
the -ind£ctment cha,rged a.gainsf all defendants is
conspira.cy to viola.fe a la1c of the [ynited Statesnot the substantire crin1e of riolaiing the law itself-zce ha-ve dis-corered ·no e-vidence that impliaates John Sarnosky, ~. . a.tha.n Hollander and
Hymie Cohen. Therefore, zcholly zci.thout rega.rd
to whether the evide·nce prores these three men
sparately gui-lty of r·i-olating the '}..Tati.onal Prohibition Act, zce find no evide-nce that sustai-ns the
verdict find·ing the·m guilty of the conspiracy
charged. L"nited States '· Heitler (D. C.) 274 F.
401. ''
Terry vs. united Sta-tes, 7 Fed. (2d) 28:

This case is so important here that it has been
already referred to -and will he cited again on the question of instructions. On the ·point now under consideration it has been widely quoted with approval.
It appeared that Terry and one Frohn agreed to
transport several barrels of intoxicating liquor from
Bodega Bay to a ranch in the vicinity of Petaluma, and
at the s-ame time the defendant Zucker rented a barn in
that vicinity and that nine barrels of intoxicating
1iquor were stored therein. About six weeks later Zucker
and other defendants, not including Terry, landed a shipment of liquor at Allen's Wharf in Monterey 'County.
All this was in California. This last shipment of liquor
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was seized, together with the automobiles, by the Federal authorities.
The indictment ~charg·ed that the defendants did conspire and confederate together to ·commit offenses
against the United States in violation of the· National
Prohilb~tion A~ct, and set forth it was claimed ~as an overt
act the shipment to Allen's W~harf. Nine defendants, in·cluding· Terry, were convicted. The trial court took the
view that the ·conspiracy was one to land, transport, sell
or poss-ess liquor generally ·and that all the defendants
'were prop·e·rly convicted there11Il!der. Zucker was conne·cted with both of the shipments, ·six weeks apart, just
as Holt was ·connected by his testimony with both of
the collections here in separate ye'ars. The appellate
court in diseus.sing the indietment says:
'' ·Tihe charge is limited, however, by the
terms of the indictment it·self. The indictment
here charg~es but one combination or conspiracy,
howeve·r divers its objects, .and no defendant
·Cou.tJ.d lbe ~convicted ·thereunder unless he was
,s1hown ·t'O be a member of or a party to that oons.piracy. Fu]}thermore, the seope of the conspir:acy n1us.t be gat,he·red from the te:stimony, and
not frorn the averments of the indictm·ent. T.he
latter may limit the S(~ope but .cannot extend it."
Judge Rudkins writing the opinion, then says that
he found no testimony tending to show any general
conspiracy reov-ering and including both incidents and
!Sia.ida that the trial -oourt apparently proceeded upon the
theory that some of the def·eudan.ts ·could be convicted
for one conspiracy ·and som·e for another. :The opinion
proceeds:
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·~If, h-o"~eyer, the eha.rgl"\ of eon~pi raey in
the indictment. i~ merelY that all the dlt'fendant~~
:had a similar general purpose in Yit~"·, nntl that
each of four groups of per~on~ "·ere eo-operat i 11g
without any priYity eacll ''"it.h the other, and not
towards the same comm-on end, but to,vards separate ends similar in character, such a combinati<>n would not constitute a sing·le conspiracy but
several conspiracies "~hich not only could not
be j-oined in one count. but not eYen in one in.dictm:ent. United States Y. McConnell (D. C.) 285
F. 164.

''IK OTHER \\~OR.DS, A CONSPIRACY IS
XOT Al\ O~IXIBl"'".S CHARGE, UNDER
WHICH YOlT CAN PROVE ANYTHING AND
EVERYTIDNG. AKD CONVICT OF 1T·HE
SIXS OF ~ LIFETI~fE. FOR THESE REASOKS THE RULINGS COMPLAINED OF
ARE ERRONEOUS AND CALL F·OR A REVERSAL. PROOF THAT THE PLAINTIFF
IN ERROR WAS GilllJTY OF ANOTHER
CRIME WAS IN lTSELF PREJUDICIAL,
A1~ .AX IXSTRl;CTION THAT HE :JIIGHT
BE COK\:riCTED OF A ~CRIME NOT
CHARGED IX THE INDICTMENIT' CANNOT
BE ·SU.STAINED.''
People vs. Zoffel, 95 Pac. (2d) 160:

Is a recent California case alleging ·a conspiracy to
commit abortions. The very pertinent holding of the
court is sufficiently indicated by the following quotation
from the opinion :
1

''M,ay took the stand in his -own defense. He
denied that he 'had committed .any abortions., but
admitted that he had entered into a conspiracy
with his nurne to practice medicine without a liSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~cense.

Obviously, proof of conspiracy to commit tha.t crime is no evidence of conspiracy to
commit the crime cha.rged, namely, conspiracy to
commit abortions.''

Davidson vs. United States, 61 Fed. (2d) 250,
Supra.:

Is also ·cited ~as a. very pertinent case. It will be remembered that three of the defendants ·soh:L an ·automobile in Missouri and whi·ch the opinion says they
knew was stolen, but it was not the larger conspiracy
~alleged which ·eonte.mpla.ted taking the ear from Oklahoma to Missouri and which larger .conspiracy involved
additional defendants, as in the case at bar.
Dickerson vs. United States, 18 Fed. (2d)

887:
Is. a case illustrating the point that the conduct
of Mr. Pear:ce in connection with Mr. Holt or Mr. Roo·ord is entirely consistent with an arrangement to attempt to .collect money from houses of prostitution in
the first instance and, from gambJing in the latt·er instance and does not point to any agreement of ~a general eonspira:cy to permit and allow all these continuing
op·erations, as alleged in the indictment.
In this ·case the court says the existence of the conspiracy was cle·arly pr~oved. A consp·iracy to transport,
receive ~and sell or ·dispos.e of alcohol wa.s. .alleged. The
objeets of the ·conspira-cy were earried out .and the appealing defendants p~a.rticip~ated therein in that they
went to the warehouse where the alcohol was stored after shipment and were there told that the al~cohol had
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been shipped from Peoria . "'"hieh \\'"as pursua.nt to and
in accordance ''ith the conspiracy, sa\\· that. the drums
were labeled "complete denaturt"\d alcohol'' "·hen in fact
they were buying- straig-ht alcohol and knew· it, and
being druggists, of course they kne"~ that the alcohol
w·as being illegally handled.
The opinion says that the evidence
"'creates some sus-picion or giYe·s rise to :an inference that the plaintiffs in error might have had
·some knowledge of the conspiracy at the time
they purchased. the liquor from one or anot.her
of the conspirators.''
The receipt of this alcohol under the circumstances
here is somewhat analogous to the alleged receipt \by
Mr. Pearce of money collected from the women. T-here
is a difference in this, that the charge here is not a
conspiracy to collect money but a conspiracy -to allow
operations, which makes the testimony as to Mr. P·earee
more remote than in the case under consideration.
The opinion reversing the conviction in the case
under consideration said:
"Wherever a circumstance relied on as evidence of criminal guilt is susceptible of two inferences, one of which is in favor of innocence,
such circumstance is robberli of all probative value, even though from the other inference guilt
may be fairly deducible. To warrant a ·conviction
for conspiracy to violate a criminal statute,
the evidence must disclose something further than
participating in the offens·e which is the ·olbdect orf
the oonspinacy; there must be proof of the unlawful agreement either expressed .or implied,
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·and parti·eipation with knowledge of the agree.
ment. Linde v. U. S. 13 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 8th
Cir.); U. S. v. Heitler et .al (D. C.) 274 F. 401·
Stubbs. v. U. S. ('C. C. A. 9th ·Cir.) 249 F. 571,
161 C. ·C. A. 497; Bell v. U. ·S. (C. C. A. 8th Cir.)'
2 F. (2d) 543; Allen v. U.S. (C. :C. A.) 4 F. (2d)
688; U. S. v. Cole (.D. ·C.) 153 F. 801, 804; Lueadamo v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 280 F. 653, 657.
·The mere fact that the plaintiffs in error
purchwsed liquor from !the C01rspir.ators is not
~sufficient to ·establis,h their guilt as eonspirators.
The purehas.er may be perfeetly innocent of ~ny
particip:ation in the consipiracy. The gi~st of the
,offellls'e is the ~conspiracy, which is nO't to be confuseldl 'vith .the acts done to effect the object of
1the ·eon:spiracy. Iponm.atsu Ukichi v. U. S. (C. C.
A.) 281 F. 525."
.
1

It appears to us that if there was proof of conspir~acy here at .all, it was of different ~conspiracies than the
one alleged ·and smaller conspiDacies by possibly some
of the defendants here and others at different times
and the object of which was different from that alleged
by the indictment.
FAILURE TIO IN:S.TRU·CT ON THIS WAS ERROR.
In this ·Connection, and on assignment No. 16 (Ab.
380) Request 3 (Ab. 283); Reque-st 3A (Ab. 284); and
particularly Requests 4 and 5 (Ab. 285-6) as to instructions, we point out that in. ~any event 'and in view of the
evidence here and these authorities the defendants were
'entitled to an instruction upon this question. Such an
instruction was requested (Ab. 285-6) and was refused
and no instruction was given upon this question. We
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call attention particularly to Requests 4 and 5 (Alb.
285-6) and the authorities there cited in ·addition to th~
~authorities cited. above, and to the fact that no instruction was given on this material a-nd vi tal issue.
Mr. Pearce's Plea and Contention of Prior Adjudication Should Have Been Considered and the Evidence Relating Thereto not Excluded.

This issue was presented by the introduction of
the indictment and Bill of Particulars and verdict of
acquittal in Case K<>. 10785. (Ex. 26 (a.)-(b)-(c)-(d).)
(See assignment 15, ·ab. 336). There Mr. P·earoo, together with E. B. Erwin and Ben Harmon were indicted and tried and acquitted. The indictment charged that
the three defendants

"on or about the first day of June, 1937, * * *
did wilfully, knowingly, and feloniously accep·t,
receive, levy and appropriate money without con·sideration from the proceeds of the earnings of
women engaged in prostitution.''

It was not contended that this necessarily constituted
~a

plea of former jeopardy. It was contended that as to
the issue there tried, it was an adjudication of that is~
sue. That it was thus finally determined that the defendants were not ,guil~y of the offense there charged of
receiving money from the earnings of prostitution.

The reoord ·shows that exactly the same evidence
was introduced by the same witnesse-s as to Mr. P-earce
here as was introduced in Case 10785. 'The principal
witnesses, H. K. Record, Golden Holt and Fisher Harris so te-stified. It was so established as to the women'·s
testimony, and in f.act ·stipulated as to all witnesses.
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It is argued by the state, that while this evidence
was introduced in the other case to prove the charge
of receipt of money from prostitution, that it was introduced here for the purpose of having an inference
of an ·agreement drawn from this same evidence and
fa;ct. We insist, as .already pointed out, that it has no
legal probative value to prove the agreement alleged
anyway.
The further difficulty with plaintiff's contention
is that all this was introduced again to prove that Mr.
Pearce received money from the earnings of prostitution, knowing it to be from such earnings. Any inference of guilt ·Could be dr.awn therefrom, only if the
claim was true. But it had ;been proved untrue. The ultimate f.act relied upon had been tried and disproved
on t~his 'Same ·evidence. Thus, the main f~act and the very
£act from which they attempted to make an inference
of ·conne~ction with the conspiracy or the existence of a
conspiracy as alleged, had been tried and adjudicated.
Before ~citing authority it is necessary to point out
that the.se exhibits were received by the court and was
the main matter of defense on whi·ch the defendant
p,eavce introduced any ·evidence whatsoeve·r. 'That aft·er
Mr. Pearce and all the defendants had rested, the
court denied him the right to have the exhibits or the
contention brought before the jury or .considered by
the jury in any way or manner, and thus he was left
at that stage of the ·cas·e without any defense so far as
hi.s evidence was concerned. (.See Ab. 168, 252-25(), 279).
The defense, as stated, is not stri~ctly one of former
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jeopardy, but it is one of prior adjudication, or what
is sometimes call~d by th~ courts estoppel, to re-try the
some issue by the same ~Yidenct."} against the same defendant.

Sta-te z·s. Hopkins, :!19 Pa.c. 1106 at 1108:
Is a leading cas~ upon this question and cites a
number of authorities thereon. Tllis case has been
previously referred to on another point. In discussing
this case previously it was pointed out that the Sheriff Hopkins, Wilson, the chief of police, and George
Bennett, .a pool hall opeT~ator, caused boot-leggers to deliver certain liquor, which was seized and the bootleggers a.tfer being locked up were run out of town and
the liquor used without any report thereof.
In the oose was introduced -evidence of a similar
transaction involYing the sheriff in the s-eizure and use
of other liquor. The court discusses the introduction of
that ·evidence, first fr{)m the standpoint of its proof of
a cours·e of conduct bearing upon the criminal intent
~and indicates that for that purpose it was admissible.
However, the sheriff having been previously tried for
that offense and on the evidence introduced with relation
the·reto, this presents ~an analogous situation on the
question of introduction of an issue already tried. The
opinion 'Says :
''But this evidence of the alleged offense
committed on November 9 was admitted ,s,olely
f.or the purpose of tending to p:r.ove that defendant acted with a felonious intent in taking the
liquor tTOOD. B·arroch on November 26. Defendant
had lbeen compelled to meet and rebut the same
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tes~timony

given by Heath upon the trial ·of cause
No. 347, and this he di~d ~sueces:sfully, with the
re,sult that the jury trying that eause pronounced
him not gui1ty, and, when the record of that acquit,tal was introduced by ~defendant upon the
trial of this ~cause, the ~court advised the jury that
it eould be eons:iJ<fured only as reflecting on the
credibility of Heath; in other words, the court
indicated ~that the jury might find that the testimony given by Heath upon the trial of this cause
was true, notwithstanding the record of acquittal. The que,stion then aris.e s : What force
or effect .should have been given ·to the record in
.cause No. 347 when introduced upon the tri:al
of this cause?
1

'Important as the su!bje~ct would 'apparently
appear to be it i:s one whieh has not be,en th{)r~oughly exp~lained by the text-writers., and not
fveqnently passed upon by the eourts, considering
the va's,t multitude of criminal ·eas:es 'and the various questions raised in that -class of eases.' 103
Am ..St. Rep. 20.
The d1oc.trine of res (adjudi,cata .as .applied in
civil ·Cases ]s fairly well :settled. It has. its foundation in two fundamental ID'axims of the law.

'A man s haH not be tw:i~ce vexed for one and
·the same .cause' and 'I't is f.or the public good
that there be an end to litigation.' Broom's Legal Maxims, 247-250.
1

Almost ta ~century and a half ago the English
Hous.e of Lord's ·de,cl:ared 'that the judgment of a
·court of ·concurrenrt juri1sdi·ction directly upon
the point i~s, as a plea, a bar, ·or, as evidence, conclusive between the same parties upon the same
matter, directly in question in another coutt.'
(IDuches,s of Kingston's Cas.e, 20 How:ell ''s State
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Trials, 353) and the do<.~trine ha~ b(\en ~HlherPll
to in this country (\Yer since.
Dutcher, ~G :Minn. 391 . . {. N. vV.
685, thf:\ court sta.ted the rule n s folio w·~ :

In MarYin

Y.

'It is irresis.tilble that the jud·gment of a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as
e-vidence upon parties and privie8- in re~pect to
every question direc.tly involved in .the issue and
determined by the judgment.'
In Freeman
said:

Dn

Judgments, seetion 318, it i's

''The principles applicable to judgments in
criminal cases are, in geneml, identical, so far as
the question of estoppel is involved, with the
principles recognized in civil cases.'

In 2 \Tan Fleet's Former AdJjudica.tion, section 628, the auth-or says :
'If there is a contest between the state and
the defendant in a criminal case, over an issue, I
know of no reason why it is not res judicata in
Wl:other criminal case. '

In Commonwealth v. Evans, 101 Mass. 25,
the doctrine was appli-ed to the fullest ex:tent.
Evans was fiflst charged with assaulting Henry
McKenzie with a knife, ·and was tried and convicted. Later McKenzie died as the result of the
wound, and Evans was then charged with man~Slaughter, and upon the .trial of that charge he
i&ought to prove that he used the knife in neoees;sa,ry -self defense. In rebuttal the commonwealth
introduced the record of his conviction in the assault case, and the .trial court instructed the jury
that the record was conclusive evidence that the
use of the knife upon McKenzie was unjustifiable,
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fully us·ed by the defendlan t in ~self defense had
been determined by the judgme,nt, and was not
·Op·en ·to him. In reviewing that instruction, the
·Suprem·e Court s1aid:
'T·he only question is as. to the e:ffiect of that
judgment, 'as evidence, UJPOn the i1s,sues of fact
raised in the trial of this ease for manslaughter.
The ~court lhelow ruled that it establi·shed conclu·sively that .the assult was unjustifiable, ·and therefore disproved the position of the defendant in
this .ca:se, th,a;t the knife wa·s useJdi in self-defense.
Upon general principles, the partie:s being the
s·ame, the former jurgment must be held to have
·e!st:abliJshed !all facts whi·ch were involved in the
issue ~then tried, and es-sential to the judgment
rendered upon it. The conviction. for as~sult and
battery therefore neees.sarily ~ex:eludes all justification which r(~ould :have he·en ·set up under the
general i1ssue of not guilty. The faets. of the asS'ault re-main the ·s:ame ; and whatever would sus~tain the ground of self-defense, now relied on,
woulld1 have been a ·complete defense to the former
pro:s·e.cution. The verdict and judgment in tha;t
~case were ,therefore rightly h·eld rto be a oon·clusive answer to the attempt a.t jus1tifi·cation
made in thils ease.'
In People v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507, the defendant was ~convicted of p·ws~sing a draft wi~th a
forged endol'lsement upon it, knowing that the
endorsement ·was a forgery. To prove the felonious: intent, the :state was p·ermitted ~to show that
~at !about the s1ame time the defendant h3Jd pas·sed
two othe-r 1dlrafts, d-esignated 3 and 9, with the
.'S'ame forged endorsement upon each of .them. In
~offering this evide-nce, the p·rose,cuting officer admitted that the defendant had been .charged with
forging the endorsement on draft 3, and with
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passing the draft, kno"~ing t hn t the l'ndor~Ptne-n t
was a forg·erY, and had ibeen tried upon ·the
charge an~.l. ~quitted. ·Th{\ SnprPlllP t ~on rt held
·that the ·admission of the eYidenee did not do
violence to the doctrine of res judicata. under the
peculiar circumstances there inYolYed., but in the
course of the opinion said :
The soundness of the doctrine to the effect
thaAt .the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction directly upon the point is as a plea at
bar, or as evidence conclusive upon the Same
matter coming directly or incidentally in question in an-other action between the •same parties,
cannot be doubted. * * * In order to render
rtJhe verdict and judgment -of not guilty upon the
draft offered in evidence conclusive upon the
facts which the prosecution sought to prove for
the puJ.l>Ose of &howing guilty knowledge, it mu-st
appear wi-th certainty from the evidence offered
in support of ~th-e all-eged estoppel that those
£acts were diirootly and necessarily found by the
verdict in that cruse in favor of the defendant ;
or in other words, 1:ha.t the jury could not have
found the verdict which ·they did without having
passed directly upon the racis offered to be
proved, •and found them against the pros-ecution.'
'1

1

After enumerating the several propositonrs.
which were neces-sarily involved in the trial of
the defendant for passing draft 3, the court continued:

'Now if all thes·e provisions we-re directly
.and necessarily decided in favor of the defendant
by the verdict and judgment in question, then the

·district attorney was estopped from makifng the
proof; or if ·either of them was rs-o decided, as rto
such he was estoppel<t, upon the principle that
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matte-:rts vvhi·eh h.ave been once· judicially determined ·eannot he .ag~a.in. drawn into controvensy
rus !between the pa:rtties and privies to the determination. ' '
And

~concluded:

' The verdict cannot opHrate as an estoppel,
exeep.t aS: to the allegation ·that the defendant
forged the endorse-ment.'
In Bell v. Sta.te, 57 Md: 108, the defendant
wa1s ~convieteidi of passing an o:vder for the payment of money on July 16;· 1880, knowin:g it to be
forged. Up·on the .tr:Ual the state offered evidence
to p·:VOV'e that on July 17 defendant had pas,sed
'a 1similar forged order. In ·de.fens,e the record was
offered, whi·ch disclosed that the defendant \had
heen !charge~ with passin.g rthe order on July 17,
1and had been tried .and aequitted. But ~counsel for
·defendant offe·r.e,d .the reeord 'for the purp<)'Se of
,affeeting the weight and ~credibility of the evidence against ~the accused', and it was admitted
for that limi.te1ct purp·os-e only. Before ·the jury,
however, counJS:el for defendant undertook to 'argue that the reeord was conclusive against t,he
·contention of the state, but were not permitted
to .continue to argue to that Hffe,ct. In disposing
~of the ·contention made, the appeUate .court ~aid:
'At the time thwt reeord wa1s offered, the
{~ounsel might, if they had thought proper, have
offered it ge:n:eDally, or as (~onclusive evidence,
.that ·the ~appellant :had not forged or uttered the
,che~ek of July 17, and as an ·es1toppel upon t~he
state, .an1d, if :vej.eeted by the court when ·thus
offered, or .admitted for the purpog.e- only of affeeting the weight ,and credibility of the evidenee
again:s,t him, .the appellant might have then excepted to such rulin.g, and ~had it reviewed by
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this court. But it "·as not ~n offered. ()n the contrarY, it "~aB offered expre~~ly on th~ tr•IwyJl~ and
for ·the pUI1)0SeoB "·hich the c.ou rt had :sta t.l'd it
would be ad1nissi1ble for: that i~. for the purpose of affecting Uu~ \\~eight and credibility of
the evidence against the acc.llSt:}.tl. ...\.nd eYPn \Vhen
the court interposed and stated the purposes for
which alone the record had been admitted, the appellant might have excepted to the ruling, limiting the effect of the record to this particular
purpose, if i.t had not been offered ''under the
permission of the court as ·SJtated in the first
exception." Sauerwein Y. Jones, 7 G. & J. 341,
Inloes '· Am.er. Exchange Bank, 11 Md. 185.
But he excepte(h, not to the limitation thus put
upon the effect of the record as evidence, but
to the court's refusal to permit his counsel to
argue that the record had a larger and br-oader
effoot, than that to which it had been limited by
the court. The court has an und-oubted right to
state to the jury the legal effect of evidence which
ihas been introduced and submitted to their contsideration. McHenry v. Marr ·and Emmart, 39
Md 532, 533; Wheeler v. State, 42 Md. 570. Not
having excepted .to the statement made by the
oourt of the legal effect of the record, it hecame
the law of the case. Hogan v. Hendry, 18 Md. 128 ;
Davis v. Pratton, 19 Md. 128; Dent v. Hancock, 5
Gill. 127. Being the law of the -case, counsel were
not at liberty to argue against it.'
In MitcheU v. State, 140 Ala. 118, 37 South.
76, 103 Am. St. Rep. 17, the defendam;t was convicted of arso~ in burning a building belonging
to .Sue Harris. To prove the criminal intent in the
commission of .that offens-e, tJhe state offered evidence tending to prove that •about the same time
'and near the :same place, the defendant had set
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fire to a buil1c1ing belonging to one Murphy. In defense the record was offered whi,ch disclosed
that ;the defendant had lbe~en ·charged with burninig 1fue Murphy .building, and had been tried and
acquitted. The trial ~court refused ·to ~admit the
reeord in ·evidence, and on appeal the Supreme
Court 1S1aid :
'·The evidence so offered was admissible unde~r the doctrine of res adjudieata, whereof it
has been well ·said: ''A final judgment on the
merits determining :any issue of law or fact af·ter
a eont~e~st ove·r it, forever set:s at rest, and fixes
it ~asi a faet or .as the l·aw in any other lirtigation
between ,the parties.'' Van Fleet's Former Adju<]i,eation, 2 et ·s.eq. * * * For the ·error in rejecting the offer above referred to, the judgment
will be revers.ed, and the eause remanded.'
The f.ollowing ~casers, though not directly in
point, illustrate the 1s:ame p·rincip.Je: Commonwealth v. Ellis, 160 Mas's. 16·5, 35 N. E. 7'73; Coffey v. United Sta,tes, 116 U. S. 436, 6 Sup. Ct.
437, 29 L. Ed. 684. ''
H·ere this record was refused ·consideration for
any purpose.
This proposition, so well recognized in civil cases,
has not been passed• upon direetly, ·so far as we have
found, lby this Court. It has be·en .suggested however.

Sta.te vs. Cheesemarn, 63 Utah 138, 223 Pac.
762:

The opinion 1a:nd authorities .cited in that case are
summarized accurately, w·e believe, in the second syllabus, as follows :
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cution for anothl:lr offe.ns·e~ unle~~ it a ppl•a r~ t ha.t
some essential elem·ent of the ~l'eond offl\H~l\ w~~
necessarily adjudicated nnd ~.leh,nnitH'd in thP
prQSooution for the first offense.,'
Authorities are cited along the ~ame line ns t·he authorities oited in the case next aboYe. The facts in the case
did not involYe a close question ·at all, as one case in\olved the matter of the report of the aceiden t and the
other the question of negligence in the accident. The plea
was one of former jeopardy.

The language of Russell vs. Place, 94 U. S. 608,
(24 L. Ed. 21±), as quoted by this Court in that case,
is applicable here.
"It is undoubt,e;dly settled la\\"'" that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdioti·on, upon a
question dire0tly involved in one suit, is conclusive as to that question in another suit hetween
the same parties. ' '

rJnited States 1.:s. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 65,
61 L. Ed. 161, 3 A. L. R. 516:

Is a later U.S. Case discnssing and directly ·S·ettling
the proposition that the same rule a.s to adjudication of
an issue that applies in civil cases, applies in criminal
cases ; and pointing out the difference between a plea
of former jeopardy under the 5th Amendment, and a
pl€a of res judicata.
The former acquittal on the issue alleged in the
previous case was under the statute of limitation. The
question is discussed as to w.hether that amounted to
an adjudication of the issue there ~cha.rged in the indict-
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ment, and the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Holme's, held that it did, an\d then discussing the questions here involved, says:
''Upon the merits the proposition of the
government is that the doctrine of res judicata
does not exist for -criminal cases except in the
modified form of the 5th Amendrnent, that a perISOn shall not be !subject for the same of£ense to
be twiee put in jeopardy of life or limb; and the
~conclusion is dra.,vn that a decision upon a plea
in bar .cannot prevent a se:cond trial when the
def,enda.nt n:ever has been in jeopa:fldy in the
1s·ense of being before a jury upon the £acts of
the offense· dharged. I:t ·seems that the mere iSitatem·ent of the ·position ·Should be its own answer.
It eannot he that the s,afeguards of ~he person,
,so often an;d so rightfully mentioned with solemn
:rever~ence, are lHss than t 1tose that protect from
;a li·albality in debt. It cannot be that a judgment
of ~acquittal on ~the ground of the S.tatute of Limit,a;tions is le~s~s a p·rotection against a second
trial than a judgment upon the ground of inno·cence, or that such a judgment is .any more effective when entered after a verdict than if entered
by the government's ·Cons·ent before a jury is impaneled,; or that it i~s «~onclusive if entered upon
the general issue. (United States v. IGssel, 218
U. S. 601, 610, 54 L. Ed. 1168, 1179, 31 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 124), but if upon a s.p·ecia.l plea. of the :staJtute, ·permits the defendant to be pros·e·cuted
'again. W·e do not suppose· that it would be doubt·ed that a judgment UJPOn a demurrer ,to the merits would be .a bar to a se~eond indictm·en:t in the
·Same words ..State v. Fields, 106 Iowa 406, 76
N. W. 802; W:hart. 'Crim. Pl. & Pr. 9th Ed para
406.

We may :adopt in its applica.tion to ·this case
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

151
·th~

statement of a judgP nf g-reat PxpPril'llOe in
the criminal la"~: "ll..here a crin1inal cha.rge has
been adjudicated upon by a court hal'in.g Jnrisdicti.o-n to hear a;nd, deter-nz.ine it, the adju-dica-ti.on,
whether it f.akes the fornr of a.n. a.cqu.ittal O'r con·riction. is final a. .~ to the ·~natter so adjudicated
upon, and 1na.y be pleaded in bar to a.ny subsequent prosecution .for the sa1ne off'ense. . . . In
this respect the crimi.nal laze is in unison with
that which prevails in ci.ril proceed1~ngs.' Hawkin~, J., in Reg. '· Mile-s, L. R.. 24 Q. B. Div. 423,
431. The finality <>f a previous adjudii.caJti<>n as to
the ·matters deternzined by it, is the ground of
decision in Com. v. Evans, 101 Mass. 25, ~he criminal and the cinl la-w agreeing, as Mr. Justice
Hawkins says. Com. '· Ellis, 160 Mass. 165, 35
K. E. 773; Brifi:tain v. Kinnaird, 1 BrDd. & B. 432,
129 Eng. R-eprint 789, 4 J. B. Moore, 50, Gow,

X. P. 164, 21 Revised Rep. 680. Seemingly the
.same new was taken in FT~ank v. Mangum, 237
U. S. 309, 59 L. Ed. 969, 983, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep.
582, as it was also in Coffey v. United States,
116 U ..S. 436, 445, 29 L. Ed. 684, 687, 6 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 437. ''
It will be -noticed that this opinion cites some of the
'Same authority cited ·supra in the Hopkins Case.
''The safegUlllrd provided by the· C onstitution against the gravest abuses has tended to
give the irnpression that when it did not apply
in terms, there was no other pri11Jciple that could.
But the 5th Amendment was not intooded to
do away with what in the civil law is a fwndamtental primciple of justice. (Jeter v. Hewitt, 22 H<>w.
352, 364, 16 L. Ed. 345, 348), in order, when a
man once has been acquitted on the merits, to
enable the govermnent to prosecute him a second time.''
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In order to get the full force of this opinion and the
r.eference~s to the "5th Amendment", this is. the amendment providing that no person may be t.wi~ce put in
jeopardy. So that Justice Holmes disposes of the ~en
eral ~contention of the state in this case-, and the position taken by t:he -court, that the only question that could
be rais·ed was one of twice in j·eopa~dy on the same
.charge. 'The above cas-e~s refutes that position.

State vs. Creechley, 37 Utah 142, 75 Pac. 384:
Goes merely to the quegtion that the issue of prior
adjudication here raised as a defense 'should have been
considered by the jury even though it were not shown
that any evidjenee was produced thereupon. As above
pointed out, this issue was entirely withdrawn from
the jury.
It should also he pointed out before leaving this
discussion, that in a:d~dition to the· allegation of an
agreement to permit and allow operations, it is charged
as an overt aet in the indietment that about the first
of each and every month betwe·en the months of June,
1937, ~and J·anuary, 1938, defendants colle,cted and ca.used
to he oolle~cted, money from the operators of house-s of
ill fame (Ab. 3), and in the Bill of p,arti,culars, that
between said dates the· defendants, with the .aid and
assist~ance of Golden Holt and Ben Harmon, collected
money from such operators. (Ah. 11). The· i~s·sue determined in ~ca.s·e 10785 adv-ersely to the st~ate, being
introduced by the same witnesses, as to such money, is
the only ·evid_ence connecting any ·defendant with such
overt act.
1
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Oliver rs. Sup. Ct. (Cal.)

~67

Pac. 764:

\fas a proceeding· to rest.rnin the trial court from
proceeding with the trial of certain deft.:\ndants \vho
had been tried under an indictment charging· ·an agreement and conspirac.y to dQ certain things and then alleging the various overt acts, and also contained counts all~ging the dDing of the things charged as overt acts in
the eonspirac.y. The petitioners, defendants in the original case, had been acquitted of the counts which
charged them with the offenses which were also pleaded
as overt acts under the conspiracy. The court held
that the issue as to these counts having been tried,
the issue was determined, and these matters could not
again be tried as overt acts of the conspiracy, and
since the statute required overt acts to be alleged and
proved, they could not be tried on a conspiracy charge
either lbecause that issue was now disposed of. The
opinion says :

''But here the conclusion cannot be escaped
that since each crime, considered and described
collectively ·as a single entity, is alleged to be an
·overt act, and as the jury fully acquitted thes·e
petitioners of ,each overt act thus alleged, the
portion of the count charging oonspimcy remaining unadjudicated is !insufficient to constitute
criminal conSipiracy. Moreover, considering the
:vooord here presented, by finding that none of
the overt acts charged as part of ifue conspiracy
were committed., the jury, in ·effect, acqlllitted the
petitioners of the offense Df conspiracy.''
'This matter is presented in suppoflt of assignment
15 see Ab. 336. The issue was seasonably raised and the
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court was .asked to consider it upon. the recoro then
available and without denial that the ·evidence would be
the same. It is also presented upon the ·assignments 9,
Ab. 317 and 19, Ab. 390, that the defendant P·earce was
prevented from having a fair trial.
Improper ~statements and Conduct of the District
Attorney Committed and Allowed was Prejudicial

'This involves assignments 11, 12, and 13 (a) to (n)
inclusive (Ab. 318-335). Also assignments 9 ~and 19, tha.t
defendants were not ~given a fair trial.

It is quite apparent that the di.strict attorney was
·determined to procure a conviction at :all •Costs..in this
cas-e. Wthile some of thes-e matters may not have been
prejudi·cial taken :alone, some of them ·are under the
authorities prejudicial standing .alone, :and certainly
taken as a whole they are prejudicial.
Spa'<~e

will not ·permit the discussion of each of
these s·ep·a:va,tely. A suf:fi.cient number will be given to
show the import .and nature and then authority will be
·cited thereon :
Assuming~

as ·stated in 64 C. J. p. 235, sec. 251, that
in an opening statement the attorney may define the
na.tur·e of the issue's, that hH may state what he expects
to p·rovr.e in a general way, that he cannot state such
proof as would be incompetent, .and that he cannot make
the opening 'Statement a medium for arguing the merits,
''nor will the relation of testimony at length lbe tolerated. '' And also assuming that it is not mis,conduct to
make an error in stating som·ething that he intends to
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prove and \Yhich he does not la.ter pro,~t\ if ~uch statem~nt is made in good faith, but that it is error if a
statement is not so made.
We consider first the nature of the opening state-

ment here as contained in the '• V-ol. ,~'' supplement to
the record and in the assignments (Ab. 318-329). Note
particularly that this statement departs from the allegations of an agreement, recites hearsay statements
at length, it imputes misconduct not pertinent to the issues to prejudice the jury, and that the whole statement,
if all that was stated in it were true, would not establish the offense alleged. The statements with relation
to investigations by Fisher Harris and what he had
found were incompetent. The statement that defendants
each had knowledge of the operations involved was immaterial, as the cases cited hold, that knowledge or
the failure to prevent the carrying out of the conspiracy, even though a person has the power so to do, is not
proper evidence in this character of case. ( 47 Fed. ( 2d)
692) supra.
The statements that Early investigated and determined there was a payoff in January, 1936; the statement that Harmon, Browning, Rosenblum and Jennings
called and asked what they could do to keep operating,
which was not only not supported by any evidence but
clear hearsay; the statement that Early sent these men
to the chief of police, ·stated in this very connection,
which was not proved; the statement that Austin Smith
would testify that there was a number of bills that had
not been ·paid lby Mr. Erwin and after these were paid
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the payoff would be reorg,anized. T!here was no testimony of this. The state~m.ents concerning memorandums
of vice eondi tions and the letter of Fisher Harris, which
was finally held to be incompetent although actually rec:i ted into the record, and the numerous. statements of
rumors !and the "gist of these· rumors" that vi~ce was
going on and that there was a payoff. These were not
only incomp·etent, but the district attorney must have
known that they were.
Thi'S violated the rule as stated by this Court in

State vs. Distefano, 262 Pac. 113 at 114
Where it is said, in the opening stat·ement the attorney may state the material facts which the evidence
will establish
''but not fa,cts whi~ch the party is· not able to
prove and none that cannot be supported by
legal evidence. Bishop's Criminal Procedur.e, (2d.
Ed.) Vol. 2, P. 791, p1ara. 969."
There was refusal to follow the suggestions of the
court that it ~be confined to competent ·evidence, but a
s-tatement by the attorney, ''But, Your Honor, there is
a rHsponsihility and hurd en on the state * * *." 'The
statement of .conversations between Holt and T~ag.gart;
the statement that all these operations were· permitted to
operate unmolested "under the instruction of Chief
Finch"; which was not prov·ed. The build,..up· by the use
of the Federation of Women 's· Clulbs and the incompetent
statement that they had made an investigation and
what they had found as to rumors of vi~, and the
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andum to the mayor n~unes of n1en vvho \\.l're alleged
to be taking a payoff. The further ~ta.tenlPnt thnt they
had discussed this "ith llr. Finch, of \Yhich there \vas
no proof. The statement of a. conYersa t inn bet,Yeen Gust
Captain and Holt, and the discus~ion about Captain being an investigator for the ,,~omen's Clubs, 'vhich was
never proved.
There was ·another build-up "-.Jth relation to Fisher
Harris and Harold B. Lee '• working 'With the ChurCh
Security plan" and relating to the conversation with
Mr. P-earce and the false statement that Mr. Harris
said to Mr. Pearce, "You are collecting from operators
{)f vice establishments''. which was never .said; and then
t:he instance in connection with Mr. Lee of the utterly
incompetent statement of Ben Harmon to Holt after
the conspiracy had ended, about Mr. Lee accusing Mr.
Pearce. And again in this connection, when the court
called attention to statements that counsel was making
of a hearsay nature, and counsel's statement in the
presence of the jury, "If we are not permitted to introduce in evidence statements made by defendants
after. they were apprehended, four or five days after
the offense, etc.'' Defendants were never shown to
have been apprehended or to have made any statements
under :such circumstances.
We have the extended ;statements 1about houses of
prostitution here and throughout, as if this attorney,
who had been in office many times ·as long as Mr. Finch
with ~hese things always oper:ating, was horrified, and in
thi~ connection. a statement that the money taken from
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these girls was ''turned over to the defendants'' which
was. not proved, and as to Mr. Finch never attempted to
be proved.
We have the statement that Chief Finch directed
Thacker to take orders from Ben Harmon and do what
Harmon asked ~him to ·do, which was nev.er attempted
to be proved, and. that Tha,cker said that Mr. Finch
would not permit Bill Browning to op·en up because
Bill Browning would not pay Ben Harmon, ~also not
proved. That Mr. Finch rep·rima.nded Hedman for making ~an arrest, ~and similarly with relation to 0. B.
Record, when lboth of these witnesses testified that Mr.
Finch did nothing of the kind. Also the damaging statement that Mr. Finch said to Judge Ell·ett, "Why can't
we let thes·e things run on~' ', whieh was. never proved;
allld the frequent argumentative appeals, when objections, were made or statements by the court, to the
jury, such as ''I have all the ~confidence in the world
that fui,s jury ·Can determine when that evidence comes
in whether or not I am telling the truth", and the statement in this ·conne~ction that he had written it down.
This •cert,ainly left no excus-e for his making statements
on which there was no -evidence. And the statement with
reference to Fisher Harris's letter, "I can assure
you it was not gossip. It was- put down in a letter * * •."
Also in ·conne,ction with objections made to the court
that thes·e things were incompetent and .also immaterial,
the voluntary 1sta tement that the attorney would not be
able to show "'any written memorandum prepared by
the ·Conspirators. 'T'hey don't d,o it that way.'' And the
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ity of this 'Yas not in the prl"\~f'DC(\ ot• the defendants.
Obviously they would not be there "yhen it wns going
on, purposely ~ * ~. '' This, and particularly when taken
in connection with the other remark~, and the asking
of leading questions to thus introduce objectionable matter, and the whole eourse of c.onduct of the attorney,
·was, quite obviously prejudicial.
Coming now to the evidence, 'Ye will cite some
more examples. In connection with the testimony of Mr.
Ellett (Ab. 329), a.n objection that a statement of "~hat
his ''friend'' had told him did not involve an admission
or denial of the crime charged, which was entirely proper ·and called for no argument to the jury, whereupon
the attorney made the two speeches indicated at page
330 of the abstract, concluding ''I reiterate that the jury
is the person and institution that will be called upon to
determine whether or not such a statement as will be
introduced would be denied by a reasonable person' ' ;
then after discussing Gust Captain in the opening statem€nt and the court having settled that evidence as to
him was not admissible, this -statement: ''We would
be pleased to introduce that conver.sation ibu.t we are
afraid there would be an objection.'' Then, after the
court's ruling out Gust Captain, and in order to tie him
in anyway, the next question the attorney asks: "Q.
Well, after you ·saw Gust Captain, I think you said you
saw Ben Harmon?'' (Ab. 331) This was asked of Holt.
Then in discussing the letter written by Fisher Harris
of hls investigation (Ab. 331) on an objection which the
court ultimately :sustained as to the doonment, the argument .~'Here is the city attorney, the chief enforcing
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officer of the city, making ·Charges against the mayor."
Ther.e was no such eharge made in the letter. (Ex. R).
·This a.rgument, ;as loud !as. he ·could sp·eak it to the jury,
was objected to and no ruling made hy the court. It was
in this cohnerction that it was pointed out to the trial
·court that objection had to be made and the -court was required to instruct.
Counsel's repeated instructions and directions to
the jury as to the law and the duty of the jury thereunder a.s above and hereinafter indicated, was "\vrong.
It is uniforma.lly held that such instruction is exclusively for the- ·court.
After reading an ordinance to Mr. Finch (Ab. 332)
a number of time's- as to the ~duties of the· police, this
could only relate to the immaterial matter as. to whether
the ·chief had been lax in his duties, and after the chief
had s.t~a,ted that he was not a. la:wyer and he hadn't read
the oDdinance, the prosecuting ·attnrney made the statement that "ignorance of the law is no justification".
·Then we have the re-cord after the state had put
in its case 'vith relation to Mr. P.earce, and afte·r H. K.
Re·eord had stated that he made no repoTt of the alleged ·convevsation, 0. B. Re•cord was sworn and asked
a long leading question (Ab. 333) ·as to the conversation bet.we,en him and his brother H. K. Re-cord. Obje·ction was made that it was hea~say and not rebuttal.
Couns·el then made an irrelevant statement about Mr.
Finch, '\\rho was not involved in the question. It was
stated· ·that the testimony would lbe prejudi•ci.al on obj~e.ction, and on this occasion, and also on other oocaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sions, the prosecuting attorney 8aid, ·'Don't get excited. We think all these thi.ngs are pt·eju.dichzl to the de-

feMant, yo'ur Hon'()r, ju.st a.s preiud1~cial as indicated
h.ere ani/, as Mr. Mullin.er th.i'nks it ·is." The objection
was sustained and there was no occasion for this statement. This will indica.t~ th~ nature of oond.uct.
We desire to point out now a few matters in connection with the closing statement. In the intr-oduction
of Dar Kempner's te-stimony (Ab. 40-64) the attorney
made a determined and misleading effort to have this
witness testify that the occasion when Abe Stubook
collected money was after the first of June, 1937, so as
to bring it within the allegation, and at a time when H.
K. Record was n{)t head of the vice squad. The witness clearly did not so testify. The attorney stated in
his closing argument ( Ab. 334) that he did, and attention was ealled to the record:
''·MR. RAWLINGS : I expected. that quibble ; but the jury will remember collections were
made up until June. * * * Kempner had known
Stubeck. They were pals together.''

·This statement was absolutely untrue. Kempner did not
!so testify. ~he state's witness Holt testified positively
that from the end of 1936 there were no collections until
he .started on the 3rd or 4th of June of 1937. Ther-e w.as
.no evidence that Kempner and Stubeck were pals, it
was to the contrary. (Ab. 62, 229)
There was another .statement (Alb, 334) by the attorney that these people wanted to be arrested and wantto be taken to jail, intimating a laxnes:s, in not arre·stSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing the·m. Attention was again -called to the record, and
Mr. Rawlings said ''They 'vere arrested. That is in
·evidence.'' It is not p1ain what was. meant by this unless this is. another intimation that the defendants were
arrested. In this ·connHction (Ah. 335) there was alsQ
the s:tatement, objected to, that Ben Harmon was "the
king pin of the underworld''. This was, not shown.
We come now to a more ~serious matter. In his closing .argument, and over obj·ection, the att·orney stated
that the defendants "hired Mr. P·e1arce", which is wholly ·contrary to anything in the reeord.. When attention
was ~called to it, the attorney said: "I am drawing an
inference. I don't know how mu·ch they paid him but
Pearce himself said, 'I am instructed by the mayor to
make these colle·ction 's. I don't know what else you
need. If that is not hiring, you don't think he W{)uld
he doing it for nothing.'' Such a statement, particularly
against these defendants, was clearly impr-oper.
There was not only no evidenee of hiring fb~ the
other defendants, but there was no evidence of collection by Pearce, and such he:arsay statement iaS to Mr.
Irwin, without foundation, was. maliciously prejudicial.
And now even a more serious matter. In many instances, as pointed out, evidence was introduced of
statements or ~conduct by one defendant here sometimes
involving the mention of another ·defendant. In many of
the.se instances the ·court ·did not confine it to the defendant making the statement, but also in seve,ral cases the
court did so limit it. As al:r:eady pointed out, there
was no foundati·on for the introduction of any of it,
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but in this particular instance the attorney had consented to the limitation. It "'"as "ith relation to testimony of a conversation with Mr Thacker. Such situation and ruling of course clearly indicated to the attorney that such statements could not be used to prove
the conspiracy, but oould only be admitted after the
conspiracy had been proved. Now after the oourt had
reminded the attorney that he is talking ,and arguing
that this testimony of '!'hacker proved the conspiracy
when it was limited to Thacker,
"THE OOURT: What is your memory!
MR. RAWLIXGS: That is my memory but
I say it because it shQws a mutual understanding.
I say it shows a mutual understanding between
these parties. ''
Further objection was made to this statement, lbut no
ruling by the court. (See next topic on this incident).

People vs. Grossman, 82 Pac.(2d) 76 at 83:
Held that where an attorney was trying to connect
the other attorney with knowledge of a complaint and
asked the witness if she signed, it under his advice
and direction, and an objection was made and the prosecuting attorney said, ''It stands to reason she did so ;
what is the use of quibbling~'', that this was improper.
It did not result in a reversal because it stood atone
and the trial oourt then directed the jury not only that
the remark was improper but that it would be stricken
out and the jury was directed not to consider it.

State vs. Solomon, 87 Pac. (2d) 807, (Ut.):
Of course, is a leading case upon this question, and
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the .statements there made outside of the record and
which resulted in reversal, are nowhere near as numerous ·or damaging as the statements of that ·character in
thi~s ·case.

State vs. Barone, 70 Pac. (2d) 735 (Ut.):
'':There is no justification for the prosecution
inje·cting ·anything into the trial of 1a. case that
would be unfair. In this .cas·e the distri~ct attorney apparently knew that the ·evidence proffered
by him was not only incompetent but prejudici,al
to defendant, lbeing ·calculated, though not re~ceived by" the court, to influence the jury against
defendant.''

State vs. Lyte, 284 Pac. 1006:
Is la ·case where this Court diS:cusses the questi~on of
previous adjudication, hereinabove d.is~cus~sed, and intimates the correctness of ~our contention here. This court
could not decide the question because of the lack of
right to have the ·case .appealed, and the point ruled on.
It also involves the question of ~conduct of an attorney.
The opinion :says :
1

''The rulings thus involve the question not
of jeopaDdy, but ·of permitting the state to give
evidence of offenS'es sepaDate and distinct from,
and not included within the ·charged offense and
of which the defendant has he·en acquitted. * • •
The evidence was admitted on the statement of
the district attorney, more adroit than sound,
to show the eharacter of the pr·emises on ,vhich
the liquor ·charged, in this ~a.ction. was. claimed
to be poss~essed by the defe-ndant and to ~show
the probability of his possession of it. * * 1 espe~cially since the atC~cus·ed had theretofore been
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acquitted -of sueh Qther offt:"\nses, may be a.ssu1ned
to be an erroneous and groundless claim or purpose f<>r whieh the eYidenoo was admissiihle. ''
~

•

* * •

*

''In all criminal ca.ses an undoubted duty ·a.nd
responsibility rests on the court and the prosecuting attorney to see that all rights and. privileges of the accused are safeguarded and protected, and that convictions are permitted only
()D competent and material evidence.''

State z·s. Jlartin, 300 Pac. 103-! at 1040 ( Ut.):
''It is of course improper for the district attl()rney to refer to extraneous matter in his argument to the jury notwithstanding it had been
referred to in argument by counsel for the de·
fense. The district attorney should have objected at the time it was so referred to and moved
the court to exclud-e it from the consideration
{)f the jury. ''

People t·s. Kregewski, 163 N. E~ 438:
Holds that attempts to elicit hearsay evidence, and
commenting in that connection that evidence was sufficient to convict, was improper.
People vs. Reed, 164 N. E. 847:
Holds that arguments have no place in an opemng
statement.
Bolden vs. State, 155 N. E. 824:
Holds that the charge ·of other matters ·of crime in
an. opening statement is reversible error:
Green vs. State, 158 S. E. 285:
Held that recital of inadmissible matters In an
opening .statement by the prosecuting attorney was
error;
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The Court Erred in Admitting Improper Matters of
Evidence.

This gener.al subject has been adverted to and under eaeh Class of Testimony, authorities ·cited sufficient
to eover each separate assignment under 14 and under
15 (a) to 15 (nnn) inclusive. (Ab. 336-372). We would
not be justified in repeating these, or the assignmelft.s
as recited in these p~ages. The ~Court by looking at them
will .see the appli~cati~on of the authorities citied as to
each of them. None of these assignments is waived.
We ask the ~court, however, to ·consider these assignments als·o in supp·ort of the general conduct cl~aimed
of introducing immaterial, incompetent and improper
evid,ence by asking leading questions so that the obj·ection thereto reflects upon the defendants and makes it
appear that the defendants were trying to ex~clude evidence. We were in fiact often accused of this and have
already cited some instances.
In ·connection with the:se assignments also and this
same general subject, w·e ask the court to note particularly the evidence of Fisher Harris, the city attorney,
'vorking in connection with the district attorney here,
to accomplish the same result. The albstract, pages 126
to 139, show the dis.cussion with rel~ation to Mr. Harris's letter and his persistence in calling f.or that letter and getting the ·Contents of it into the record regardless of the ruling of the ·Court excluding the letter.
In this ·Conne~ction ·also will be noted at the pages of
the abstract indicated, and particularly the pages of
the reco~d therein ·cited, the persistence of the proseSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ooting attorney in asking irrele,ant leading que~tions
as to what the witness had heard, and "~hether the defendants asked Harris wh{) was getting the payoff mentioned in the letter and other questions of this character.
While relying upon the authorities hereinabove
cited as to each of the single assignments above referred to, we want to call the court's attention to a note
in 78 A. L. R. 766 on the subject of counsel implying
that an adversary was trying to suppress facts. The
note there says :
''Gratuitous statem-ents of coun-sel, not warranted by the evidence, are universally frowned
on and regarded as improper by the courts, for
t:he reason that the statements thems-elves, or
th-e inferences which naturally flow from them,
might tend to mislead or improperly influence
the jury. In cases where such misconduct of
counsel has had that result, the courts have held
it suffieient ground for a reversal of judgment.''
Also:
109 A. L. R. 1089 a note on the subject of offering

improper evidence {)r asking improper questions as
ground for reversal:
''Improper questions may be prejudicial in
various ways, including the following: They may
plainly convey information ;excluded by the rules
of evidence; may hint at the eai'i$tence of signifi-

cam,t though inadmissible facts, with or without a
suggestion as to their exact nature; may, ibry the
assumptions therein contained, and notwithstand. ing the ~answers being prevented, impress upol).
·the jury, by a mere .show of proof, matter.s which
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~are

not ·admissible in evi~dence and which perhaps :could not be proved, as inferred, even if
opportunity were afforded; and may, by reason
of the objections m·rude, emphasize the facts suggested more effeetively than might be done by
answers admitted without obiection.''
* * * * * *
''In almost every instance of such mis-conduct, opposing (~ouns~el, if he makes objection,
is neeessarily pl1aced in the false light of suppressing significant circumstances and attempting to ~de~ceive the jury into ren,dering an unjust
v:erd.i~ct. ' '

Also:
116 A. L. R. 1170 and the note there relating to
comment by attorney on opposing counsel's objection or
refusal to permit introd~uction of evidence :
''There are conflicting views as to whether it
is prop·er for ~couns~el to comment on the exercise
lby an opposing party of a p~rivilege with respect
to testimony or the calling of a witness. By what
seems to be the better rule, it is held improper
for counsel to make such comments.''
This last note refers to the matter involved in assignment 15 (;nnn) (Ab. 371), as well as. a numlber of
other a.ssi·gnmen ts.
We now call attention ~and sihall ~discus.s only generally assignments 15 (000) to 15 (xxx) inclusive. This
refers to improper cross examination and improper rebuttal and ,comes under a little different classification.
WH shall discuss 15 (ooo) and 15 (pp·p). (Ab. 3724), a.s illustrative. We ask the court to examine the abSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stract at 194 to 200 ine. The di~ trict attorney stood with
copies of the newspapers in his hand and was trying
to bring out that the Federa.ti'On of \\T omen's Clubs ha.d
stated to the Telegram that there wa.s vice here including gambling in card rooms. If it were admitted that
they .so stated, it was utterly incompetent and irrelevant to the charge of an agreement here. No conversation was attempted to be :fixed with Mr. Finch and that
objection was repeatedly made. Mr. Loofbourow pointed
out to the court (Alb. 200), "It is just an effort to read
these newspaper stories into the record, without any
possibility of contradicting them in any legal way.'' It
was emphasized to the jury and could not have failed
to have been prejudicial. It was utterly indefensible.
It was in this discussion that counsel commented that ignorance of the law was no excuse.
Repeated efforts were made to have the court instruct the jury to disregard the matters read from the
newspaper. It had absolutely nothing to do with any
direct examination of the witness or any matter referred to by him, or to refute any of his testimony. It
was another illustration of building up a case by improper gossip and propaganda.
It is hard to pursue the assignments above referred
to without thinking that the most ·condemnable conspiracy was between the city attorney and the prosecuting attorney to besmirch Mr. Finch, an honest and upright citizen, by a show of pretended indignation about
ope:r:ations here, during his short term of offiee, which
had gone on under these same prosecuting attorneys for
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many years before and since. Certainly they knew
better than he could know how to deal with these prob.
lems and how to stop the·m if they could be stopped.
When the city licensed card rooms, charging ~as much
annually as $150.00 on one table, everybody knows that
the chief of policB ·could not prevent gambling therein;
and when the city practically licensed and provided for
the contvol of p~rostitution by the Boa:r.d of H·ealth every.
body interested knew and had always known that that
operation was going on. It was almost plain hypocracy
to pr.ate about these ''vices'', totally irrelevant as they
were, :and thus haras•s ~and bring about a conviction of
Mr. Finch, who had performed his duties just as every
police ~chief had and does perform them, and undP.r the
same conditions, and with the same operations during
the entire memory of thes-e prosecuting attorneys. He
was- not being trie.d for thi,s..
In the group of assignments now under considera·
tion, w·e eall brief attention to 15 (www), (Ab. 378). It
will be noticed there that the ·Court ~called the writer
down for making an obj-ection with relation to an al·
leged conversation with Mr. Thacker, and the .court
said:
''THE C~OURT: Listen, Mr. Mulliner, this
does not involve anybody but Thacker 'and Mr.
H.anson 'has. not obj~ected.
'
·MR. MULLINER: If the failure of Mr.
Thacker to do anything is an -agre·ement, then it
is going to affe,ct all of us. ''
Now after this, as above' pointed out, with relation
to .the testimony of thiis same witness the prosecuting
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attorney "~as allowed to argue to the jury that it did
affect all of the defendants and showed a. ''mutual understanding'' between these parties.

It is a matter often commented upon 1by the courts
as showing prejudice in the cas~s of this kind, that the
court supported and gave approval to the conduct of the
attorney, thereby impressing the jury, and even arousing sympathy for the prosecuting attorney, where objections are made to such conduct.

State

'V.

Trogstad, 100 P. (2) 564 (Ut.):

This is a recent case discussing the question here so
vitally involved as to the introduction of other matters
of ·alleged wrongdQing, or of general vice, both in the
statements of the attorney and throughout in the evidence, and without actual proof of any other actual
crime, to show intent, or for any other purpose.
The opinion in this case says :

''On the prosecutilm for a particular crime,
evidence whick tends to show that the accused
committed 0/Mther crime, im,d,ependent of that for
which he is on trial, even of the sa;me sort, ~ inadmissible. There are exceptions to the general
rule, carnal knowledge eases being one. In re
Sadlier, Utah, 85, P. 2d 810, on rehearing 94 P. 2d
161, and cases cited. ''
The Court Erred in Refusing Requests and in Giving

Certain Instructions.

In the matter of instructions, the trial court con-

con-

tinued to con.fuse the issue here with the class of
spiracy where a substantive offense is charged and the
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alleged ·Conspi:r:ators engaged in ·committing the offense
or, in not as stated 1by the ·court in the Wyatt Case, 23 F.
( 2d) 791, supra :
' ' Keep~ing in mind that the on:e crime which
the indi~ctment ·charged against all defendants is
~conspiracy * * * not the substantive crime of vio-lating the law itself-"
The instructions clearly leave the jury believing
that they ·could ·convict the ·defendants, or any of them,
for any mis·conduct or omissions of duty shown in the
mass of insinuation argument and tHstimony as to
isolated matters of this kind.
The instructions do indicate that the mere operations alleged in the incti:clment in 1936 and 1937 are
not proof of the ·conspiracy, although this is .somewhat
nullified by other ~and more gener:al language. The in,structions fail to advise the jury at .all wri th reference
to the matter of alleged admissions by silence, and leave
the jury to believe that the long recitals: lby the witnes~ses
of ·conditions that they had investigated, or found out,
or been told about, could be (~o.ns:idered as evidence.
1

The instructions also not only lea.ve the jury believing, but ~advise the jury thrut any kind. of co..Jop-eration
in any manner related to any of the operations by any
p·ersons, can be considered as proof of guilt of the
charge here, making no distinction, notwithstanding the
requests, as to the parti·cular conspiracy and any other
:smaller conspiracies or !any omissions to stop any of the
operations alleged.
The instructions are entirely mislea:ding upon the
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point .that conduet, admissions and declarations of a
single alleged conspirator cannot be used to prove the
conspiracy. That such matters inYolving .any other
conspirator could be admitted only if the conspiracy
was otherwise proved. It is in this connection particularly that the jury are left to 'believe, as indicated by the
court in the previous quotation herein, that anything
said by anyone, anywhere, may be used to prove the
conspiraey or to charge defendants here.
The instructions also contain a serious misstatement
of fact by the court. It is these matters only that we
will discuss. (1) First, wit-h reference to the alleged
admissions by silence, defendant requested (Ab. 287)
S€parately with reference to the testimony of Attorney
Harris a.nd what he had in,estigated and had heard or
found out, that his recital w.as not to be taken as proof
of the matters which he recited, and agruin (Ab. 288)
generally with relation to Attorney Harris and other
witnesses that their recital of what they had heard or
been told or f{)und out was not to be considered by the
jury as proof of the things that they recited. And then
lby request 10, (Ab. 292) asked another proper instruction on admissions by conduct. Thes~ requests were
clearly correct and all were refused No instruction was
given upon this subject, which was ·clearly made an
issue throughout by objeclions ~and motions.
The only instruction with relation to the subj·ect
of admissions at all, and this was wholly insufficient and
did not ·advise the jury on this issue, or even bring to
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their .attention the matter at ·all, is a short statement,
subdivision (b) of instruction 23 (Ab. 277) :
' ' (b) The term 'admission' means the act
of acknowledging something :ass·erted; acquies·Cence or ·concurrence in the truth of an allegation or statement; ·conceding that a statement is
true.''
i'his failure violates the rule repeatedly laid down by
this Court that the defendants were entitled to an in.;struction presenting their theory of the evidence and
instruction upon all .material issues.
The ·se·cond matter of S·erious importance, is
that with relation to separate conspiracies or :s:eparate
offens.es by different persons here charged, or other
p-ersons whos-e names were introduced in evidence. We
have attempted to show under previous subdivisions of
this brief that that matter "\v.a.s confused and that the
evidence supported such separate eonspiracies, if any
conspiracy at all was proved. It appears to us beyond
question that the proof of conspiracy here that must be
relied upon rests upon Holt's testimony. It rest·s particularly upon Holt's testimony that he eollected money
in 1936 and again in the latter p1art of 1937. We do
not see that this supports the general eonspiracy.
( 2)

W·e ·clHim that under the rule of evidence applicable
it clearly does not, but it has been and will be relied
upon by the state as s.upporting the 1agrjeement alleged.
Now it must lbe clear, we think, ·that Holt's arrangement, when he himself was head of the anti-vice squad,
with Rosenblum, commencing by his testimony (Ab. 99)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

175
about July of 1936, and ending at the close of thnt. yPar,
and which arrangement in no "~ay in,..olved anyon~
charged a.s a conspirator here, "~ag a ~eparate and distinct arrangement a.nd tJJ.e testimony proved no n1orP
than this. It must also appear that the 1natter of his
alleged arrangement "ith Mr. Harmon about June of
1937, and his alleged contact with )fr. Pearce a.t that
time, and then his collecti001 and turning over of money
to Mr. Harm.{)n indicated another definite setup. These
may have indicated understandings to collect money
from pr{)stitution. It in no way involved the larger
agreement as alleged or the purposes of the general conspiracy to permit, allow or a-ssist operations. This matter has been discussed and authorities cited at length
on it, and it is submitted to the Court upon the cases
hereinabove previously cited at length.
In any event we were entitled to have the jury instruct~ on this important issue.

Requests were made for instructions on this (Ab.
284) which related particularly to the separate arrangement attempted, according to H. K. Record, between
him and Mr. Pearce and Mr. Harmon in 1937, when he
was head of the anti-vice squad. Separately a request
was made (Ab. 285) directly with relation to the testimony of Mr. Holt and to the testimoo:y of Mr. Kempner
as to these separate arrangements, the requests being
that these could not be considered as proof of the conspiracy ''unless you believe that such collections were
made, if you believe they were made, as a result of the
agreement ·alleged here or that such collections * * ""
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weor·e made beeause of the .agreement alleged against the
defendants.'' And further, that such .circumstances
should only be considered if they were, in the mind
of the jury, consistent only with the existence of such
agre·emen t.
We then made request No. 5 (Ab. 286). direetly on
this question that if the, jury believed that some one or
more offenses had been committed lby .one or more alleged conspirators, or if they .believed that there were
some agreements or understandings other than the
conspiracy eharged, that proof of these smaller offenses
or ~agreements or conspiracies at different times "if
they believed they wer:e such'', would not justify conviction of the offense -charged, .and added:
''·Moreover, where, .as here, a single ~conspiracy,
general in its nature, is charged, defendants cannot be· .convicted upon proof merely of other of£enses or of other or smaller conspiracies or of
any conspira.cy different from that .alleged."
We .cited in this -connection:
29~5

U. S. 78, 79 L. Ed. 1314, 43 Fed. (2d)

890.

We have now eited an abundance of other authority
showing tha.t this instruction was .correct and fairly
pres·ented ·the issue. No instruction was given on this
subject. Instead, the court .confuses the matter throughout by a number of instruct~ions. indicating to the jury
that they ·can find these defendants guilty without actual proof of their ·entering into the agreement alleged.
This they tdd·d.
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In instruction 7 (..Ab. ~tl-i) tht.'\ r.ourt say~ that the
agreement may be sh(nvn by \Yhat is tern1ed eiroumstantial evidence ''or by infert.~net.~~ deducible and justifiable from other proven fact~ and son1e acts and conduet of the defendants, Wtd eaoh of them.'' The court
then attempts to limit by saying that the circumstantial
evidence must be sufficient to convince beyond a reaso:nable doubt of the guilt of the defendants, ·'or some of
them, as charged in the indictment, and as having committed the unlawful acts or some of them in furtherance and in pursuance of the alleged agreement of conspiracy.''
Then in 12, the court instructs that if Erwin, Finch
and Thacker failed to perform their duties ''then you
may take such fa.cts into consideration in determin~ng
whether or not they, or any one of them, so failing to
perform his duties are guilty of conspiracy." 'l'his appears to indicate that this failure, which the cases definitely ihold does not support the agreement here, .may be
considered as proof of conspiracy.
In 12(a) (Ab. 269) the court ·dDes say that mere
cognizance of these operations ''in the absence of
other evidence" would not be sufficient to support the
ta,greement. He should have said that the mere cognizance of these operations was no proof at all, but adds
again:

''In other words, to find said defendants, or
any of them, guilty as charged in the indictment,
you are required to find beyond a reasonaJble
doubt that they were parties to the alleged con·~piracy or agreement, or actually particilpated,
thereim in carrying out the sa;me,"
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In taking the e~ceptions (Ab. 302) it was particularly pointed out and discussed with the court that this
instruction as to the ·Carrying out of the conspiracy,
permitted the conviction for any acts in any way connected with any 'Of the operations mentioned in the indictments, and .that in any view of the matter they would
.!have to participate in acts to carry out the conspiracy
knowing of the existence of the conspiracy. The court
suggested that he might put in .the word "knowingly".
It was then suggested that that would be insufficient because a p·erson might do what ne did knowingly, as
for example Stubeck's alleged collections, but that he
must know of the .conspiracy. The court, however, made
no ·Change in the instruction whatsoever. 'This instruction as to this character of conspiracy was cle'arly prejudicial.
1

This kind of instruction shows the misconception
of t'he court as to this charge. If the commission of substantive ·crime had been charged, then doing something
in the commission of that crime may have been some
evidence of an agreement to ·commit it. But here no
substantive crime was charged. It ·could not certainly
be left to the jury to decide that any act committed in
·connection with the operation of any of these operations would justify a conviction, and that is what these
instructions do.
( 3) The third general matter referred to abow
is dis·cussed at length under the gubdivision of this
brief with relation to the admission of declarations and
co.~duct of alleged conspirators wHJhout a foundation of
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agency. "\Ye haYe cited numerou~ casl~~ on thi~, including the lea'lici.ng· case of Terry rs. [.""n-ited States, 7 Fed..
(2d) 28, where the opinion said :
'• In other "~ords, a conspiracy i~ not an omnibus charge under which you can prove anything and e\erytbing and conYict of the sins of
a lifetime. * ~ ~ Proof that the plaintiff in error was guilty of another crime ""'as in itself
prejudicial,' '
Again this matter is confused and not covered although requested. There are statements, however, which
are cl-early misleading and contrary to the authorities
cited.
In instruction 13, after stating that if they believe
that a conspiracy as alleged existed, the instruction
says:
"then the court charges you that any statement
or declaration, if any, made by any or more of
such conspirators in furthemnce and pursuance
of said conspiracy or agreement and while carrying out the same and the said common unlawful
design or purpose and while it still was in progress, is admissible as against all persons engaged in such conspiracy or agreement, "' * * and
is admiHsible as against all persons engaged in
such conspiracy.'' ·This meant any conspiracy.

There is no instruction that these things cannot be
used to establish the conspiracy. This demarcation is
never made. In the requests (Ab. 282) this issue was
asked to be submitted. It w:as requested that in considering the matter of circumstantial evidence, ''you are
not to consider as proof of the conspiracy * * * any
statement or declaration, or alleged admission made by
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any alleged .conspirator. The existence of the conspiracy
charged ·cannot lbe established against any alleged conspirator :herein by evidence of the acts or declarations of
any ot:her alleged ·conspirator, done, or made in the
absence of the .conspirator sought to be ·Charged'', etc.
All defeilJdants then joined in request No. 11 (Ab.
292 where the folloWling was submitted, taken directly
from one of the cases ·cited supra and supported by all
the cases:
'' Y.ou are instructed that the offense of conspiracy ·Cannot be p·roved by statements or admissions of the defendants, or any of them, out of
the presence of the !others.''
The ·court never ·covered this point. The ·court did, however, give instru-ction 16, which misled the jury to the
contrary. This instruction also covered matters previously ·covered in the other instru·ctions and therefore
served to confuse the whole matter. This instruction
says that before they :eould find the defendants guilty
''you must find from facts in evid.ence from which it may
be reasonably inferred that the offense was committed",
and then coming to subdivision ( 4) thaJt ''the defendants
here, or either of them, conspired, agreed and eonfe~r
ated among themselves or with Ben Harmon, or with
9-olden Holt, or with Abe Stubeck to permit, allow and
assist'' houses of prostitution ''or permit, .allow and
assist'' lotteries, etc. Then ·Coming down to (5), that
''.at least one of the following overt acts was committed.'' I~t does not sa.y by whom on the overt acts, but
puts in Abe .stuheck as well as mentioning others (Ab.
273).
1
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The first part of this instruetion, · · .tJOU tnnst find
from facts in evidence. fronr 1chich it nta.y be rea.so·nably
inferred", and this applies to all the sulbdiYisions of tha't
instruction, is direetly contrary to the holding: in Terry
rs. United Sta.tes. 7 Fed. (:2d) :28, 1chercin the ft·i.al court
instructed that if they found that the ac.ts of the parties
and under the circumstances shown in the PYitlt)nce and
the conditions surrounding them '" giYe rise to a reasonable and just inference that they were done ns the result
of a previous agreement, then yon are justified in finding ~that a eonspiraey existed between them to do those
acts.'' The opinion &ays that the foregoing ''does not
contain a correct statem.ent of the laze" and adds:
''The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution must so distinctly indicate the guilt of the
aooused as to leave no reasonable expl'anation of
them which is consistent with the prisoner's innocence.'' (Citing authorities).
And that was a case where a substantive offense was
charged.
Now, subdivision (-!) of this instruction 16 above
quoted just simply tells the jury that they can convict
here on any kind of a side agreement between -any of
the defendants or Holt or Stubeck either in connection
with prostitution ''or'' the gambling operations. This
~ounts to an instruction contrary to the requests and
contrary to the law as cited hereinabove at length with
relation to separate offenses or separate conspiracies.
: · . Subdivision ( 5) of this instruction 16 tells the jury
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fies the statute as to overt acts, whether committed !by
any of the defendants or by any pe.rson shown by the
evi1dence to be a party to the agreement ~alleged, and
without any indica;tion that it must be after such foundation, and by a party actim.g with knowledge of the agreement :and in furtherance thereof.
The fourth matter, which is technical but quite
serious here and to which objeetion w:as taken, is in
instruction 15 (Ab. 271). This instruction in the first
part reads:
''You are instructed that if you fbelieve that
either Officer Holt .or the witness Stubeck, or
both of them, collected money as they testified~''
( 4)

Mr. Stubeck did not so testify, but testified exactly to the
contrary, that he had never .gone wit!h Kempner and
·colle·cted money from these pool halls, as testified, ei1ther
at the time testified or at any other time. Of course the
!balance of the instruction should not have been given in
view of the fact that Stube·ck was never in any way
conneeted with t:he agreement :here and any conduct of
his could not pTove the agreement alleged.
This instruction plainly assumes the fa,ct that Stubeck colleeted the money as the court says he testified
that he did.
State v. Hwnna, 21 Pac. (2) 537 ( Ut).
In this case this Court held ag.ain that such an assumption was error.
T'he Court at 540 says:
"Tihat it is Hrror for the court in instructing the
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verted fact is held by thi~ eourt in ~tate Y. SPymour, 49 Utah, ~85. 163 P. 7~~l 4H~. wlH\rl\ tht\
court, spooking through Chief ,l n~tiel\ Frick,
savs: 'Courts, in charging juror~. ~hould be vpry
ca~eful not to assun1e any material faet or fact~.
Jurors, "~ho a.re lnymen. ·are ah,·ay~ eager to
follow the opinion or judgment of the court. and
if the court assumes any material fac.t in the
charge, the jurors are most likely to folio\\~ the
assumptions of the c.ourt. Indeed. w·e must assume that such is the case unless the record
clearly sho-ws the contrary.' ''
In addition to the authorities heretofore cited
Weniger vs. ['"nited States. ±7 Fed. (2d) 692, recites:

'''The crime of conspiracy consists in the
combining or confederating of two or more persons * =~= * Neither will the commission of an
overt act. though unlawful in itself, be enough
to show that the actor was a party to the conspiracy. The law requires proof of the common
.and unlawful design and the knowing participation therein of the persons charged as conspirators before a conviction is justified.''
This recital alone, that Stubook had so testified, requires a reversal here under the authorities.

Holland v. State, 206 S. W. 89 (Tex.)
We cite this case :finally as supporting the discussion under No. 3 of this topic and also as having a more
general bearing upon the question of error here in the
refusal of our requests. In this case a request was refused and as here, no instruction was given on the
point. For this error the conviction was reversed .
. .T~e instruction requested was as follows:
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'' 'Gentlemen of the Jury: You are instructed that you cannot ·consider the acts and declarations of Norvin Holland and Hill Holland made
in the abs-ence of defendant, for the purpose of
proving a conspiracy; but you must find from
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that a
.conspiracy was formed before you would be perm.itted to consider said ·acts and declarations of
said Norvin H olla;nd a;nd Hill Holland for a'MJ
purpose whatever.' ''
The opinion s:ays this request correctly stated the
law.

GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS COVERED
Assignments 7, 8, 9 and 10 (Ab. 317) dealing 'vith
the over-ruling of .defendants' motion for a non-suit,
and separately for a direeted verdict and in receiving
and entering a veDd.ict, ~are covered by the preceding discussion as to the sufficiency of the evidence and also as
to the nature of and the: ·e1imination of evidence. These
matters were brought to the Court's attention by these
general motions and also motio~s to strike. (Ab. 159-168,
247-252). This was in addition to motions made throug·hout the trial.
Assignments 18, 20, 22 and 31 are covered also by
the preceding idliscussion. Tlhese relrate to the insufficiency of the evidence and particularly to its insufficiency
under the rule as to circumstantial evid.ence, and also
to the over-ruling and denial of appeUants' motions
in arrest of judgment and for a new trial.

AS.SIGNMENTS

~COVERED

BY AD,OPTION OF
ERWIN BRIElF
Assignments of error 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 (Alb. 316-17),
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are no"- coyered by the adoption oft la\ brit"\f filPd ht\rein
in this case on behalf of defendant E. B. Erwin. This

brief discusses the issues therein contained and the
matters of over-ruling the n1otions to quash the indietmen.t .and objootions to the Bill of Pa.rtirular~, and othlH.
matters in connection with the pleading·s as therein referred to. The defendants Harry Finch and R. 0.
Pearce do not waive these :assignments but do adopt
the argument in the brief of the defendant Erwin filed
herein in respect to said assignments, "'ithout repeating the argument and brief on these ma•tters herein.
1

POIXTS IX OONCLUSIOX
The point is made throughout this brief that the
evidence is insufficient to support the charge actually
alleged. Defendants are not called upon to meet any
other charge. It will be noticed in this connection that
beginning with the Bill of Particulars the charge is departed from. It recites that houses of prostitution operated, that lotteries operated, that gambling in licensed
card rooms operated, all in Salt Lake City. These, of
course, always operated. The Bill of Particulars then
recites that the defendants permitted and allowed these
things to operate. T·his was not the charge. It was the
misconception upon which the case was tried. The Bill of
ParticuLars proceeds to blame the defendants for !these
vices. It then alleges collection of money for which it
attempts to blame defendants. This, again, was not the
charge.
We have next the opening statement of the attorney, containing no reference to the agreement or any
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confed·eration of any kind or any conne-ction between
the {1efendants, but charging ·the defendants with miscellaneous and isolHted wrongdoing and alleged omis'Sions with relation to alleged vice. These recitals were
very damaging, but again this was not the charge, and
the whole statement, if true, and if established, did not
sustain the charge. The principle portions of the statement 'and the most damaging parts w·ere never proved.
Then w-e come to the testimony, and again we have
miscellaneous insinuations of separate wrongdoing and
omissions but no testimony of probative legal proof of
the agreement. T·his we have ·claS'si:fied under (1) testimony as to the operations, which always will Hnd always have gone on in substantially the s:ame manner
as shown in the testimony; tas to this their appears
to be no dispute. Under (2) we have .classified the te~
timony of alleged admissions and have shown ·the damaging nature of these long ·recitals of vice, of alleged
payoff at times incidental thereto, and containing in·timations of wrongdoing by individuals. The authorities
cited under this division of tbe brief, w.e believe, establsh that this tes1timony does not support the conviction
of the offense charged in the indictment .and. w:as almost, if not entirely, erroneously admitted in that it
involved no admission of the offense charged. This was
inadmissible for the other reasons and under the authorities. ·cited in the division of the brief with relation totestimony under classification (2). Error on this was also
carried into the ins.tructions.
Under classification ( 3) we have considered the
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intimations of va.rious matter~ of isolated tnisconduot,
which it seemed to us "ya~ erroneously adtnitterl. It was
in line with the Bill of Particulars and "~ith the opPniug
statement and the general purpose here of blackening
the defendants in any conooiVI&ble way. The authorities
cited under the division of the brief "·ith relation to
testimony under classification ( 3) sho\Y, we believe, that
this evidence does not serve to support the conviction
of .the offense charged, and· for the most ~art was erroneously admitted. When taken in connection with the
Bill of Particul-ars, which was read, the opening and
closing arguments of counsel, and the conduct of counsel
throughout and the voluntary statements made by him
with ·referen~ to defendants, this was clearly prejudicial. T-his error also was in the ins trnctions.
With reference to the testimony under classification
(4), we lbe1ieve the authorities conclusively prove that
the conduct and statements of individual defendants referred to in statements introduced and made out of
court by other defendants or by other persons, could
not be used to prove the agreement, that the agreement
was never proved independently thereof, and that these
were erroneously admitted, and being incompetent and
also immaterial to the issue charged here, were in addition prejudicial. This is especially true when, as
shown in the later subdivisions, the error .as to .this and
in fact as to the previous classifications, was carried
throughout the instructions.
With relation to the discnssion of the insufficiency
of the testimony to sustain the charge, the authorities
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cited elimina:te from ·consideration, substantial portions
of tha.t discussed generally under these four classificat~ons. In addition we have pointed to re:asons and authority why (a) the tes,timony of Kempner as to Stubeck's
conduct and s:tatements should he eliminated and its admission was also prejudicial; (b) why the testimony of
Golden Holt ·cannot be ·considered as supporting the
verdiet here- under the authorities ·cited in the division
of the lbrrief as to his te-s:timony; and (c) that the testimony of H. K. Record does not support the eha.rge but
rel1ates to a sepa:r:a.te attemptea ~agreement that was by
his own testimony never entered1 into; and (d) why evidence of different :and smaller conspiracies was not admissible as proof of the general agreement and conspiracy alleged; and finally on this matter, that the
s~a.me testimony as to Mr. Pearce :and Mr. Er,vin, from
the same witnesses, to establish the same fact as between the s:ame· parties is not available here as establishing that fact. This is for the reason that the ultim:a1te
fact of re-ceipt of earnings from prostitution, knowing
it to be from such operation, is the very fact from 'v-bicb
they seek to have an inference of guilt drawn here, and
that fact was adjudicated and determined in the other
proceeding. Such prior 1determination, under the authorities cited, is ·conclusive.
The division of the brief under improper statements and conduct of the district attorney, we believe
also shows prejudici~al conduct. This is somewha;t involved in the next sulbdivision discussing the improper
admission of matte-rs of evidence, particularly a·s to the
specific i terns referred to under this, and incorporating
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the discussion and· authoritiP~ ritPd under the ela.ssification of testimony as discusse..i under t host~ sepa.rate
headings.· All this goes ·also to the n~sign1nents that
defendants were not accorded a. fair trial.
Coming to ~the in~truction~. 'vhile \Vt:~ haYP not dise~s·sM these at great length. "ye hHYe sh<.n,·n, '"e believe, the error of the court in refusing: (a) the requests as to the alleged admissions by conduct; and (b)
the requests as to the matter of other and isolated
misconduct which is so seriously confused in the record,
and in this connection the matter of t·he request
with relation to separate conspiracies. On this, the court
not only refused to instruct on these matters, but gave
instructions clearly indicating to the jury that the defendants could be found guilty here for misconduct
in connection with the operations mentioned and for
separate conspiracies. This was particularly emphasized in the quotations from instruction 16. And also
(c) in the .matter of the request for an instruction that
the conspir-acy could not be proved, nor could the connection of any defendant therewith be proved by statements of another alleged conspirator or other person
~entioning or attempting to involve such absent defendant This was another vital issue, and again the instructions of the court are misleading to the effect that
sue~ matters could lbe used to connect.
Tlhere is· also the add[ tional point made that the
court -stated. to the jury that Mr. Stubeck had testified
that he collected money, when in fact· he testified to the
contrary.:. It. is, of ·course, true that his collection of
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money would have no tendency to prove the ag~eement,
but, nevertheless, it was not his testimony that he was
collecting and that the money was being distributed to
Erwin and his ·Crowd. None of this was his testimony;
he denied it; and in view of the fact that defendants
must have been convi~cted for 'Such matters as this, the
instruction becomes prejudicial.
It is quite obvious from the fact that Mr. Thacker,
who ·was head of the anti-vioe squad, was acquitted,
that the jury lost ·entire- track of any agreement,
because if these vices or the allowance of these operations was proof of an 'agreemen~ by these defendants,
such .an agreement would have to involve Mr. Thacker,
as head of the vi,ce squad, as he was the very person
who could show leniency or could condone any of such
operations. If he was not a p~a.rty thereto, as the jury
£ound, no s-uch ;agreement could operate.
The fact is, that in this case, a very serious InJUStice has been done, particularly to Mr. Finch. He was
not given a fair trial, that is olbvious. He is not guilty
on this record of the offense charged here, nor is he
guilty in fact. He is a man well along in years, selected
by the Inembers of the City Commission, Wlho personally
knew his long honest service in the Parks Department of
the City Commission, and had and have every confidtence
in his integrity. H·e has been unfairly imposed upon
and disgraced. He was wJ~hout police ·experience, and
with a police depar.tm·ent that he had to take as it was
under the civil service r·egul:ations. He was convicted
largely upon uncorroborated testimony of this man Holt,
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who absolutely and clearly betrayed Mr. Finch, nnd
then ha:s attempted to disgrac.e hi1n to snYt' hi~ ow11 hirlP.
It is a miscarriage of justice "~hieh oan ne,~t:'r "·hnlly h~
rectified.

. As to Mr. Pearce, there a.re intimations in this record of wrongful cond.uct. These intimations he was not.
ealled upon to refute or ~iefend against, booause he had
10nce defended thereon and been acquitted, a.nd because
here this was not the charge. So "·e do not haYe his story
with relation to these intimations. He is not gwilty, and
by no stretch of the imagination can it be indicated
here that there is evidence of his guilt of the offense
charged of agreeing with these \'arious people to permit or allow or assist the operations alleged. There
isn't the slightest intimation of such an agreement by
bim. There is no connection with these operations s·hown
on his part, and he, as a layman, had no power to permit or allow such operations, and absolutely no control
over them. The fact attempted to be established here of
the receipt of money from prostitution, which is the intimation of wrongdoing contained in this record, was
tried and proved to be an untrue charge.

The admission by the Court here of tJhe record in
that cas·e 10785 bringing ~t to the attention of the jury
-and :then the withdrawal of it by the Court .after the
close of the trial, when it was the only evidence introduced by this defendant, and the refusal to permit the
matter to be mentioned in argument to the jury and
then the instruction to the jury (A'b. 79) that they were
not to consider this af all, was not only erroneous in
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substance and thus prejudicial, but was. prejudicial
also beeaus·e of its separate effect upon Mr. P·earce·'s
pos1irtion with the jury.
He was not tried, nor was any defendant tried upon
the charge alleged in the indictment, nor was that charge
proved ·against any defendant here, nor were the d~
f endants here given a £air trial.
We believe it has been es'tablished that the judgment a.s against these defendants. should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

H. L. MULLINER,
Attorney for Appellants,
Harry Finch and R. 0. Pearce.
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